Frontispiece.

H. Gravelot inv.

N. Parr Sculp.

Frontispiece.

H. Gravelot inv.

N. Parr Sculp.

CIRCE,

Tranſlated from the ITALIAN of

John Baptiſt Gelli,

OF THE

ACADEMY of FLORENCE.

Otii Cato reddendam operam putat.
Præf. Juſt. Hiſt.

LONDON:
Printed for R. DODSLEY at *Tully's* Head in *Pall-mall.* 1745.

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



Cosimo de Medici Duca di Firenze

N: Parr Sculp

H. Gravelot inv. T. Bafire fcul.

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

ALLEN

Lord *Bathurſt.*

MY LORD!

THE *obſcure Merit* of my Author, I am perſuaded, will be a ſufficient Recommen-

 dation

dation to your Lordſhip, who has through Life ſhewn, that it gives a generous Mind equal Pleaſure to call true Merit into Light from any Diſadvantages, as to do it Juſtice and Honour when ſhining in its proper Sphere. This proves a Heart well refin'd both from Pride and Envy, Paſſions that too often render Men entruſted with ſuperior Fortunes, uſeleſs or hateful to the World, and unhappy in themſelves. By ſuch, Men of Genius muſt expect to be treated like the Glow-worm, which though it ſtrikes every

Ob-

Obſerver with Admiration, is paſs'd coldly by and left to adorn a Ditch. A happy Concurrence of Circumſtances engaged your Lordſhip early in the ſtricteſt Ties of Friendſhip with Men of that Sort of Greatneſs, which Deſert alone can give; Men of that Caſt of Mind, which is never ſuſpected of baſe or ſelfiſh Views. In a Word, whoſe Familiarity could have been purchas'd with nothing leſs than an engaging Diſpoſition, an enlarged Underſtanding, and a Parity of Turn for Converſation. The

Obſervation might be ſufficiently juſtified by your long Intimacy with Dean *Swift*, Mr. *Addiſon*, and Biſhop *Atterbury*, than whom none were ever more nice or diſintereſted in the Choice of a few Friends.

But I can ſcarce forbear exclaiming

Oh! noctes cœnæque Deûm----

When I remember to have ſeen at your Lordſhip's Table, my Lord *Lanſdown*, Mr. *Prior*, Mr. *Congreve*, Mr. *Gay*, Mr. *Fenton*, and Mr. *Pope*; whom I reſerve for the laſt, as Hea-

ven

ven has done. Thus *Virgil*, in deſcribing a Group of ſuch Maſter-Spirits, concludes with his principal Figure,

His dantem jura Catonem.

Theſe are a Sort of Companions that always know their Friend, and from whom He is ſure to be known and will be judg'd of by Poſterity.

For Time who, as the Virtuoſi aſſure us, ſoon devours the frail Materials with which Folly or Envy attempts to diſguiſe genuine Inſcriptions, never fails to preſent the Original Charac-

ters freſh and fair, and more happily preſerv'd by the very Arts employ'd to injure them.

I am,

My Lord,

Your moſt obliged

Humble Servant,

H. Layng.

THE PREFACE.

IT may be expected, (and I would not have the Reader every way disappointed) that I ſhould ſay ſomething of a certain Paraphraſe, Traducement, Carricattura, or what you pleaſe, of this Book, by the late Mr. Thomas Brown *of facetious Memory. And I can ſafely ſay, that if I could, upon a ſtrict and diſagreeable Enquiry, have met with his Tranſlation ſooner, it would have ſaved me the Trouble of making this: and if I had not found his at all, it would have ſaved me that*

of

of printing mine. But it appeared to me ſo contrary to the Character of a Writer once in the higheſt Eſteem, though ſince almoſt loſt, by being condemn'd by the Inquiſition, that he ſeemed to ſuffer as wrongfully from his Tranſlator as from his Judges. And I muſt own it gives me a Pleaſure, which I hope is of the generous Kind, to think that I have endeavour'd to reſcue a worthy Perſon from bad Company that had uſed him ill; and put him into a Capacity of delivering his natural Senſe without the expreſſive Epithets of Billinſgate, *the flowing Eloquence of Water-Language, or the ſtrong Metaphors of a Gin-Shop.*

Perhaps, after all, Mr. Brown, *for he was a Wag, intended to adapt his Performance to the Subject, by giving, inſtead of a Verſion, a Metamorphoſis of his Author; and like that before him too, by changing a Philoſopher into a Beaſt. If ſo, never was Writer more happily brutaliz'd. And ſure that Pen muſt*

muſt be able to work as mighty Wonders as Circe's *Wand, that could convert an excellent Moral, convey'd with all the Advantages of Learning and Purity of Language, enliven'd with a moſt pleaſing Fable, into a pert flat Compoſition cook'd up to be a Claſſic for an Alehouſe. It may be no more proper to refer the Reader to the whole Book, than it would be polite to ſend a delicate Perſon to a Place that he might convince himſelf of its Offenſiveneſs. But a curſory Examination ſhew'd me that in the very Title-Page he miſrepreſents the Intention of the Author, which he ſays was to diſplay the Infelicities of human Life. A moſt delightful and uſeful Plan truly! Whereas* Gelli *in the Epiſtle Dedicatory declares, that he propoſes to ſhew how thoſe Evils may be avoided, which from a wrong Choice Man brings upon himſelf. Theſe Accounts of the Book are ſo unlike, that leſt he ſhould be confronted by the Pages immediately following, from mere Mo-*

deſty

deſty he leaves out the whole Dedication. If he were only to be charg'd with Faults of this kind, I mean, only falſe or miſchievous Repreſentations, they might be eaſily pointed out and anſwer'd. But there is an Air of Buffoonry that runs almoſt through the whole, to which no Man can be hardy enough to reply, that would not fence with Harlequin, or diſpute in Syllogiſm with Merry-Andrew. From Page 50 *to* 55 *there are intolerable Indecencies, to which the Original gives not the leaſt Countenance. Page* 82, 154 *monſtrous:* 165, 184, 186, *to* 190, 230, 240, 251, *to ſay the beſt of it, all his own. From* 159 *to* 161 *he makes an unnatural Excurſion to abuſe his Majeſty* Lewis XIV *of* France, *for no other poſſible Reaſon but becauſe he dar'd.* Starne, *p.* 208, *which he renders* Stares *from the Similitude of Sounds, ought to be red-legg'd Partridges. Page* 95, *inſufferable Buffoonry, which there is not a Word in this Author to juſtify.*

Page

Page 78 *he tells us, as a* bon mot, *that Wealth is like a ruinous Building* [Sceſe] *which generally falls in the weakeſt Place. Now though this Obſervation be ſo very juſt, that I dare ſay it will hold good in all Kinds of Architecture military and civil; yet I ſhould rather ſay, that Riches like a Catarrh or Defluxion, for ſo the Word alſo ſignifies, tend to the weakeſt Part.*

This little out of much, I think ſufficient to ſhew that Gelli *has been abus'd; it remains to prove that he deſerv'd better Treatment. Now when we would ſpeak of the Eſteem an Author was in during his Life, we ſhould conſider the Character of the Age and Country in which he lived. For as to ſay that a Writer was in vogue here at Court in the Days of our King* James *the Firſt, ſeems to carry in it more of Satire than Panegyric: So what can be a higher Encomium, than to have been admir'd at* Florence *in the* 16*th Century, and under that excellent Judge and more*

than

than princely Patron of learned Men, Coſmo *the Firſt?*

This has been very juſtly ſtiled the third Age of the World, in which the Liberal Arts have been rais'd to ſuch Perfection as to ſtand for Epochas, for Gages of human Wit: like thoſe Marks on the Obelisk, that ſhew how high the Waters of the Nile *have reach'd, but which they have never exceeded.*

The firſt Age, which yielded ſo luxuriant a Crop of Poets, Philoſophers, Orators, Hiſtorians, Painters and Sculptors, is the time a little preceding Philip *of* Macedon, *and laſting ſomewhat after* Alexander *the Great.*

The ſecond is bounded on one Side * *by* Cæſar *and* Cicero, *on the other by* Suetonius *and* Tacitus.

The third is that ever-memorable Æra for Chriſtendom, when Conſtantin Paleologus *was expell'd the* Greek *Empire by* Mahomet *the Second. Then*

* *See* Pieces fugitives par Voltaire. *And* Giambullari dell' Origne della Lingua Fiorentina, altramenti ill Gello.

it

it was that the Arts, flying before an Inundation of barbarous Eaſtern Enthuſiaſts, were receiv'd, careſs'd, and almoſt ador'd by the Princes of the Houſe of Medici. *Nor was their Patronage ill beſtow'd, which within the Compaſs of a Century gave birth to the* Michael Angelos, Raphaels, Titians, Arioſtos *and* Taſſos. Leo *the Tenth laid out the public Spirit ſo peculiar to his Family in reviving the Taſte of ancient* Rome; *which it muſt be own'd he retriev'd to ſuch a Degree, that the Genius of the* Auguſtan *Age ſeem'd to awake fully refreſh'd from a ſound Sleep of above a thouſand Years.*

The Province left for Coſmo *was to correct and poliſh his own native Language. To effect this, he erected a learned Society at* Florence *call'd the* Cruſca. Gelli, *or* Gello, *for he is indifferently call'd either, was ſo diſtinguiſh'd a Member of that Academy, that he is frequently called its ſecond Founder. To execute this Plan of their Prince,*

Gelli

Gelli *publiſh'd a Treatiſe* della Lingua Toſcana, *and* Giambullari, *who was reckoned one of the moſt learned Men in* Italy, * *printed another* dell' Origine della Lingua Fiorentina, *which, as a Teſtimony of his great Eſteem, he entitled,* Il Gello. *Theſe two with the concurrent Labours of their Brethren brought the* Tuſcan *Language to ſuch Perfection, that it has ever ſince been eſteem'd the Standard* Italian, *and all the reſt are look'd upon as ſo many Dialects of it. So that I think we have gain'd one Point for* Circe, *from what has been ſaid of its Author, that probably, as* Hamlet *ſays of his Play, the Original was wrote in excellent* Italian. *And I believe it would be very difficult to find a Book, that could give ſo juſt an Idea of the State of Literature of that Age and Country.*

The Circe *was ſoon tranſlated into the principal Tongues of* Europe; *and*

* Giambullari paſſa pour un des plus ſçavans Hommes d'Italie. *See* Ghilini Theat. des Hommes illuſt.

has

has the Honour of giving Birth to the * *philoſophical Idiom which was by It firſt introduced into the modern Languages.*

His Skill in Criticiſm may be collected from the many Lectures he publiſhed on the Poetry of Dante: *As may his Knowledge in philoſophical Matters from the Treatiſes which he was prevailed upon by the urgent Entreaties of* Simon Portius †, *to tranſlate for him from his Works into* Italian.

I find Gelli *alſo a Writer of Reputation in the way of Wit, as Author of two Comedies,* La Sporta, *and* L'Errore: *But the* Capricii del Bottaio, *or Humours of the Cooper, is ſo capital a Piece of Drollery, that Monſ.* Duchat *in his Notes upon* Rabelais *on ſome of the moſt humorous Paſſages, ſays, that if the Dates of the Publication of the two Pieces would allow*

* Vide Fontanini della Eloquenza Italiana, p. 117.

† *See* l'Autheur de la Vie des Academiciens de Florence.

of it, Il n'heſiteroit point a croire, que Rabelais l'auroit paraphraſé.

He alſo tranſlated, one would think to ſhew the Verſatility of his Pen, the Tragedy of Hecuba *from* Euripides: *and was engag'd in a Work that requir'd an intimate Acquaintance with the* Latin *Tongue, by* Paulus Jovius, *who himſelf was even in thoſe high Times by common Conſent ſtiled*

Romanæ gloria Linguæ.

Now to have been diſtinguiſh'd by ſome Proofs of Approbation by the foremoſt Writer of the Age in which one lives, I think too great an Honour, not to be claim'd for my Author, ſince I muſt always eſteem it the greateſt that ever happen'd to myſelf.

This I have the more inſiſted on, becauſe the great Thuanus *ſays of* Gelli *roundly, that he had not the leaſt ſmattering of* Latin *. *From whence I could not but make this Reflexion upon volu-*

* Nullis Litteris Latinis tinctus.

minous

minous Writers, that if it be very pardonable when Sleep ſometimes ſteals upon them, it is very deplorable that during that Interval ſo many Dreams ſhould iſſue into Light through the Ivory Gate.

It was the more effectually to ſecure Gelli *from this falſe Repreſentation, that I have in a few Notes pointed out the Paſſages of the* Greek *and* Roman *Writers that he tranſlates or alludes to; which though they are few in compariſon of what might eaſily have been produc'd, will, with what has been ſaid, ſufficiently evince the great Extent and Variety of his Learning.*

A Writer of his Knowledges, as well as Humour, might certainly have more enliven'd the Fable by Epiſodes, Deſcriptions and Machinery; but it required juſt as much Judgment as His to keep the Moral ſtill in view. And he is contented with only as much Fiction as was neceſſary to keep the Diſcourſe from ſtagnating into a hea-

vy Lecture, without being too ſolicitous about changing the Scenes or diverſifying the Characters of his Speakers. But herein he follows Cicero's *Advice in a ſimilar Caſe, who blames* Ariſto, *in his Treatiſe of Old Age founded on the poetical Story of* Tithonus, *for indulging too much in the fabulous Part, which muſt give an Air of Levity very improper for the Deſign. As there is nothing more frequent than for injudicious Painters in the Glare of a meretricious Colouring to loſe the Dignity as well as Simplicity of the Subject. But* Gelli *carries us, like ſome* Roman *Road, a ſhort becauſe a ſtraight Way; on a moderate Eminence that preſents us incidentally with delightful Proſpects, but never leads us from our Point for the ſake of them.*

TO

TO THE

Moſt illuſtrious and excellent Prince

COSMO de MEDICI,

Duke of FLORENCE.

OF all Creatures in the Univerſe, Man alone ſeems to me, moſt excellent and ſerene Prince, to have it in his Power to chooſe for himſelf both his preſent Condition, and his ultimate End. And in purſuit of his Deſign, he may proceed clear of any natural Impulſe, under the ſole Influence of his own Free-will. Whereas who conſiders carefully the Nature of his fellow Creatures, according to their reſpective Species, will find certain Directions conſtituted under unalterable Laws, by the great Author of all Things, which they are not to violate in order to render their appointed Condition

better or worſe. But Man is at Liberty to make his Option of the State that pleaſes him beſt. *Proteus* was not more ſuſceptible of the Shape, nor the Cameleon of the Colour that he likes to aſſume. He may be either a groſs Animal or a divine Creature; and quit any old Track for what new Courſe he pleaſes to prefer. Hence it is plain, that if he be fixed by hard Fate or a wrong Judgment in ſuch a Situation, as to converſe only with ſenſible Objects, and to have his Eyes ſo wholly turned towards them as never once to be caſt up towards Heaven, his Lot is little different from the Beaſts, or rather is not to be diſtinguiſhed from that of Animals quite devoid of Reaſon. Again, when he can extricate himſelf and return to his true and proper Employment; can ſoar from low and baſe Concers, to ſublime and pure Entertainments, he arrives at the Perfection of his Nature, like thoſe happy Spirits, who beyond the Limits of this corruptible Worlds paſs their Exiſtence

iſtence in the Contemplation of divine Truths. This I have endeavoured to demonſtrate and to recommend, as it is the Duty of every one, according to his Abilities, in the Courſe of the following Dialogues, built upon the Plan of the very learned *Plutarch.*

And as Man is naturally led to expreſs his Adoration of the Deity, not only by his Heart and Lips, but by ſome viſible Sign, ſome Offering of the beſt he has: ſo is it the indiſpenſable Duty of Subjects to pay the Tribute of Honour in the beſt manner they can to their Prince. Who, to uſe the Language of the ſame Philoſopher *Plutarch*, is the expreſs Image and Repreſentative, in his peculiar Diſtrict, of the great univerſal Love diffuſed through the World. I therefore, being both by Nature and by Choice a Subject of your Serene Highneſs, and being ſenſible from all the Motives of Gratitude under what various Obligations I am to pay my Devoirs, that my Inclinations may atone

for

for the Defects of my Abilities, have presumed with all Humility to present you with the following poor Compositions. Hoping still, that as the same supreme Being in all his Majesty rejects not the meanest Offering of the humble and the sincere; so you, Sir, will be pleased to accept of this small Gift only as the best Thing I had to present. How unworthy it will appear of your Greatness, and how short of my Obligations, I am but too sensible, and therefore must conclude that I once more pray you only to regard the good Intentions of one that desires nothing more than to serve you, and to prove himself, as in Duty bound,

Sir,

Your faithful and
devoted Servant,

Dated at Florence 1548,
the First of March.

John Baptist Gelli.

The ARGUMENT.

Ulyſſes *returning to* Greece *from the Deſtruction of* Troy, *being driven by contrary Winds to many different Parts of the World, arrived at length at the Iſland of* Circe. *Where being courteouſly received, he ſtayed ſome Time to enjoy the Favours of the Goddeſs. But having an invincible Deſire of ſeeing once more his native Country, he demanded Licence to depart; and at the ſame Time inſiſted that ſhe ſhould change back into Men, all the* Greeks *that ſhe had transformed into divers Animals about her, and give them full Liberty to return with him to their own Homes. The Enchantreſs readily complies with his Requeſt upon this Condition, that he ſhould aſk this Favour for thoſe only that deſired it themſelves; and that all the reſt ſhould remain with her,*

her, to finiſh their Lives under the Shape of thoſe Beaſts they then repreſented. And that he might come at their real Sentiments, ſhe by art Magick reſtored to each of them the ſame Power of Language they enjoyed in their human Form. Ulyſſes *traverſes the whole Iſland, and frequently makes his Propoſals, but every one for Reaſons which he gives peculiar to himſelf, obſtinately refuſes to accept of the Offer, and declares that he will by no means quit his preſent Condition to turn Man again. At length he meets with one who, convinced of the Excellency of the human Nature from the Superiority the Underſtanding gives it over other Animals, intreats to become again the Man he was.* Ulyſſes *recovers him to his priſtine State; he, as 'tis natural to Man, returns his Thanks to God the Author of all that's great and good; and they in Tranſport ſet ſail for* Greece *together.*

CIRCE.

Face Dialo: 1.

H. Gravelot à veteri pictura delin.t

N. Parr. S

CIRCE.

Tranſlated from the *Italian* of

JOHN BAPTIST GELLI, *&c.*

DIALOGUE I.

Ulyſſes, Circe, *the Qiſter and the Mole.*

Ulyſſes. AND yet 'tis true, fair daughter of the Sun, illuſtrious *Circe!* amidſt this vaſt profuſion of delights, and full poſſeſſion of celeſtial charms, after ſo long an abſence, this ſtrong deſire of ſeeing home will ſuffer me to know nor reſt, nor peace. But e'er we part I beg to be reſolved, if there be any *Greeks* diſguiſed under the hideous forms of lions, wolves, bears, and other ſavages that glare upon us.

Circe.

Circe. As I can hide no truth from dear *Ulyſſes*, I fairly own there are; but why that queſtion?

Ulyſ. Let us a while enjoy the proſpect which that ſeat upon the rock commands, and I will tell you all. The infinite variety that will preſent itſelf to our view, will either furniſh diſcourſe, or ſerve to enliven it. The little action of the waves heav'd gently by the breeze diverſifies the ſcene; and the ſoft *Zephyrs* ſeem in their paſſage to have robbed the flowery ſhrubs of half their odours.

Circe. As I aim at nothing but to pleaſe you, you have nothing to do but to propoſe.

Ulyſ. The reaſon then, fair *Siren*, why I aſk if any *Greek* be concealed here under the figure of a beaſt is, becauſe I purpoſe, if ever *Ulyſſes* had any intereſt in that breaſt, to beg,—with tears to beg, that they may be recalled to their human ſhape, and be the glad companions of my voyage.

Circe. And what reaſon can you give for this requeſt?

Ulyſ. What reaſon? The pity that I feel for every wretched countryman, within this ſighing boſom. What bleſſings muſt they in tranſport pour upon me, to find themſelves redeemed from this ſo vile and miſerable a ſtate? Or elſe, what an eternal ſtamp of ignominy muſt my name be branded with, to

have

have it ſaid, this was the man that left his miſerable friends transformed to brutes, nor ever once endeavoured to reſcue them from the mean condition of the beaſtly herd?

Circe. But, on the contrary, if inſtead of all theſe bleſſings, all theſe thanks, to you and to the Gods, your flattering fancy promiſes, you find each moment from their recovery employed in bittereſt curſes, and moſt execrable vows, how will it repent the generous *Ulyſſes* of his miſplaced benevolence, and too officious love?

Ulyſ. Ha! ha! to recover a loſt friend from beaſt to man, muſt, without doubt, prove an unpardonable injury.

Circe. Ay, moſt unpardonable.—But make the trial—I conſent—only with this proviſo, that this be practiſed on none but who themſelves are willing to ſubmit to it.

Ulyſ. Agreed; but how can this be done? How ſhall I know their inclinations, ſince, poor wretches! I ſhall neither underſtand them, nor they me. This, *Circe*, ſavours too ſtrongly of a banter.

Circe. As for that I beg you'll give yourſelf no trouble; that's already granted.

Ulyſ. Granted! What? That they ſhall have the uſe of language, and the ſame language that they uſed before their metamorphoſis.

Circe.

Circe. The ſame. The power that converted them into brutes, ſhall now be exerciſed in recalling their paſt ideas, and the full force of all their reaſon *. To loſe no longer time, d'ye ſee two ſhells that ſtick upon that rock? See! now they open, now they cloſe again. A little o' this ſide (d'ye mark me?) is a ſmall heap of earth, not far from the water, at the foot of yonder palm-tree.

Ulyſ. I ſee them both diſtinctly.

Circe. The ſhells contain an oiſter, and the hillock harbours a mole; both were men, both *Greeks*, as you will find by their diſcourſe. And that you may examine them with the greater freedom, I will remove to ſome diſtance, and divert myſelf along the ſtrand, where, when you fully have ſatisfied your curioſity, you may be ſure to find me; and when you have *their* conſent, you freely ſhall have *mine*. *Exit.*

Ulyſ. ſolus. Why this is a maſter-piece of her art! But is it poſſible that by her powerful charms, they ſhall be able both to converſe and reaſon with me? I muſt own it ſeems to me ſo much to paſs the bounds of probability, that I ſcarce dare riſk the banter it expoſes me to. But then, ſay, who is here to laugh at me? None but herſelf; and it muſt be beneath the ſprightly humour of a

* Νῆϊς ἦν ἴμπης ὡς τε παῖς ἀταλὸν τε νήπιος. Hom. Od. x. 240.

God-

Goddeſs to lay ſo dull a ſcheme, as to draw in a friend to expoſe himſelf, merely for the poor ill-natured pleaſure of laughing at him. Well — then 'tis reſolved — and I'll begin. But how? For I know no other names for theſe people than that of the animals they repreſent. Let us try then: You Oiſter; maſter Oiſter.

Oiſter. What would *Ulyſſes* have with me?

Ulyſ. My name too! now am I quite aſhamed not to be able to return the compliment: but anſwer, and boldly too, if, as *Circe* ſays, thou art a *Greek.*

Oiſt. I anſwer rather that I *was* a *Greek*; I have reaſon to remember it: I lived near *Athens*, my name was *Ithacus*, and I was miſerable enough to be a fiſherman.

Ul. Then I congratulate thee, old *Oiſter*, that thou haſt found a friend, who hearing that thou waſt born a man, out of the univerſal love he bears his ſpecies, and above all, his countrymen the *Greeks*, has undertaken to entreat the Goddeſs, that ſhe will inſtantly reſtore thee to thy former ſhape, and ſend thee a glad partner of his return.

Oiſt. I ſhould not be inſenſible of the force of that wiſdom and eloquence for which the ſage *Ulyſſes* ſo juſtly was renowned among the *Greeks*, were not the one employed to draw me from the uninterrupted happineſs

I now

I now enjoy, and the other proſtituted to reconcile me to manhood, the moſt miſerable eſtate any animal in the univerſe can be doomed to.

Ul. Sure, *Ithacus*, thy ſhape ſuffered leſs than thy underſtanding in the change.

Oiſt. If you ſpeak as you think, I am perſuaded that your underſtanding would not ſuffer by any change. But rallery apart, let us without prejudice examine the point, and you will find that I, who have experienced both eſtates, ſhall demonſtrate the truth of every thing I aſſert.

Ul. Come on then, for I love demonſtration dearly.

Oiſt. Attend then; but firſt I muſt demand your word of honour that, when I throw open my upper ſhell in order to exalt my voice, as muſt happen in the courſe of our dialogue, you will keep a ſtrict eye, that none of yon ſly villainous crabs chuck in a pebble, which they carry in their claws, between my ſhells, and ſo hinder me from ſhutting myſelf up.

Ul. What pray ſhould they do that for?

Oiſt. Only that they may gag me, and ſo thruſt in that ſame claw to tear me out and eat me *, that's all, Sir. And that's what

* *Veteratoriam hanc cancri calliditatem late deſcribunt* Oppian. Plut. Plin.

they

they are creeping up ſo cloſe to put in execution.

Ul. A very refined plot truly! But pray who taught you thus, either to ſecure yourſelf, or to foreſee their deſigns upon you?

Oiſt. Nature; that never fails us in neceſſaries.

Ul. Go on then; and ſpeak without ſuſpicion or fear, while I ſtand your pledge.

Oiſt. Have patience then, and tell me a little *Ulyſſes*, if you men, who pride yourſelves in being more perfect, and more wiſe, than other animals, by all the boaſted advantages of reaſon, if you, I ſay, don't always more value thoſe things that you eſteem to be better than others.

Ul. Certainly; the perfection of human reaſon conſiſts in diſcerning the value of things, and then ranging them in their proper claſſes, according to the degrees of their merit. To prize things equally muſt proceed from not being acquainted with the relations they ſtand in; and is an infallible ſign of ignorance.

Oiſt. And don't you love one thing more than another?

Ul. Yes; becauſe our love or hatred muſt riſe in proportion to the value we diſcover in any thing. Every thing that appears lovely muſt excite deſire, and whatſoever is unamiable muſt create diſlike.

Oiſt. If you love one thing more than another, will not that love expreſs itſelf in a greater concern for the thing beloved?

Ul. No doubt of it.

Oiſt. D'ye think Nature does not do the ſame thing? Or, which is all one, that Intelligence that directs Nature? And muſt not ſhe do it more effectually, it being impoſſible that Nature ſhould ever err; as I have heard your philoſophers a hundred times aſſert at *Athens*, when I have been with my pannier of fiſh in the ſchools?

Ul. That I grant too.

Oiſt. Nay then you grant all I contend for; if you allow ſo much, it muſt follow by juſt conſequence that we are your betters.

Ul. How ſo?

Oiſt. Becauſe if Nature takes more care of us, ſhe has more love for us, and that can only follow from the reaſon aforeſaid.

Ul. Why, who would have thought to find ſo much logick between a pair of ſhells? I proteſt, old fiſhmonger, I'll back thee againſt the firſt logician in all *Athens*.

Oiſt. I know not what you mean by your logick; I ſpeak the language that Nature dictates; and what ſhe ſuggeſts, if attended to, will always be found right.

Ul. As witneſs the propoſition before us; that ſhe ſets a higher degree of value upon the brute creation than on man.

Oiſt.

Oiſt. This is ſo evident a truth, that a ſmall degree of conſideration will give you the full force of the demonſtration. And to tire you but once for all, let us go back as far as we can, up to the firſt time that *either you or me* make our Appearance in the world: I mean, let us take our eſtimate from our birth-day. Now which of us two does ſhe ſeem to be moſt ſolicitous about? About thoſe that are dropt ſtark naked, and expoſed to the wide world; or thoſe that ſhe has been at the pains to ſet out thoroughly furniſht and equipt? This animal with a tough hide, that with a warm fur; this armed with ſcales, that beautifully adorned with feathers. Here I think one cannot long doubt whoſe preſervation ſhe ſeems to have moſt at heart.

Ul. That is not the reaſon why we are born naked, or covered with a ſkin ſo very delicate, that the ſlighteſt impreſſion is capable of offending us. The true reaſon of this was, becauſe as ſhe intended we ſhould exerciſe more than you all the internal ſenſes, eſpecially the imagination, in order to keep them in readineſs to ſerve the underſtanding, it was neceſſary that all our parts, particularly thoſe that are the immediate organs and inſtruments of ſenſation, ſhould be ſupplied with a fluid more active and ſubtle, more ſpirituous and capable of a higher degree of

rarefaction, than yours. Whereas, were we like you filled with foul humours, and heavy blood (from whence you are of a ſtronger texture, and of more robuſt limbs; but we generally longer lived, which by the by argues a better mixture in our conſtitution) our ſenſibility which is affected by very minute objects would like yours be but very ſlow and imperfect. For as your *Phiſiognomiſts* obſerve, our diſpoſitions depend upon the configuration of the parts *. He that reſembles a lion will behave like one; and the manners of a bear ever correſpond with the likeneſs of a bear. The obſervation holds good through our own ſpecies; thoſe that are compoſed of groſſer humours are of ſlower parts, and where you find the ſkin ſoft, and the fleſh ſupple, you may promiſe yourſelf a certain delicateneſs of apprehenſion. So that when Nature deſigned to make us rational creatures ſhe was obliged to make us juſt as we are.

Oiſt. I can never believe that ſhe which made all things, was under the impulſe of any neceſſity to determine her operations, which ſhe could accommodate to her own purpoſes; and could have purſued quite different methods, and other means to accompliſh her end. As for inſtance, ſhe could

* So *Ariſtotle* in *Phyſiognomicis*, and *Bapt. Porta.*

have

have given water the burning quality, and fire the freezing one.

Ul. Not with ſafety to that uniformity, that harmony, that we ſo juſtly admire, and is ſo conſpicuous, throughout the univerſe.

Oiſt. But if a different diſpoſition of things had better pleaſed her, different beauties muſt reſult from it, perhaps no way inferior to the preſent.

Ul. Nay if once we fall into gueſs-work, and bare poſſibilities, we muſt be loſt. But to return to our argument; what does it ſignify if ſhe did turn us out naked, and at the ſame time furniſhed us with either ſkill or ſtrength enough to ſtrip you of your ſkins to clothe ourſelves withal?

Oiſt. Ay, but how full of dangers many times is the attempt? How many have ſuffered in it? Not to inſiſt on the labour that muſt ſucceed: In the trouble of ſpinning, weaving, and dreſſing them, before they can be fit to be worn?

Ul. What you call labour is in truth a mere amuſement.

Oiſt. It may ſeem ſo to you; and for aught I know to others, who are quite at their eaſe; but aſk thoſe that live by theſe amuſements, and I am miſtaken if they don't call them by another name, and they are the beſt judges of the pleaſure of working. For my own part, when I was a man,

I had ſuch an abhorrence for work, that it was ſolely to avoid it that I turned fiſherman. For there is no danger that I would not prefer before labour. The life of a labourer ſeems to me to be exactly the life of an ox, who is all his time in the geers, and when his labour is done, he is rewarded by a good thump of a ſledge upon the forehead.

Ul. He that to avoid labour could turn fiſherman, juſtifies the old proverb, that *Lazieſt folks take the moſt pains*; if a man flies from trouble, I obſerve it generally follows him. Of all trades yours, unleſs a man ſhould chuſe it out of a particular turn for it, muſt be the moſt diſagreeable, as it is perpetually expoſed to the ſudden changes of heat and cold, and all the uncertainties of wind and weather.

Oiſt. You ſee I think ſo; and therefore abſolutely refuſe to become a man again. Who ſeems to me (beſides being expoſed by Nature naked and helpleſs) wholly unprovided of a place of reſidence; without a houſe to hide his head in from the inclemencies of the ſeaſons; the vagabond and exile of the world.

Ul. Pray Sir, what curious dome has ſhe provided for you?

Oiſt. I beg you, Sir, not to overlook the beauties and conveniencies of this pair of ſhells. See, with what eaſe do I throw them open?

open? With what readineſs do I ſhut them, juſt as I want either to eat or ſleep, or to defend myſelf? Not to mention the ſnail and the tortoiſe; with what facility do they bear their houſes about with them?

Ul. How few ſuch can you name out of the whole brutal world? For example, there's the whole nation of the birds, what manſions have they built for them?

Oiſt. I anſwer; for their winter habitations the ſafe caverns and deep grottos of the earth; for their ſummer ſeats, the retirement of the groves, or the whole range of the mountains.

Ul. Delightful apartments truly! and finely furniſhed with all manner of neceſſaries!

Oiſt. What they want in furniture they make up in comfort and ſatisfaction, which are great rarities in ſome of your caſtles and palaces.

Ul. Then it muſt be our own faults; ſince we are our own architects, and conſequently may build them to our own taſte.

Oiſt. That taſte is no ſecurity againſt the trouble of defending them, the expence of repairing them; and what is more, againſt the danger of their tumbling upon your heads. Not to mention the horrors men ſometimes are thrown into from the mere apprehenſion of earthquakes, which you know in our country are ſo very terrible,

that I have known men quit their houſes, to ſleep in the fields by night, and all the day long run up and down ſcreaming like a flock of frighted herns, praying and adjuring the Gods with lighted torches, and all the nonſenſe of charms that ſuperſtition can ſuggeſt: So that the ſofteſt thing one could ſay of it was, their fears had drove out their wits.

Ul. Theſe inſtances are ſo very rare, that they are of no account.

Oiſt. Further; you cannot always chuſe your ſituation; and when you have, there you are nailed down without the power, as many of us have, of carrying our houſes on our backs.

Ul. A great diſadvantage truly; when a man has pleaſed himſelf every way in the choice of his ſituation, not to be able to run away from it. Don't you know *Chi ſta bene, non debbe mutarſi?* "he that is well, has no "buſineſs to riſque a change."

Oiſt. And is it really no diſadvantage to be pinn'd down to a bad neighbour, who may be always plaguing one by his ill-nature, or offending you by ſome diſagreeable trade? whereas we under ſuch circumſtances have the whole world before us to ſettle in. So that to return to our firſt propoſition, as Nature has taken more care of us, and as ſhe cannot err in her choice, it muſt follow, that we

we are better and more valuable than you, which was the thing to be demonſtrated.

Ulyſſ. Was there ever ſuch ſophiſtry! Whereas the true reaſon why ſhe may ſeem to provide more for you than for us, is becauſe ſhe knew you had not faculties enough to provide for yourſelves. But I think one ſhort queſtion will cut this argument ſhort: Pray which is higheſt in rank, the maſter or the ſervant?

Oiſt. The maſter, conſidered merely as ſuch.

Ul. Right; and thus it is in the nature of things, that which is conſidered as the end, is more noble, and of more eſteem than the bare means in order to ſerve that end. Now that we are the end for which you were created is evident, becauſe all that you are good for is employed in, and directed to our ſervice. You carry our burdens, do our drudgery, and plough our ground, when alive; for which we do you the honour to wear your ſkins, and eat your fleſh, after you are dead.

Oiſt. By parity of reaſon that ſame ground is more excellent than you. Your lives are ſpent in it's ſervice; and when you are dead, it generouſly repays you by devouring you; that therefore is the ultimate or final cauſe of your creation.

Ul. I deny the conſequence; which you will eaſily ſee to be falſe, if you pleaſe to conſider that final cauſes are of two ſorts.

Oiſt. I would fain ſpare you the trouble, *Ulyſſes*, which I ſee you are going to give yourſelf, of entering upon a queſtion which I have ſo often heard handled by the Philoſophers in the porches at *Athens*, where, as I told you before, I uſed to ply with my fiſh; in which they ſeemed to me readily to diſcuſs what, I believe, neither they nor any body elſe underſtand. Beſides I perceive the dew begins to fall, with which I never fail, by flinging my ſhell up, to regale myſelf, and that too in a condition ſo void of care, ſo undiſturbed by thought, that I never remember to have enjoyed the like in the ſtate to which you would bring me back. So that I hope, by this time, you begin to ceaſe to wonder, that I am reſolved to continue juſt as you ſee me. If your notions claſh a little with mine, pleaſe to keep them to yourſelf, for I am determined not to be troubled with them. After ſupper it is my method to ſhut up, and compoſe myſelf to reſt, without leaving room for ſo much as one eaſy reflection, which is more than the wiſeſt among you can often boaſt of. And I am more pleaſed with my own contentment, than with any thing that it is in your power to beſtow on me in lieu of it. *Exit.*

Ul. Well!

Ul. Well! I have certainly ſet out with very ill luck. That I ſhould light on ſuch a perverſe creature! who muſt have been a wretch of a low degree of reaſon: His very trade proves it. Thoſe that can beſtow their whole time in attending upon birds and fiſhes have very ſeldom an underſtanding three degrees better than they; always excepting ſome ingenious young men of quality who condeſcend to ſet their wits againſt ſuch animals. What a reliſh muſt he have of the pleaſures of the world, that could prefer a little dew to the moſt exquiſite of them? E'en let him remain the wretch he is, as a juſt reward for ſo much inſenſibility. In the mean time we will proceed to reaſon a little with the inhabitant *Circe* tells me reſides in this mole-hill; we ſhall find him perhaps a grave and diſcreet perſonage. Now for it. Mole, why Mole, I ſay.

Mole. What wouldſt thou have with me, *Ulyſſes?* Or how have I deſerved that thou ſhouldſt thus break in upon my peace?

Ul. Did you but know how I have employed my intereſt with *Circe*, and how far my prayers have prevailed for you, the leaſt ſpark of gratitude would incline you to forgive me this intruſion.

Mole. I know it all; I overheard what paſſed between that other *Greek* and you; I mean the Oiſter.

Ul. What!

Ul. What! that I had the grant of reſcuing thee from this priſon, of conferring manhood upon thee; and, if thou art a *Greek*, of conveying thee ſafe back to thy own country?

Mole. A *Greek* I was; and of the moſt delightful part of all *Etolia*.

Ul. The ſtronger then muſt be thy wiſhes to reſume thy old ſhape, and to reviſit thy native ſoil.

Mole. You ſpeak of alterations that I have not yet been fool enough to conſider.

Ul. How! Is it folly then in your language to wiſh to change from worſe to better?

Mole. No; but it is ſo to make intereſt to change better for worſe, which is the preſent caſe. Sir, the ſtate of the bargain is this, to barter uninterrupted tranquillity for all that anxiety of mind, and racking cares, which human nature is ſo plentifully ſupplied with.

Ul. You are giving a proof indeed, that you were liſtening to that fool of a Fiſhmonger with whom I was talking.

Mole. I liſten to nothing leſs than to experience, the ſtrongeſt proof; and what is more, to experience grounded on my own employment.

Ul. In what manner did this ſame experience prove that we are leſs happy, or more miſerable than you? *Mole.*

Mole. I ſhall confine myſelf to the obſervation of one only miſerable circumſtance that attends you; which I ſay my own employment naturally threw in my way to make. Then I ſhall leave you to your own thoughts, to make the application, and to draw conſequences.

Ul. Say on; but firſt, What ſtrange employment could that be which led you into ſuch groſs miſtakes?

Mole. I was an huſbandman, a day labourer indeed.

Ul. Why this is falling out of the frying-pan into the fire with a witneſs; to eſcape from a fiſherman, and to ſtumble upon a clodpate, who, unleſs he has undergone a thorough transformation, muſt be ten times ſtupider than he.

Mole. Ulyſſes, it will better become you to mind what I ſay, than to reflect on what I was. Take this with you, that every man is a man; and if you are attentive, I don't doubt but we ſhall ſoon have you lamenting your hard luck, that you miſſed the favour of being changed yourſelf by the Goddeſs, as well as your neighbours

Ul. If you only require my attention, you may depend on that.

Mole. What animal then do you find throughout the univerſe, of which there are infinite ſpecies, terreſtrial or aquatick, for whom

whom the earth does not of itſelf provide proper ſuſtenance, except man alone? Who unleſs he is weary of his being, muſt undergo the perpetual drudgery of ploughing, ſowing, and all the fatigues of huſbandry?

Ul. This is a miſtake grounded upon mere luxury; whereas were we but contented to live as you do, we need be at no more pains than you.

Mole. Well then, pray what herb, what ſeed, or what fruit, does the earth ſpontaneouſly produce, I mean without the aſſiſtance of art, which is a proper food to preſerve either your health or life?

Ul. Did you never hear how the firſt and beſt of men fared in the ſo much boaſted golden age?

Mole. That I take to be a fable too groſs for the wiſe *Ulyſſes* to ſwallow.

Ul. Granting all that you ſay to be true, and that man is obliged to this circle of tilling the ground, pruning his vines, and grafting his trees, is he not ſufficiently rewarded by the pleaſure that attends the taſk? It is at moſt but a recreation that Nature cuts out for him, having his welfare too much at heart to ſuffer him to paſs his time in idleneſs. And that this is true, the recompence of his toil abundantly ſhews. For there is nothing more agreeable, or that gives us an

an opportunity of ſhewing that ſkill and management that ſets us ſo much above you beaſts.

Mole. Say rather, that it was inflicted upon you, as an effectual means to ſecure you from enjoying one hour's peace; for beſide the trouble of making the moſt of what you have, you are plagued about what you have not. And as the produce of the earth is very uncertain, when there happens to come a ſcarce year, all that time is ſpent in dreadful apprehenſions how far it may go; and not a morſel can be ſwallowed without the fear of a famine before your eyes; which can never be our caſe: when proviſion begins to come ſhort in one place, we immediately look out for another, without being much embarraſſed by removing our luggage.

Ul. Then I preſume you never heard of ſuch a thing as commerce, and of ſupplying the neceſſities of one country by the redundancy of another.

Mole. But with what fatigue from journeys, what dangers from voyages? And what is more, with what diſquietude of mind? Let this ſuffice, to ſhew that your life is one continued ſcene of diſtreſs, now labouring under one misfortune, now ſtruggling with another. So that, what you cannot retort upon us, you have reaſon at your birth to

ſhed

ſhed thoſe tears, that are but a prelude to the miſery that muſt enſue.

Ul. That's abſurd; becauſe when we ſhed thoſe tears we are neither conſcious of good or harm.

Mole. Be that as it will; you begin from that moment to find the inconveniencies of the climate to which you are doomed; which, as I ſaid before, is made ſuitable to every animal but you. And for that reaſon you alone are by Nature ſupplied with tears.

Ul. How! did you never hear of a horſe's ſhedding tears * ?

Mole. Yes, but I never believed it. And thoſe drops that have been ſo well atteſted to fall from their eyes, I take to be nothing more than a ſuperfluity of moiſture,

* *Virg. Æneid.* Lib. XI. Carm. 90.

Poſt bellator equus poſitis inſignibus armis
It lachrymans, guttis humectat grandibus ora.

It is ſufficient to juſtify a poetical philoſopher, (*Poeticum enim eſſe σύναον philoſophiæ ait Syneſius*, Ep. 1.) that *Ariſtotle* and *Pliny* ſay, horſes often weep at the loſs of their maſter; but what *Suetonius*, an hiſtorian, ſays of *Cæſar*'s horſes weeping at their maſter's paſſing the *Rubicon*, gives unqueſtionable authority. So *Hom. Iliad.* XVII.

Their godlike maſter ſlain before their eyes
They wept, and ſhar'd in human miſeries.
Mr. *Pope.*

which

which ſo delicate a creature as a horſe is, may well be ſubject to. And even according to the ſuppoſition, I dare ſay, 'twas for ſome misfortune that grieved him, that he muſt leave a loved maſter, or a loving companion; and that it was never pretended that he has been ſeen to weep, like you, the minute he was foaled. But you have reaſon enough for it, to think that you muſt implore the aſſiſtance of ſome good-natur'd nurſe, to ſwaddle you as well as feed you, not having it in your power to ſupply yourſelves with what is neceſſary to your ſupport. And therefore to give you as little trouble as poſſible, I for my own part declare, that I will ſooner die as I am, than be gulled by your offer.

Ul. I believe, Mole, I muſt be obliged to repeat to you the ſpeech I made to the Oiſter, that the ſame moment robbed you of your manhood and your ſenſe together. Sure you muſt be very ignorant, not to know what ſort of creatures you are: If you were indeed compleat in your kind, perfect animals, I would ſay ſomething to you.

Mole. Why pray, what hinders us from being ſo?

Ul. What? Why your friend there has neither the faculty of ſmelling or hearing, or the power to move himſelf an inch. You,

as I take it, are blind *, and what is worſe too, after being acquainted with what the pleaſures of ſight are; by much the moſt inſtructive of all the ſenſes.

Mole. Hey day! but how does this prove us to be imperfect? That you are pleaſed to call us ſo I grant; and perhaps we may be ſaid to be ſo, in reſpect of thoſe that have all the ſenſes. But I don't underſtand how we can properly be ſaid to be imperfect, unleſs we were defective in any thing that belongs to our own ſpecies.

Ul. But is it not better to have them all?

Mole. No; it would be no advantage to me, as a Mole, to be able to ſee: Nor to the Oiſter to be able to ſee or hear, or to ramble up and down. Deal ingenuouſly with me; can you conceive any other uſe in being able to ramble from place to place, beſide the power of fetching what one wants?

Ul. Certainly Nature gave it for no other reaſon; and therefore the old ſaying holds good, that *all motion implies neceſſity.*

* The proverb in *Suidas*, ἀσπάλακος τυφλότερος, *Talpâ cæcior*, is ſufficient to juſtify *Gelli*. But he, *Pliny*, and *Ariſtotle*, knew that the Mole had ſmall eyes as well as the moſt enlighten'd modern Philoſopher. *Vide Plin.* Lib. IX. Cap. XXXVII. *ex Ariſtotele.*

Mole.

Mole. And you think if you had every thing you wanted within your reach, you yourſelf ſhould never ſtir out of your place?

Ul. Why ſhould I?

Mole. What occaſion then can the Oiſter have for locomotion, who is ſupplied with every thing he wants as he ſits ſtill? So for the faculty of ſmelling; what uſe could it be of to him, that has nothing to hunt after, but has every thing he wants brought home to him? Thus I, who out of choice am always under ground, where I find myſelf perfectly at eaſe, what advantage would ſight pray be to me?

Ul. But one would be glad to have more than one has a mere neceſſity for.

Mole. Why? eſpecially if it be not ſuitable to one's nature. For my part I have no more ambition to ſurpaſs the perfection of my own kind, than you have reaſon to wiſh for the luminous body of a ſtar, or to envy a bird the advantage of a pair of wings.

Ul. You ſuppoſe what would be highly inconvenient to ſuch a creature as man.

Mole. But if all other men were ſo made, you would think yourſelf hardly dealt with to be excepted.

Ul. I believe it.

Mole. And won't you believe that to be juſt my caſe? If my brethren the Moles could all ſee, I ſhould be uneaſy for want of eyes; but as I am upon an equal footing with the reſt, I beg to be no longer troubled with your propoſition. I find I am perfect in my own kind, and what is more, perfectly eaſy, and ſo ſhall endeavour to remain, without hazarding happineſs in a human form. Probably you have ſome buſineſs of your own; if not, don't hinder thoſe that have; I cannot poſſibly be longer abſent from ſome few concerns under ground.

Exit Mole.

Ul. Am I awake? or is this all imagination? If this be not a dream, yet I, however, can't be what I was: I am no more *Ulyſſes*. He could not be baffled thus, in proving to theſe two people ſo plain a truth. *Ulyſſes* was famed for proving to the *Greeks* whatever he had a mind they ſhould believe. It muſt be ſo then, that the fault muſt be in them; and it was my luck to meet two wretches not capable of taking an argument. And, upon reflection, 'tis no great wonder if the Fiſherman be no wiſer than the Ditcher. So that I have no reaſon to ſuſpect the ſame ſucceſs with the reſt of theſe creatures. For as they were of different profeſſions and ranks in the world,

it

it is not likely they ſhould all have the ſame turn. But firſt I muſt go in queſt of my Goddeſs, and inform her of every thing that has paſſed, and inſiſt upon her promiſe, of having the privilege of examining the reſt; for it would be barbarous to deprive others of the benefit of the propoſal, merely upon the account of the ſtupidity or obſtinacy of a couple of blockheads.

Exit Ulyſſes.

CIRCE.

Tranſlated from the *Italian* of

JOHN BAPTIST GELLI, *&c.*

DIALOGUE II.

Ulyſſes, Circe, *and the Serpent.*

Circe. WHAT report may we expect, *Ulyſſes*, from your friends the *Greeks?*

Ulyſſes. I have yet founded none, except the two you ſingled out; whoſe lives were ſpent in two ſuch miſerable and laborious employments, that it is no ſurprize to find them averſe to accept of a propoſal that muſt bring them back to ſo much wretchedneſs.

Circe. To prevent you from imputing ſo odd a rencounter to mere chance, I frankly confeſs it to be a ſcheme of my own; to give you a little inſight into the comforts and pleaſures of low life, which are ſo much the ſubject

ſubject of panegyrick among your writers. To convince you that the moſt vile, and what you call the moſt imperfect animals, prefer their preſent ſituation, for reaſons which they themſelves aſſigned.

Ul. But ſtill it muſt prove them to have been the dulleſt of all creatures, when they found themſelves miſerable in one way of life, not to think of looking out for another.

Circe. So far from it, that I think it ſhews greater management to be able to ſuit one's ſelf to our own circumſtances, be they what they will, than to endeavour to change them. As the dexterity of a gameſter is ſeen by making the beſt of a bad caſt, which ſhews his ſkill at leaſt, if not his luck: So if a wiſe man can't command Fortune, he will take care to leave as little in her power as poſſible.

Ul. Circe underſtands human nature too well not to know there is a wider difference between men, than between any other animals of the ſame ſpecies. In ſome you diſcover ſuch a compaſs of knowledge, ſuch a vivacity of imagination, as may juſtly rank them with the immortal gods. In others you perceive ſo poor a ſtock of ideas, and an apprehenſion ſo very ſluggiſh, as levels them with the beaſts. Which has made ſome doubt if all may be ſaid to be endued with a rational ſoul. Whereas caſt your eyes a-

mong lions, bears, or what kind of brutes you pleaſe, you will find the difference ſcarce diſcernible. And as for thoſe two with whom I have had the pleaſure to diſpute, I take them to be of that claſs of people, who for want of judging what is good or bad for them, are always apt to fancy every condition better than their own.

Circe. If good or bad were to be diſcerned by quickneſs of parts, or ſtrength of judgment, I ſhould ſay ſomething for your opinion: But as experience is their only rule, that being a touchſtone that muſt ſhew things to be juſt as they are; the caſe is quite altered. But hold a moment; here is another diſputant for you; I mean that Serpent—now he croſſes the path—now ſee! he makes towards us. If I remember rightly, it was a *Greek* I changed into that ſhape. He perhaps will anſwer more to your ſatisfaction than the former two. However for the preſent I give him power to converſe with you.

Ul. I fancy he knows we are talking of him, by his keeping his eyes ſo fixed upon us.

Circe. It may be ſo; do you try him whilſt I withdraw a little to join the nymphs who are diverting themſelves, I ſee, upon the ſhore.

Ul. I confeſs myſelf in the main ſo well entertained with the two laſt creatures, that though

though I could not carry my point with them, I am reſolved to try my luck once more; ſo, Serpent, I ſay, Serpent, there.

Serpent. What wouldſt thou have, *Ulyſſes?* But oh! unhappy me. Do I then underſtand, and do I ſpeak? Sure I am relapſing into manhood! Oh! forbid it all ye powers.

Ul. What reaſon canſt thou give for all this horror, at the thoughts of being what thou waſt? I preſume the miſerable condition of thy former life.

Serp. Oh! no, 'tis the ſtate itſelf; 'tis humanity itſelf I dread: The ſad receptacle of all woe.

Ul. I begin to doubt if my preſent experiment will prove more ſucceſsful than the former. But Serpent, once for all I charge thee hear me. Know then, the Goddeſs, wearied by my entreaties, has given me full power to unbind the charm that holds thee metamorphoſed. And, as thou art a *Greek*, I make thee here an offer of the ineſtimable grant.

Serp. If you have that love for me you pretend, I beg you to make the tender where it may be more acceptable. All my ambition is, to end my days juſt as I am. I ſhould be glad to oblige you; but really it would be making too fooliſh a bargain, to change circumſtances with one of you.

Ul. Your reaſon.

Serp. I thought you had reaſons enough given you to day already.

Ul. Alas! the two wretches I diſcourſed with, were creatures of ſo baſe a condition, and ſo poor an education, that 'twas impoſſible to pay the leaſt regard to any thing they ſaid.

Serp. And yet even theſe, you ſee, could give you reaſons for not accepting your offer.

Ul. Why, one of them, you muſt know, who was a poor fiſherman, could not bear the thoughts of having his lodgings always to ſeek, whilſt the reſt of the creation has them ready provided. This creature in holes and burroughs, that in buſhes or upon trees; one always in the water, others on land and water indifferently. The other, who was a huſbandman, dreaded the thoughts of returning to his labour; and except the ground be kept in perpetual exerciſe, by manuring and ſowing, he found it produced nothing for man's uſe, as it did for all other animals in the world.

Serp. And I, who in the days of my humanity was a phyſician, ſhall make my objection againſt a cauſe of miſery of a ſuperior nature: Miſery above the power of art to redreſs; and grievances not, like theirs, to be remedied by agriculture; defects not to be ſupplied by architecture.

Ul. Name them.

Serp. I mean the poorneſs of your conſtitutions, which ſubjects you to ſuch a liſt of diſeaſes, that you can never be ſaid one moment of your lives, like one of us, to be perfectly

perfectly in health: Are never ſo ſecure as not to be in danger from every little exceſs of catching a diſtemper.

Ul. This, as I told the other two, muſt of neceſſity be ſo; as Nature intended in us to carry on her operations in a very ſubtle manner; which could not be effected, if we were compoſed of more clumſy materials: If our humours had been inſpiſſated, our blood heavier, and our texture coarſer, as it is with you.

Serp. Say rather, 'twas to confirm you the moſt crazy puny wretches in the univerſe.

Ul. Well, granting our ſituation to be as tickliſh as you repreſent it; you can't deny us to have a ſuperior judgment, to avoid what may prove injurious to us.

Serp. In ſome meaſure I confeſs it, but 'tis ſo very tedious, that you find few are at the pains to exerciſe it. But to prove that this happens out of the mere ſpite Nature owes you, ſhe has at the ſame time given you an appetite ſo inſatiable, and a will ſo ungovernable, that you are ever inventing new diſhes; and if one chances to hit your liquoriſh palates, you give yourſelves wholly up to gluttony without reſtraint; or at leaſt are with the greateſt difficulty kept within the bounds of only ſatisfying nature: which muſt lay in a magazine of ſuch different and dangerous diſeaſes.

Ul. Pray

Ul. Pray what is the food you allude to, which Nature herſelf does not point out for our ſuſtenance?

Serp. How can you aſk the queſtion? when you know it to be of infinite ſorts. But to be particular, I mean all that you employ to give a reliſh to other things, which at the ſame time are not themſelves ſingly eatable; ſuch as ſalt, pepper, and the whole tribe of aromaticks.

Ul. Now for my part, I always thought the reverſe, and received it for an acknowledg'd truth, that ſalt was abſolutely neceſſary to preſerve the life of man.

Serp. If there be any truth in the notion, it only proves, that you have ſuch a redundancy of humours through intemperance, as to demand ſo great a drier to abſorb them. Whereas were the food ſimple and the quantity moderate, it would not find too much moiſture to feed on. But the fact is, that theſe things, by heightening the taſte, ſo provoke the appetite, that people are more intent upon humouring their palates, than of ſatisfying their ſtomachs. The conſequence of which muſt be, that ſuch mixtures muſt inflame a thirſt not to be quenched but by a profuſion of liquor much too great for Nature to diſpoſe of; which lays in a ſtore for catarrhs, defluxions, apoplexies, gouts, and rheums. Not to mention

tion a thouſand other diſtempers that uſually ſucceed, not to be carried off but by ſtrong evacuations, and yet none of theſe things fall to our lot.

Ul. Why, truly, ſo far I own there is ſome truth in what you ſay.

Serp. Now ſee how differently, out of pure affection, ſhe has dealt with us! We have no unruly appetites to crave what is not proper for us. We never exceed in quantity; neither have we art enough to vary our food, or to make ſuch fallacious mixtures, as ſhall provoke deſire where there is no hunger. Don't you obſerve farther, that in order to allure you effectually to your deſtruction, you are tempted to mix with your food ſuch things as are properly the objects of another ſenſe, the ſmell? I mean the perfumes you make uſe of as ingredients in your compoſitions: of which, that you may not be too proud, give me leave to tell you, that they are no very cleanly part of ſome of us. Whereas we find no pleaſure from that ſenſe but what our meat yields, and that only as long as we are eating juſt enough for our ſupport.

Ul. The reaſon of this ſeems to be, that as man has a larger quantity of brain than any animal, in proportion to his ſize, and that you know is naturally of a cold temperament; ſhe has put it in our power to invi-

invigorate and warm it by perfumes, which have a hot quality, in order to aſſiſt her in performing the functions of the internal ſenſes, for the ſervice of the underſtanding. And much obliged to her we are for this advantage which ſhe has given us over you, who are inſenſible of any delight from odours, but what ſteam immediately from your food.

Serp. Shall I tell you the plain truth? Why then it is yet a doubtful point with me, whether your excellency that way be a real advantage or a misfortune to you, there being ſo many bad ſmells to be met with for one good one: Or perhaps perfumes, after all, may not be improper for thoſe who fill themſelves with groſs humours, that muſt produce offenſive ſmells. Another argument of the debility of your make, ſubject, nay doomed, as I ſaid, to ſo many infirmities, that are not ſo much as known to us; they reckon up, I think, above fifty different diſorders incident to the eyes alone.

Ul. Allowing it, yet we have the means at hand to remedy them all.

Serp. Pray from whence?

Ul. From phyſick; and for the truth of this I appeal to yourſelf as a proper judge in this caſe, being, as you profeſs, one of the faculty.

Serp. This

Serp. This is the point I have been labouring to bring you to; becauſe in this I eſteem mankind the moſt unhappy race upon the earth.

Ul. You'll tell us why too, I hope.

Serp. Becauſe I am firmly of opinion, that phyſick does much more harm than good in the world. Nor is this my private opinion alone, the whole world ſeems in a great meaſure to give into it. You know there are whole ſtates in *Greece*, that have both baniſhed the doctors, and put down their trade.

Ul. Why ſo? can you deny that phyſick is one of the ſeven liberal arts; that it has truth for its object, and the benefit of mankind for its end? This you muſt allow, unleſs you are apt to decry what perhaps you never underſtood. It being very common, when people are ignorant of a thing, to pretend that it is not to be known; by which they in ſome meaſure bring others down to a level with themſelves.

Serp. I ſhall not go about to deny it to be an art, real, beneficial, and worthy of all eſteem. Neither ſhall I diſſemble that I was ignorant in the art, in the ſame ſenſe that the reſt of my brethren of the faculty were. But as far as it is to be underſtood, my ſkill was ſo great, and my reputation ſo well eſtabliſhed, that I was always named with the

firſt Phyſicians in all *Greece*. You yourſelf ſhall be my witneſs, who could not but have heard a thouſand times of the famed *Ageſimus* of *Leſbos*.

Ul. Art thou that famous *Leſbian*? And art thou *Ageſimus*, or ſhall we ſpeak more properly, and call thee his ghoſt?

Serp. I am the very he. You muſt know then that I embarqued for the ſake of travelling, and in my voyage arriving at this iſland, with the whole crew was transformed as you now ſee me.

Ul. Then let me bleſs the fortunate rencounter, that gives me an opportunity of converſing with a perſon whoſe fame is yet ſo freſh among his countrymen. Why this will indeed ſecure my welcome to the *Greeks*, that I have been able to recover to them a man of ſuch conſequence.

Serp. You talked of reaſoning cloſely, but are wander'd very wide of it: But to prevent all ſuch interruption, I declare beforehand, that I will never conſent to your propoſal. And that you may ſee I have not taken up this reſolution raſhly, to reſume our diſcourſe, I aſſert, that phyſick may be conſidered two ways. Firſt, as a ſcience; and as ſuch it is undoubtedly certain and concluſive; becauſe ſhe is converſant only about univerſals, whoſe eſſences being eternal and immutable, they can never deceive us in drawing

drawing conſequences. And this being the knowledge of things by the relations they ſtand in, it is juſtly called a ſcience, as being an object of ſpeculation, whoſe ſole and ultimate end is to lead to the truth. In this light many may be ſaid to underſtand phyſic; and I myſelf will venture to profeſs that I knew my ſhare of it. But it may alſo be conſidered as an art; now all arts being, as you know, grounded upon experience, as ſuch it is very fallacious. And that it is ſo, the phyſicians themſelves are ready to allow, when they tell us, that even experiments * themſelves, in this art, are very deceitful. This then is of the active kind, which has practice for it's end, and particulars for it's object. And here our knowledge comes very ſhort, as every day's experience abundantly proves.

Ul. If you were ſo ignorant in the practical part, to what do you impute your own vaſt reputation?

Serp. To the folly of other people; for, let me tell you, men ſeldom mind what you do, if you have but art enough to impoſe upon them by what you ſay.

Ul. Well! ſurely mankind is under the fatality of being very ſhort-ſighted, in things that concern them moſt.

* This ſeems to be the right ſenſe of that aphoriſm of *Hippocrates*, ἡ δὲ πεῖρα σφαλερὴ.

Serp. And above all things, ſo, in what concerns their health, through the immoderate deſire of living on. This I think is evident from their rewarding our blunders, which they would puniſh in any other ſet of men. And thoſe too are ſo notorious, and ſo monſtrous, that it would be bad for us, ſays a wiſe man, if the earth were not always ready to cover our miſtakes. I think they tell ye of the ſame philoſopher, that being aſked one day how he came to enjoy ſo uninterrupted a ſtate of health? *Becauſe*, ſays he, *I never hire a Phyſician to deſtroy it.*

Ul. That other great countryman of ours was exactly in the ſame way of thinking, who uſed to ſay, that *A good Doctor never phyſicks himſelf.*

Serp. Well; but go on, let us hear that other wiſe obſervation of his.

Ul. Which do you mean?

Serp. That *A good advocate is never fond of ſtanding a law-ſuit.* But, what is ſtill worſe, in order to keep up the reputation of the farce, they will pretend that they really do take phyſic themſelves. So you ſhall ſee them go very formally to the apothecaries, and preſcribe for themſelves; after that, all the world may ſee it carried very gravely to their houſes; but they'll take care that no body ſhall ſee them throw it out of the window: and this has been practiſed to my knowledge.

Ul.

Ul. As for that, I am not at all ſurprized, ſince our whole life is nothing but the circulation of thoſe tricks that each man plays upon another.

Serp. True; and then you may be ſure, that men will take care to lay on thoſe cheats the thickeſt, the belief of which brings moſt profit to the actors.

Ul. You ſee therefore, and indeed the obſervation is very old, that the confidence which the patient has in his Phyſician, very often does him more ſervice than the preſcription: Now he that knows beſt how to impoſe upon him, will always gain moſt confidence.

Serp. I myſelf am an inſtance of it; and know, that a glib perſuaſive knack of talking, eſpecially among the ladies, (whoſe good word raiſes more Doctors than their ſkill) got me the reputation you are pleaſed to compliment with me. But to return; you ſee they have not a clear notion of what they are about, becauſe you find them frequently huddling together many remedies for one ſingle complaint.

Ul. No! why I thought their putting many ingredients together, was a proof of their greater knowledge in the art.

Serp. Quite the reverſe; becauſe he that gives many medicines for one diſorder, demonſtrates that he does not know it's true

proper ſpecific. For as all effects are produced from one ſimple principle naturally, though the like may proceed from the concurrence of many cauſes accidentally, (as heat, for example, is the natural effect of fire, though it may be produced accidentally from the friction of ſolids, the fermentation of fluids, or the like) thus every illneſs has it's proper remedy, which he that knows will infallibly cure. So that when you ſee a Phyſician loading his patient with many remedies, you may ſafely ſay, that man does not know the true one, but is feeling about for it, and if he has luck on his ſide, for aught I know, he may hit on it.

Ul. Aren't we then in a bleſſed condition when we fall into your hands?

Serp. You ſee how it is; and therefore many will tell you, 'tis better depending upon a lucky Phyſician than a learned one.

Ul. What do you mean by a lucky Phyſician?

Serp. One that ſends the major part of his patients well out of his hands. For that man properly may be called a lucky man, that has had ſucceſs in the major part of his actions. Nay if the numbers are equal, or only pretty near upon a balance, I think he may be ſaid to be of the fortunate ſide. Becauſe, as I ſaid, the application of univerſals to particulars is ſo very nice a thing, that the patient

patient as well as the Doctor, muſt have good luck if he does no miſchief.

Ul. What a ſcene have we here opened againſt mankind, and their avarice; which prompts them, for the ſake of a little gain, to undertake they know not what!

Serp. Right; but for much more againſt Nature, that has been ſo careful of us, and ſo negligent of you, by giving you a delicate conſtitution with an irregular appetite, and to finiſh all, has inſtructed you in the art of phyſic, which, upon the footing it now is, I affirm again, does much more harm than good in the world.

Ul. But how has Nature provided better for you in this point?

Serp. Both by a firm texture, and regular inclinations; which have not ſo much as the leaſt hankering after what may be pernicious to us. And then againſt accidents has furniſhed us with a much more certain rule for the recovery of loſt health.

Ul. This is ſo very extraordinary a poſition, that I hope you can prove it better than by a bare aſſertion.

Serp. As for the goodneſs and ſtrength of our make 'tis ſo obvious, that I ſhall not take up your time by inſiſting on it. Then to ſhew how orderly our appetites are, conſider, pray, firſt the ſimple nature of our diet, and that you ſhall never ſee one of us diſcover the leaſt inclination but to the very

food calculated for us: Nor to that neither, but in ſuch quantities as are neceſſary for our ſupport. Whereas with you the whole is reverſed; you are ſupplied with an infinite variety of eatables, and all bad for you; then as to the quantity, when you are thoroughly pleaſed, you know no bounds but the power of eating no more.

Ul. In this I grant you have the advantage of us.

Serp. What ſhall I ſay as to liquors? that whilſt we never exceed the quantity abſolutely neceſſary to life, you give yourſelves up in ſo diſſolute a manner to the pleaſures of wine, that beſides the ſcandal of drunkenneſs, you may aſcribe to it a thouſand different diſtempers.

Ul. This is a ſubject that I fancy you had better drop; becauſe Nature has herein manifeſtly given us the preference, ſince it was for us alone ſhe provided that precious liquor.

Serp. I allow it, if ſhe at the ſame time had given you proper limitations in the application; but upon the preſent eſtabliſhment, 'tis juſt like the grant of a thing much more likely to do harm than good, to one that has neither diſcretion nor temper in the uſe of it.

Ul. You may rail 'till you are tired againſt wine, without making me a convert.

Serp. Your gallantry is ſtill more fatal t'ye: How many deaths may we impute to it? Whilſt Nature is too fond to leave us in this

this reſpect without reſtraint. Our times for purſuing it are ſtated, and thoſe too with a due regard to our own health, and a proper ſeaſon for the education of our young.

Ul. Are there none then amongſt you under the perpetual influence of this paſſion?

Serp. If there are any, 'tis only ſuch as you have adopted into your ſervice, and inſtructed in your own manners. For your domeſtick animals are the greateſt breeders. But let us paſs to the next topic of ſo much account in the ſcheme of health, and conſider a little the nature of the air. The quality of which is of ſo great importance, as our bodies are filled with it in every act of breathing. Now where did you ever find one of us in a climate improper for us, unleſs we have been forced thither by ſome of you? Whilſt out of avarice, or a hundred other motives, you quit the place deſigned for you, to catch your deaths in a foreign region.

Ul. This is not to be denied.

Serp. As for ſleep, diet, and the other neceſſaries of life, I ſhall avoid ſpeaking to them, becauſe I know you are already convinced that you don't endeavour to make a proper uſe of them; which depends neither upon art or fancy. Whilſt we who follow Nature in them all are from thence, you ſee, *Ulyſſes*, ſubject to ſo few infirmities, and even for thoſe few that are incident to

us, we are each of ourſelves directed to it's proper cure.

Ul. And is this certain?

Serp. As certain as fate: And this ſingle point is ſufficient to determine the diſpute before us. Since each ſpecies of animals is inſtructed in a cure for the diſtempers to which it is liable. And that not only the ſpecies, but each individual in it.

Ul. I proteſt now you make me ſtare.

Serp. If it ſeems ſo ſtrange to ye, I would not have you reſt ſatisfied with my bare word for it. Let us begin to examine at home, and you will find amongſt us ſerpents, that each of the kind, as ſoon as awaken'd by the ſpring, perceiving his ſkin ſtarky and rivelled, by lying the whole winter folded up in one poſition, makes directly to the *finochio*, and crams himſelf with it, till it makes him with eaſe caſt his old ſlough. When our ſight is impaired, we have immediatè recourſe to the ſame plant, which preſerves in us ſuch a ſtrength of viſion. Have not the lizards recourſe to a certain herb, with which they cure themſelves when ſtung by one of us? The wounded * ſtag flies im-

* This is generally ſaid of the wild goat: So *Virg. Æneid.* XII. 412.

——— *Non illa feris incognita Capris*
Gramina, cùm tergo volucres hæſere ſagittæ.

Theophraſtus, *Plutarch*, and *Cicero* ſay the ſame thing. *Solus Plinius hanc proprietatem Cervis aſcribit, ait Camerarius.*

mediately

mediately to the dittany: And when bit by the *phalangium*, which is a very venomous kind of ſpider, they know how to cure themſelves with † cray-fiſh. The ſwallows ‖ when they perceive a humour coming in the eyes of their young ones, know how to cure them by celandine. The tortoiſe cures our bite with hemlock. The * weaſel, before he enters the liſt with the rat, fortifies himſelf with rue for the combat. The ſtork recovers himſelf with origanum; the wild boar with ivy. Does not the elephant defend himſelf againſt the poiſon of the cameleon with olive-leaves? The bear makes uſe of ants to rouſe him, after having eaten greedily of your ſleepy mandrakes. The rock-pigeon, blackbird, and partridge, purge themſelves with laurel; the tame dove-turtle,

† This remedy ſeems to lye ſo little in the ſtag's way, that to juſtify him, it may be neceſſary to ſhew that *Oppian* ſays the ſame thing, *Cervos ita affectos fluvios petere, ibi cancellos comedentes ſibi medinam facere.* What ſtrength does it give to the compariſon, if we ſuppoſe the Pſalmiſt's Hart under theſe circumſtances, *deſiring the water-brooks, viz.* by Nature hot, burnt up by a thirſt from the climate, the ſeaſon, and the ſoil, inflamed by invenomed wounds, and impelled by inſtinct to ſeek a cure, as well as hurried by appetite to find a reſpite to his agonies?

‖ Celandine, called *Hirundinaria, quia ſcilicet hirundines hujus herbæ ſucco oculis medentur.* Skin. Dict. Etym.

* Theſe are *Ariſtotle*'s words, only the ſerpent is put inſtead of the rat. *Ariſt.* Lib. IX. *Hiſt. Anim.* Cap. VI.

Muſtela vero quoties dimicatura cum ſerpente, rutam comedit.

and

and the hen with chickweed. The dog and the cat make themſelves ſoluble by ſwallowing quitch-graſs ſopped in dew. But not to tire you with too much natural hiſtory, ſingle out what ſpecies of animals you pleaſe, and you ſhall find them ſupplied with the ſkill to remedy the particular diſeaſe to which they are ſubject. Nor is this knowledge given to whole ſocieties, but to each individual contained under them; ſo that we are ſaved the pains of learning our art from others, are never puzzled with doubtful caſes, and are prevented from the expence, which you wretches are at of feeing him that puts you to death. And perhaps at the ſame time you are not ſenſible that you think, the more you give your doctor the better; and that you take care that the fees ſhall be preſented in the choiceſt pieces * you can collect.

Ul. Not every one, dear Serpent; but I ſuppoſe you have your fools too as well as we.

Serp. No, Sir, take it for granted there is none of us, (though ſome may be more ready or ſubtle than others) without the intelligence proper to our ſpecies. Whereas with you, if every madman ſhould wear a

* This muſt allude to the Virtuoſi at that time making collections of rare pieces.

white

white bonnet, you would meet, I am afraid, but very few black ones †.

Ul. Perhaps thoſe whom you call madmen, are the wiſeſt as well as the happieſt people we meet with. Which puts me in mind of one who, after the recovery of his right ſenſes, was aſked by a Lady for the receipt, for a ſon of hers, who was in the ſame way; but he begged to be excuſed, for that he would not do the young gentleman ſo great an injury as to rob him of his diſtemper. Which proved that he never thought himſelf ſo happy as in that interval.

Serp. And what could be his reaſon for thinking ſo, unleſs that he found himſelf then free from thoſe reflections that embitter human life, and aggravate it's misfortunes?

Ul. This is what I ſhall not now diſpute with you. But to return to our argument; if you have really fewer infirmities, it is becauſe your lives are ſhorter, and that itſelf is a melancholy reaſon; a miſerable ſecurity from misfortunes.

Serp. It may be deemed ſo to us indeed, who have every neceſſary provided, every infirmity cured, every grief baniſhed, and every paſſion ſubdued to our hands. But the fear of death with us is very light, being never anticipated, as it is with you, by thoughts

† Literally, *You would look like a flock of geeſe.*

about

about it. Nor are we acquainted with the mighty loſs of falling into nothing. Whereas to you, ſhortneſs of life ought to be eſteem'd a real bleſſing, to whom longevity muſt imply a longer ſtruggle with diſeaſes, and where to lengthen out days muſt be to multiply ſorrows. Every fit of the head-ach alarms your apprehenſions of death; ſo that every bodily diſorder raiſes a more acute one in the mind. For which reaſon ſome have aſſerted, that "yours cannot ſo properly be called "life, as a continuation of the fear of "death."

Ul. Theſe are words.

Serp. Nay, ſome who have more ſeverely animadverted upon your condition, have pronounced, that "it is better never to have "been born; but that thoſe are in the next "degree of happineſs who expire in their "ſwaddling-bands." How many, from the like reflections, to free themſelves from ſo great a train of ills, have with their own hands forced a way to death? A thought ſo full of horror, that it has never yet found admittance with one of us.

Ul. Some poor-ſpirited wretches, who have neither the ſkill to prevent calamities, nor the courage to endure them. But for one of theſe you'll find a million ſhrinking at the thoughts of death.

Serp.

Serp. That's very true; and do you know the reaſon of it?

Ul. What is it, pray?

Serp. The fear of falling into a yet more miſerable eſtate after it; which is a panick early and deeply impreſſed, from the deſcriptions in your writers, of I know not what regions of *Pluto*; where there are endleſs torments prepared for thoſe who, to gratify deſire, dare to tranſgreſs the line of reaſon: Concerns that never trouble us. But could men once be brought to believe, that the ſame ſtroke would put an end to life and ſorrow, each day would preſent you with ſcenes ſhocking to human nature. So many there are among you that are miſerable, yet bear with life; ſo few that are happy and enjoy it.

Ul. I perceive now, *Ageſimus*, that ſo much obſtinacy is incapable of being convinced, and therefore think it high time to drop the diſpute. Eſpecially ſince by what laſt eſcaped you, you muſt be void of reaſon, becauſe you grow ſceptical in Religion: Which may perhaps be proper enough for a brute as you are, and ſo I pity you. And as you are my countryman, I make you ſtill the offer of the favour *Circe* has granted me, of recalling you to manhood, and of conveying you to *Greece*.

Serp. I

Serp. I refuſe it now; and may all that's powerful defend me ever from accepting it.

Ul. Is it poſſible then, that you can be ſo inſenſible of your miſerable and deſpicable ſtate? and that you are the animal of the world moſt abhorred by men *?

Serp. That's one of the greateſt comforts we have. The love that you men bear to any animal is always for your own ſakes, and for the uſe you can make of it.

Ul. However it is evident, in your holes and caverns, you ſleep away the major part of your time, without any pleaſure.

Serp. So do you too, friend, and let me tell you, not half ſo pleaſantly as we do.

Ul. Strange! to hear one bragging how well he fares, whoſe entertainment is duſt, or elſe ſome ſorry reptile; and whoſe choiceſt liquor is water.

Serp. What does that prove, if we deſire no better?

Ul. Not to mention the unſettled ſtate of your brain, which muſt always be, where the ideas are ſo confuſed, and the imagination ſo giddy.

Serp. Ay! what do you know of that?

Ul. What I know is from my obſervation of you animals, whoſe progreſſive motion is

* *Angue magis odioſum*, was a *Latin* proverb.

per-

performed by ſticking the ſcales of your fore-part into the ground, and ſo by gathering your hinder parts up to it. Now what I obſerve is, that when you find any obſtacle in your way, you take a quite different rout, without any regard to the road you ſet out in. What can this be owing to, but a confuſed head, and a memory ſhorter than that of a gnat. Hence I conclude, that you are never determined to any certain point, but are wholly directed by chance.

Serp. I ſhould have a confuſed head indeed, if from a ſtate of happineſs and eaſe I ſhould conſent to turn man again, whom I know to be entirely governed by caprice and whim. And as for my memory, that muſt be much ſhorter than it is, before I agree to revert to a ſtate ſo full of complaints and afflictions. Not to fatigue you then any longer, I can never bring myſelf to accept of a favour that muſt ſubmit me to ſo many infirmities, and cauſe me to be haunted with ſo many deſires, that may not with ſafety be gratified: Where every little exceſs is repaid with innumerable diſorders; and what is the worſt of it, where one muſt be baited with the perpetual fears of death, and yet live every moment in danger of it. Let me not therefore detain you, while I indulge a little in rubbing my ſkin, in order to preſerve it clean and ſupple, againſt yond juniper-tree.

A ſen-

A ſenſation not to be equalled by any that I can recollect in your ſtate; becauſe I find the pleaſure pure, and without allay; whereas with you, the ſweet is ſo mixed with the bitter, that the latter is by far the moſt predominant, and leaves a more laſting impreſſion. So that it has been rightly obſerved, that "a thouſand enjoyments are not a re-"compence for one pain." *Exit.*

Ul. Well! at length I am convinced, that I have been converſing with what, after all, are but brutes, endued with the power of ſpeech without judgment, which makes them overlook principal points to dwell on trifles. However, I'll not deſiſt from my glorious enterprize, but find the Goddeſs out, to preſent me to ſome that are worthy of the offer. For as the proverb has it, *You may eaſily do a perſon an injury againſt his inclination, but it is very difficult to ſerve him againſt his will. Exit.*

CIRCE.

Tranſlated from the *Italian* of

JOHN BAPTIST GELLI, *&c.*

DIALOGUE III.

Ulyſſes, Circe, *and the Hare.*

Ulyſſes. IF I had not been favoured with unqueſtionable proofs of *Circe*'s love, I muſt own I ſhould ſuſpect the Goddeſs was neither willing to grant my requeſt, nor yet inclined flatly to deny it; and therefore had choſen to amuſe me, by preſenting only ſuch as ſhe knew were invincibly bent againſt this change, that finding theſe beyond all powers of perſuaſion, I

ſhould through mere deſpair deſiſt from the attempt.

Circe. Let not *Ulyſſes* entertain a thought ſo unworthy of my love to him, or the reſpect I owe to the dignity of my own mind, which abhors a trick. Though you know one may, without cruelty, be a little ſhy in granting a favour.

Ul. Right: But you put me upon diſputing with the moſt obſtinate of all wretches; when I made him the offer of reſtoring him to his ſhape, and of conducting him to *Greece*, he looked upon me through the prejudice of his perverſeneſs, as if I intended him a real injury, and remonſtrated vehemently how great a ſufferer he ſhould be by the change.

Circe. As you would have done yourſelf, had you been in his caſe.

Ul. When he was a man, it is true, he was a practitioner in phyſick, and thoſe you know are converſant with little elſe but miſeries and complaints, noiſomneſs and infirmity, ſighs and groans; of which retaining ſtill a lively idea, (for what offends makes a more laſting impreſſion than what pleaſes us) he is ſhocked at the thoughts of returning to ſo diſagreeable a ſtate.

Circe. The caſe is general; misfortunes and complaints every where abound; contentment and happineſs are great rarities.

Ul. Then

Ul. Then he was not ſo wiſe a man as he is taken for, that, amongſt the bleſſings for which he daily offered up his thanks to Heaven, never omitted to praiſe the Gods, that he was formed a man and not a brute.

Circe. He did it in compliance with the opinion prevailing amongſt men, drawn from abſtracted and tedious conſequences. Whereas ſurely theſe people are to be looked upon as the beſt judges, who having experienced both conditions, have ſenſible demonſtration for their evidence; which is not only the moſt excellent, and leſs liable to error, than any other degrees of aſſurance, but the very ground and baſis of all knowledge.

Ul. I grant it; if the ſenſes of mere animals were to be compared to ours, whereas they are much leſs perfect.

Circe. Of which I don't believe one word, becauſe I find many of them excelling you in each.

Ul. It is undeniable, that ſome have a particular ſenſe more exquiſite, as the ſight of the Eagle, the ſmell of the Dog, and the hearing of the Gooſe, plainly ſhew. But we ſurpaſs them as much in our judgment upon ſenſible objects, by having the common Senſory more perfect; ſo that we draw juſter conſequences, and are better qualified to compare the repreſentation of one ſenſe and that of another. But come on—let us try

once more.——Sure all cannot be ſo far loſt to reaſon as theſe three firſt, who were deſervedly turned into ſuch ſorry animals, that their ſhape might match their underſtandings.

Circe. I agree: You ſhall diſcourſe with that Hare, which you ſee grazing in the ſhade of yon oak: Make up to her, and challenge her from me, that ſhe enjoys the power of ſpeech.

Ul. Hare; ſo may the Gods receive thy petitions as thou attendeſt to mine, which is, that thou would ſtay and anſwer me, as *Circe* ſays thou canſt.

Hare. Alas, what can this mean? And do I hear the ſounds of human language? and underſtand them too? Oh! ye cruel Fates, why have you dragged me back to ſo much miſery?

Ul. Call'ſt thou it miſery to underſtand the ſpeech of men?

Hare. Ay, miſery and unhappineſs itſelf; unleſs their nature has undergone a thorough change ſince I was of the ſpecies.

Ul. Why ſo?

Hare. Becauſe from every quarter my ears were pierced with moans and mutual complaints.

Ul. (*aſide*) Now have I fled into the jaws of *Scilla* to take refuge from *Charybdis*. The Phyſician, from his calling, converſed with few

few beſides the diſtreſſed and unhappy: and this, as far as I can gueſs, with none but the melancholy or mad.

Hare. This, as I was ſaying, made ſo ſtrong an impreſſion upon me, that I would a thouſand times have fled into the woods, far from all prints of human footſteps, had it been conſiſtent with my nature, without ſuffering the greateſt difficulties, to ſubſiſt in a place of ſolitude.

Ul. But have not other animals their complaints, and their manner of expreſſing them too?

Hare. They have: And when any of our own ſpecies have a particular paſſion to diſcover, we underſtand the ſounds that are affixed to it. As it is natural to every creature, by a variation of ſigns, to explain their grief or joys; but then theſe different modulations only ſignify the affection in general: now this is much more tolerable than your human way, which beſide the piteous manner of expreſſing yourſelves, with ſighs, groans, and melancholy accents, exaggerating your own miſeries, communicate them to thoſe that hear them. For my own part, beſides theſe infectious lamentations, I can charge my memory with little elſe but relations of murders, treaſons, robberies, and aſſaſſinations, perpetrated by one wretch upon another; ſo that I can ſafely ſay, I ſuf-

fered more by the impreſſions made upon me from without, than from any ſorrow ſpringing originally in my own mind.

Ul. Pray (unleſs you have any objection) tell me what might be your imployment when you was a man ?

Hare. Why, to tell you the truth, I altered my condition ſo often, that I cannot directly anſwer you. But what may be your reaſon for aſking that queſtion ?

Ul. The natural love I ſhall ever bear my countrymen. It was this put me upon ſoliciting the Goddeſs of the iſland, to reſtore to human ſhape all the *Greeks* that ſojourn here ; and learning from her that you was one, I here make you a free offer of the boon, being myſelf a *Greek*, and my name *Ulyſſes*.

Hare. To me! oh never, never, whilſt I have any choice left.

Ul. But why ? Is it not better to be a man than a ſavage creature ?

Hare. I anſwer from my own knowledge in the negative.

Ul. But are you really ſerious ? and are determined to let life take it's courſe in this ſame ſhape ?

Hare. Even ſo ; becauſe as I am, I am contented and eaſy in my way, which when a man I never found myſelf to be.

Ul. This might be your own fault, by being

being perhaps too unreaſonable to be content with any thing.

Hare. I ſhould ſuſpect as much myſelf, if I had ſeen any perſon in any ſtation whatſoever, (and my acquaintance was general) whom I found perfectly contented. But to reaſon upon the caſe, How is it poſſible any man can be perfectly eaſy? For either it is his lot to be loaded with the care of governing other people, or his fate not to have the government of himſelf.

Ul. In either of which ſituations I aſſert, that with a little prudence, a perſon may be very happy.

Hare. I roundly deny that he can be ſo in either. If he be a Prince or Governor, if he endeavours to diſcharge the duties of his office, it is impoſſible he ſhould have an hour's eaſe. He is the butt of all plots and conſpiracies, which he has reaſon enough to fear, perpetually ſpringing up out of the envy that is the attendant on his ſtation. The Prince within his diſtrict repreſents the great and good Governor of the Univerſe, whoſe care extends itſelf to all things: So that the ſaying is true enough, that "his 'ſubjects ſleep for him;" But what pleaſure is reſerved for his ſhare?

Ul. Pleaſures of the moſt exalted kind, to ſee nations civilized by his care, and mutually contributing to each other's happineſs; from

whence he reaps a harveſt of glory and honour, that repays him with immortality.

Hare. But where are theſe happy creatures to be found? Only among us, that follow only what Nature directs: Whereas you that go beyond her preſcriptions, find your deſires impatient and boundleſs. Hence all the train of ſeditions, tumults, and conſpiracies, which every where ſo much abound, that for my own part, I ſhould prefer a ſituation among craggy rocks in the moſt abandoned ſolitude, inhabited only by the moſt ſavage beaſts, before a ſeat in the beſt adminiſtered government upon earth.

Ul. But you forget, that under a good and well-governed adminiſtration, there is no room for the perturbations you deſcribe.

Hare. And how pray is your peace preſerved? Why, ſo great is the perverſeneſs of human nature, that offenders are reſtrained by ſuch penalties and tortures, that the judge who pronounces the ſentence, and the ſpectator that ſees it executed, ſuffer little leſs than the malefactor. So much the cruelty of your nature exceeds ours, we never quarrel with thoſe of our own ſpecies, and ſeldom with thoſe of another, unleſs prompted to it by hunger, driven by fear, or forced to it in our own defence.

Ul. Why truly it is not to be denied but that ſovereign Princes, as they ought to have

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the welfare of their ſubjects at heart, muſt meet with more incidents to diſturb than to pleaſe them: But as it can fall to the lot of very few men to be Princes, let us rather take in the majority, and conſider the ſtate of a private man, who is ſuppoſed to have few concerns beſides thoſe for his own family.

Hare. The caſe is juſt the ſame with a private man; for either he is rich or poor. Riches, as they are acquired by care, are ever attended by it; and the fear of loſing them never permits the poſſeſſor to enjoy them a moment quietly. Sometimes the apprehenſions of a war, which time and the courſe of things muſt neceſſarily bring on, are the bugbear; one while the wife is in fault, another the children; to day the ſervants, and to morrow the very labourers are villains. In a word, as gold is every body's aim, ſo it requires great circumſpection to ſecure it. If your private man be poor, I ſhall not take up ſo much of your time as a deſcription of his miſery would require; for of all conditions the poor man's is the leaſt tolerable.

Ul. That is more than I ſhall readily allow, becauſe many of our wiſe men have both wrote in praiſe of poverty, and ſtudiouſly courted it, by contemning riches, and throwing them away, that they with the leſs interruption

interruption might attend upon their ſpeculations.

Hare. The greateſt part of them, I dare anſwer for it, and perhaps all of them, did it out of vanity, to paſs upon the world for ſomething great and extraordinary. Beſides, there have been inſtances of thoſe that have thrown away an ounce to get a pound. For it is the way of the world to load you with what you ſeem to deſpiſe.

Ul. You love to hear yourſelf talk. I ſay that I have known many a one live contentedly in a ſtate of poverty; particularly among the Philoſophers.

Hare. And I aſſure you they were in the right on't; it being the only way they had to ſecure themſelves from the contempt of the world. Though I am perſuaded the more knowledge a man has, the more impatient he is of poverty.

Ul. Whence it ſhould it proceed?

Hare. From reflections on the partiality of Fortune, in denying him the favours which ſhe ſcatters with profuſion on a thouſand fools.

Ul. You put me in mind of a friend of mine, who uſed to ſay, that *It is with riches as with a defluxion or catarrh, they generally fall upon the weakeſt part.*

Hare. What aggravates the miſery of their condition is to think, that Nature ſeems to take

take a ſtep out of her ordinary courſe on purpoſe to oppreſs them. For whereas ſhe abundantly provides for her whole family, in this her method is reverſed, and one part of it is overwhelmed with ſatiety, whilſt the other pines in want: And this only from a fault in the diſpoſition, where every one is permitted to take juſt as much as he is able, which can never happen to one of us. Becauſe no one either deſires, or indeed can poſſeſs more of the good things that Nature ſupplies him with, than another.

Ul. You are of their opinion I find, who hold that robbery has loſt its name. For the thing ſtolen has undergone ſo many thefts already, that now all right to it is loſt but what poſſeſſion gives.

Hare. To cloſe the argument: Let this convince you, Sir, that poverty is an evil of the firſt rate, ſince to avoid it, Men will ſubmit even to be ſervants one to another. A thing ſo ſhocking, that there is not amongſt us an animal ſo baſe as not to prefer death to a ſorry ſubſiſtence ſo dearly purchaſed, every one being neceſſarily his own maſter.

Ul. By your leave, there may be other motives beſides poverty that may make men content to be ſlaves; witneſs the great number of the rich that are ſo.

Hare. Theſe, according to a true eſtimate, are the pooreſt of all creatures; labouriug under

under the worſt ſort of poverty, a poverty of ſpirit, or a meanneſs of underſtanding, which out of an indulgence to a depraved appetite for fame or titles, would be contented thus to ſacrifice their reſt.

Ul. This cannot be the caſe, becauſe many ſuch were before that in very happy circumſtances.

Hare. Pray who were they? for I never yet ſaw the man who could ſay either that he wanted nothing, or was not deſirous of getting more. Unleſs ſome few, who towards their latter end have out of ſpite endeavoured to get rid of thoſe riches which coſt them ſo much pains in their youth, that they thought their death was haſtened on by them.

Ul. Theſe are miſtakes in Judgment, not faults in Nature.

Hare. This ſeems to me to be the ſame thing, ſince pernicious miſtakes flow from your very nature. Whereas our nature never leads us into any. I remember when I was at the age in which one begins to have ſome dawnings of reflection, that being under the care of a tutor ſet over me by my father, who was a man of fortune and quality in *Etolia*, as he was inſtructing me in ſome part of the Mathematicks, according the method of our *Greek* education, I hit upon a thought, that the mind of man was a meer

a meer uninſcribed tablet *, wholly devoid of all ideas but ſuch as are imprinted on it. This ſingle reflection, though I had no reaſon to complain of any unaptneſs in myſelf to learn, or ſeverity from my preceptor in teaching, yet out of a mere reſtleſneſs of temper natural to boys, gave me great uneaſineſs, under circumſtances in which I lacked nothing to make me happy.

Ul. I would fain know what concluſion you will draw, from the acts of an underſtanding which you own to be immature, and conſequently, in a ſtate of imperfection.

Hare. Well; the next alteration in my condition was at the death of my father; this embroiled me with my brothers, till a proper diviſion could be made of his eſtate. However, it was ſome comfort to be able to ſee that there muſt be ſome time an end of our quarrels, and then the remainder of my life, I reſolved, ſhould be one calm ſcene of uninterrupted tranquillity. Which was juſt the reverſe of what was really my lot. For as my fortune conſiſted partly of lands, and partly of money, each of theſe brought with them their reſpective troubles. My

* *Gelli* ſeems very artfully to infinuate a notion which it was not ſafe for him to aſſert, but was reſerved for our great countryman Mr. *Locke* to demonſtrate, with all that freedom of thought with which he delighted to ſubvert the moſt venerable errors.

lands engaged me with Farmers, and my money involved me with Merchants. And he that ſhould be in league with a band of Highwaymen, would have to do with honeſter people than either of them. But tho' I could find them pretty well agreed, as to the main point of getting all I *had* to themſelves, yet I could perceive each in his own ſtation to be very diſcontented. The farmer found fault with the ſeaſons, and the men of buſineſs with the times. This complained of his hard luck, and laid the blame both on the Heavens and the Earth. The other entertained you with nothing but the cruelty of Fortune, the perils of Voyages, quarrels of Princes, and the deadneſs of Trade.

Ul. It is very true, that each man has his own grievances, and it is as true, that each of you has his alſo.

Hare. But where we meet with one, you feel a thouſand. Farther, give me leave to obſerve, that the common occurrences of life, to defend one's property (for all men are cheats, though in different ways) throws you into the hands of an infinite number of tradeſmen and lawyers. Now I can't charge my memory, that I ever found one of theſe pleaſed with his own circumſtances: Becauſe theſe having all the ſame view of raiſing a fortune, lamented their being obliged to be

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in a perpetual ſtate of wrangling and quarrelling, which however was neceſſary to it.

Ul. I think he has much more cauſe to lament, that has any thing to do with them; as for their part, I fancy they ſuffer very little from other people's quarrels, which are their harveſt.

Hare. He that is always plaguing others, can have no peace himſelf. Conſider what it muſt be, to be hated by thoſe that do not employ you, and always ſuſpected by thoſe that do.

Ul. Right; and this puts me in mind, that when a queſtion was ſtarted in one of the ſchools, which ought to have the precedence, a Lawyer or a Phyſician? it was anſwered, that "Cuſtom had determined "the point; for that the thief always goes "before the hangman."

Hare. Tired with the diſcontentedneſs of theſe people, and deſirous of eaſe myſelf, if there be ſuch a thing as peace, ſaid I, ſure ſhe muſt have taken up her habitation in one of the colleges of our Prieſts. Theſe, being ſeparated from the cares of the world, are acquainted with no other but that of ſerving their Gods; are exempt from the troubles that attend property, by having all things provided for them in common; and from any political concerns, by being ſubject to one of their own order. Charmed with the

the delightful idea, I reſolved to quit the world, to live in peace with them. But alas! a ſlight acquaintance with their manners convinced me, that diſcord and unhappineſs were no ſtrangers amongſt them. For each of them at all adventures aſpiring to be their chief, ſtuck at nothing to diſſerve and undermine the reſt: I ſoon diſcerned likewiſe with what reluctance they ſubmitted to their ſeveral ſubordinations, and the difficulty they found, to maintain themſelves in that eſteem in the world which is their ſupport. Add to this the diſagreeableneſs of an inactive recluſe life, and the labour it requires to perſuade men, that they are more in the intereſt of the Gods, than thoſe that ſerve the world with only ſuch laws as God and Nature gave us. Theſe diſagreeable circumſtances made me fling my reſolutions of retirement ſo far from me, that they have never ſince been able to reach me. My next trial was to take upon me the ſtate of a Man of Quality, and to fill up my vacant hours with the amuſement of hunting, and ſuch like diverſions.

Ul. Whoever propoſes to find happineſs in that ſort of life, and much more in the army, I dare pronounce him, from my own experience, miſtaken.

Hare. As for the army, I had no turn to it; thinking it abſurd to ſeek for peace in a ſtate of war. Beſides, it ſeemed to me highly

ly ridiculous, when neither the publick good, or one's own private honour, or ſome juſtifiable occaſion demands it, to ſell one's life at any rate. For as we can come but once into the world, I think one would not be bought out of it at ſo poor a recompence, as all the treaſure that is already coined, or is breeding in the world. Seeing farther, that it was impoſſible to keep up the port or dignity of a man of rank without a great number of ſervants, who are all in a different intereſt from their maſter, and are inceſſantly doing one thing or other to plague him, I threw up all thoughts of that kind of life. At laſt, thinking that to ſerve a Prince in ſome honourable poſt would anſwer the end I propoſed, I determined, with the ſmall abilities I was maſter of, to ſet out and make an offer of them at Court, where I was as much baulked as in my former ſchemes. For beſides the fatigues of attendance, and the ſacrifice one muſt make of time, quiet, and health, the neceſſity of bearing with the envy that reigns in Courts, and the ingratitude of Princes, which their Miniſters would accuſe them of, ſhould they give them half their kingdom, coſt me many hours of happineſs, and left me very little to make ſatisfaction for the want of them. At length, through mere deſpair, I reſolved to tempt the dangers of the Sea, where good luck

threw into my way what I had ſo long been in queſt of in vain. For being happily brought to this fortunate iſland, *Circe* tranſformed me into what you ſee, Sir, a Hare. Which change ſhe wrought upon me, by ſteeping my faculties in a ſweet oblivion; in which ſtate, if it be true that I have fewer ideas than when I was one of you, I am ſure I have fewer fears.

Ul. Ridiculous! to hear the moſt ſtartliſh, timorous of animals boaſt of his courage.

Hare. Againſt all of our own ſpecies we dare; which is my ſecurity; and a greater than the anger of the Gods has granted you.

Ul. Well, allowing that every human condition you have named, abounds with theſe and yet greater cares; however, I don't find you have any very exquiſite pleaſures, in your preſent ſtate, to brag of.

Hare. If you come to that; pray what pleaſures do you men enjoy, which are not embittered by the more predominant ingredient of trouble? This made one of the oldeſt of our *Greek* poets declare, that "The "pleaſure now flouriſhing in the world is "not ſincerely and genuinely ſuch, but ſor-"row clothed in her robes."

Ul. How did he make that out?

Hare. Why, "when the fatal box was "opened, and *Pandora* filled the earth with

"un-

" unnumber'd evils, Pleaſure amongſt the " reſt took her flight about the world, and " with her bewitching charms ſo engaged " mankind, that not one was left to caſt up " a pious thought, or wiſhful look, towards " Heaven. Enraged at this, the Father of " the Gods diſpatched the Muſes, to try if " by their harmony they could allure her " up to Heaven. But firſt they made her " quit her robe to qualify her for thoſe un- " corruptible manſions, where all things ap- " pear in undiſguiſed purity. Sorrow in that " inſtant wandring up and down the earth, " by all ſhunned and hated, took up the " robe, and hoping thus diſguiſed not to be " deteſted, put it on, and ever ſince, in Plea- " ſure's ſemblance, has impoſed upon man- " kind."

Ul. What would the old Bard teach us by this ſtory?

Hare. That thoſe things which men take for delights, are in truth ſo many puniſh- ments. Which he thus accounts for, that " Sorrow impoſes on the world in Pleaſure's " habit, and they never diſcover the cheat " but in the end." Give me leave to men- tion one thing, which all mankind, how different ſoever in their circumſtances, agree to rank among their pleaſures, yet I will maintain it to be nothing elſe but mere eſſen-

tial miſery; and that is a hankering after play, or gaming.

Ul. I fancy, Sir, you mean loſing; for there is no harm in playing, they ſay; but loſing is, I own, a bad thing.

Hare. They are both bad; though I agree with you, that the loſer has generally the worſt on't. And if every thing that cauſes violent perturbations in the mind is to be avoided, even to win is not deſirable, though it ſeems to have the advantage in point of profit. If it be ſaid, that it exalts the mind to a very high extaſy of joy: It may be anſwered, that no joy is warrantable but what proceeds from virtuous and juſtifiable reflections. And then, even their good luck runs them into ſuch extravagancies, that when a man is given up to play, I give him over for loſt and ruined.

Ul. This I can never come into; becauſe I have known many live this way, who had no other method of ſupporting themſelves.

Hare. Perhaps ſo; but then I warrant you, it was long after their original ſtock was ſunk. For I uſed to think, that play ſerves a man of fortune, as ivy does a good wall; when it has once taken firm root in him, it never leaves him till it brings him into a ruinous condition; but then it will prop him ſo, that he ſhan't tumble quite to the

the ground. Thus when a Gentleman is thoroughly attached to gaming, he'll be ruined by it; but then it will keep him from ſtarving. Becauſe, by being acquainted with the gameſter's haunts, it gives him an opportunity, by cringing to every one, and flattering the winners, to recommend himſelf to a ſorry maintenance. Believe me, Sir, the love of play is one of the greateſt misfortunes that can befall a man, and it ſeems to me to be a peſtilence of ſo contagious a nature, as to threaten the whole ſpecies. For we ſee very conſiderable parties ſo intirely devoted to this infatuation, as profeſſedly to renounce for it all honourable employments, by which they might do their country ſervice, and ſome particulars ſo bewitched by it, as to neglect all thoughts of honour, health, and credit; all concerns for friends, children, wife, nay even for themſelves, till at laſt, by making away every thing that belonged to them, they are reduced to ſo ſcandalous a ſtate of poverty, that they fly from the preſence of a man with greater precipitation than we hares do from the ſight of a dog; eſpecially if he chance to be an old acquaintance, that knew him in the days of his extravagance. And what yet aggravates the miſery, they have ſtill a hankering after the deluſion that ruined them, and are per-

petually caſting about to come at ſome ſmall trifle to venture, in order to fetch back (as they call it) the reſt; for which they are content to deprive themſelves even of neceſſaries. That, I think, *Ulyſſes*, a ſtrong inſtance, how fallacious at leaſt men's pleaſures may prove to them.

Ul. The inference is only from a particular; beſides, I know no obligation that a Man's nature lays upon him, to determine him to this folly. Nor have you named any evils of this kind which a little prudence might not prevent or remedy.

Hare. True: But with what difficulty, in ſo corrupt and debauched a ſtate of mankind? So that I can never perſuade myſelf to exchange a being free from care, for one that is ever embarraſſed; where I muſt have the mortification to ſee what Nature gave in common to all, only in the poſſeſſion of thoſe that are mightier than myſelf; to whom I muſt be a ſlave, forſooth, to get a niggardly allowance of what ſhe ſcattered with a liberal hand. And to complete all, where my ſeeming pleaſures are ſure to prove real misfortunes.

Ul. How impertinent is ſo much obſtinacy in ſo contemptible an animal, who knows ſo little of himſelf, as not to be ſure what ſex he is of!

Hare.

Hare. It is truer that you, who muſt ſeem to be ignorant of nothing, don't know it. For our own parts, we are ſatisfied with our knowledge upon that head.

Ul. Thou art ſo great a coward that every thing affrights thee : Thy whole truſt is in thy feet, and they betray thee to whole ſpecies of animals, that are in combination to purſue thee.

Hare. What is that to me as an individual, if our whole ſpecies be liable to the ſame ?

Ul. Then your lives are ſo precarious, that every ſlight injury puts an end to them.

Hare. I beg of you, no more ; nor endeavour to ſhew me the want of that knowledge which, if I had, would render me the moſt unhappy creature in the world : So pray make your offer where it may be more welcome, which I aſſure you will find no acceptance here. In the mean time, as I always follow the impulſe of Nature, I muſt obey her ſummons to the delicious paſturage of the inviting verdure upon yonder riſing grounds.

Ul. I muſt tell thee, Hare, thou putteſt me ſtrongly in mind of a ſcoundrel, who being caſt into priſon for his debts, and finding himſelf without any trouble ſupported by the goal maintenance, made intereſt with his creditors, not to drag him from a place

ſo agreeable to his indolence. What could this be owing to but the moſt abject baſeneſs of mind? Or who would not prefer a life of liberty, with all it's inconveniency, to the greateſt affluence in a coop? For a manly prudence is never ſo properly exerciſed as in providing againſt the accidents to which Nature ſubjects us. So that in thy ſtate of manhood, I collect thou muſt have been both a mean and unreaſonable creature, not to be able to confront the troubles which the World and Fortune throw in our way; and conſequently, loveſt the thoughtleſſneſs of a Brute, better than the active wiſdom of a Man. So I leave thee to enjoy it, rather than force thee, contrary to thy inclinations, to a change that would prove a ſcandal to our ſpecies; as every one is, that is baſe enough to think like thee.

Hare. I could eaſily anſwer all this ſounding harangue. But as we are by Nature reſtrained from exceeding her demands, ſo are we neceſſitated to ſatisfy her cravings, when proper food is provided for us. And as that beautiful herbage has ſtruck my eye, from the hill that riſes there over-againſt us, and I find myſelf hungry, I muſt beg to take my leave.

Exit Hare.

CIRCE.

CIRCE.

Tranſlated from the *Italian* of

JOHN BAPTIST GELLI, *&c.*

DIALOGUE IV.

Ulyſſes, Circe, *and the Goat.*

Ulyſſes.
Always thought, illuſtrious Queen, that *Man differs much from Man*, as our *Greek* proverb has it, but could not have ſuſpected the difference to be ſo wide, if I had not diſputed with the Hare you preſented me to; or to ſpeak more properly, with him whom you changed into that ſhape.

Circe. Why? Pray has he a mind to be changed back again?

Ul.

Ul. The fartheſt from it in the world: He received my propoſal with greater deteſtation than any of the reſt.

Circe. I hope you are now convinced, how vain your ſorrow was, that I had thus transformed your friends.

Ul. No, I aſſure you, I lament them more than ever; being more confirmed in my notion, as it is evident to me, that this wretch's cowardice and puſillanimity hinders him from diſcerning the truth. Would you believe it! that he was naturally of ſo baſe a ſpirit, and ſo averſe to any little trouble, that he rather choſe to live in the moſt abject ſlavery, void of care, than to enjoy the moſt honourable poſt, attended with the buſineſs that is inſeparable from it?

Circe. Who told you ſo much of him?

Ul. Himſelf; by preferring the life of a beaſt, merely becauſe men ſeemed to him to be ſubject to ſome trouble. Though at the ſame time he could not help owning, that he was under ſo ſtrong a biaſs from Nature, and ſo powerfully neceſſitated by her influence, that he was not maſter of his own actions. For finding himſelf in the midſt of our diſpute diſpoſed to eat, and ſeeing I know not what herb, which he ſaid was proper for him, he left me abruptly, quite unanſwered, and ſorely againſt his will; declaring that he muſt obey the call of Nature which

which directed him to it. And yet to prove to you how mean a wretch he muſt have been, he chooſes to continue in the ſtate of ſlavery, rather than to be reſtored to manhood, and the government of theſe tyrannick paſſions. Though he could not but have heard of the many noble examples of our illuſtrious countrymen, ſo celebrated by Fame, for having freely ſacrificed their lives, rather than lye under any ſlavery or conſtraint, and yet have never eſteemed it a diſgrace to have ſtruggled with Fortune and the World.

Circe. What you call force or ſlavery is to him neither the one nor the other.

Ul. How ſo?

Circe. Becauſe his nature requires it. When a ſtone deſcends towards the center, does it act under any force?

Ul. I ſhould anſwer that I thought not.

Circe. And yet it can't act otherwiſe.

Ul. True: But as it's nature required it; the motion by which it proceeds in that direction, ariſing from an intrinſick power and an internal principle, does it no violence; becauſe all violence is what is ſuffered from ſome exterior power, which can by no means be ſaid to happen to the ſtone, in the motion you deſcribe; ſo that though it cannot but act as it does, it cannot be ſaid to ſuffer any violence.

Circe.

Circe. However it is true, that it is attracted towards the center by the force of it's own gravity.

Ul. Not by the force, but by the nature of it's own gravity; it being natural to it to gravitate, which if it did not, it would not be a ſtone.

Circe. This is juſt the caſe with the propenſions of mere animals, under the influence of their proper nature, which can't be called force, as it acts always for the beſt for them, and what moſt effectually tends to their preſervation and perfection.

Ul. But would it not be better to be above the reach of this influence, and be able to act abſolutely free?

Circe. Quite the reverſe; becauſe having no underſtanding, which is the reſult of reaſoning, they would be perpetually (unleſs thus controlled, led into miſtakes, which, as matters now ſtand with them, ſeldom or never happens.

Ul. What proof have you of this?

Circe. Experience; for though there be a ſample of every ſpecies within the narrow compaſs of this little iſland, which conſequently muſt fall under my daily notice, I can't charge my memory with having ever obſerved any of them diſorder'd, from either an undue quantity, or an improper kind of food. Whence, though a ſhorter term of life

life falls to their ſhare, yet they get to the end of it healthy and vigorous, which is more than you dare boaſt of.

Ul. If they are ſubject to none of theſe diſorders, how comes it about that their life is ſhorter than ours?

Circe. From their conſtitution; which is not ſo well mixed as your's. The radical moiſture, which is the ſupport and food of life, being more impregnated with water, and participating leſs of the nature of air; ſo that it is more eaſily diſpoſed to corrupt. I mean in general, though there are inſtances of animals, ſuch as the elephant and the ſtag, that are much longer lived than you.

Ul. And are you ſeriouſly of opinion, that it is better to be a Beaſt than a Man?

Circe. I never ſaid ſo much, nor have you any reaſon for drawing the inference. If ſo, pray why don't I change myſelf into one? But if I muſt take the ſame ſide of the queſtion with you, converſation drops of courſe. Let it ſuffice, that you have full commiſſion to make your offer to any that will accept of it, and if you are reſolved not to be too ſoon diſcouraged, who knows but you may find ſome one that will at length cloſe with it?

Ul. I am reſolved then, it being a reflection upon a man to have deſiſted cowardly from a brave enterprize.

Circe.

Circe. If ſo, then call to the Goat that browzes there, who, as I remember, was a *Greek.*

Ul. Attend, you Goat, for *Circe* tells me that thou art a *Greek.*

Goat. I was ſo, when I was a Man, my name *Cleomenes* of *Corinth:* But I am no longer ſo; and what's more, will ne'er be ſo again.

Ul. What aſhamed of your country! *Corinthian?*

Goat. How can that be, when there is not upon earth a more honourable city?

Ul. What is it then that you are ſo reſolutely bent againſt?

Goat. Againſt returning to manhood. This is the only fear that remains with me; ſo much more happy am I in my preſent than in my former ſtate.

Ul. I was juſt going to make you an ineſtimable offer, of no leſs than that of reſtoring you to your former figure, of extricating you from this ſtate of ſlavery, and of being your convoy to your native country.

Goat. I am obliged to you for any good intention; but I fear, that in this caſe the fact would prove the reverſe of the promiſe.

Ul. How is it poſſible, good *Cleomenes*, when I have often heard our *Grecian* ſages defend this propoſition, " that Man is the " moſt noble and moſt perfect animal; or " rather,

" rather, in ſome meaſure the end and lord " of all the reſt?"

Goat. And they ſpoke like Sages; for a wiſe man ſhould think well of what is his own; and an honeſt man ſhould ſpeak as things appear to him.

Ul. But what is this mighty happineſs you enjoy, which humanity would ſo much abridge?

Goat. If I ſhould deſcribe it to you, I know you by your nature ſo difficult to be pleaſed, and ſo inſatiable when you are ſo, that perhaps you would deſpiſe it; and be no more ſatisfied with it, than with the good things of this life, or the expectations of the next. But I will ſubmit to you a few of thoſe evils which we are abſolved from; evils of ſo malignant a nature, that if you judge without prejudice, you muſt envy us, as much as you fancy we ought to envy you.

Ul. Come on then, as many of them as you pleaſe.

Goat. Manifold are the miſeries, and various are the evils, to which mankind is expoſed, which would induce one to prefer any condition that ſets us free from them. But it were impracticable to reduce them within the ſcanty meaſure of time that is allowed me to treat of them. For, to own the truth, having dined very plentifully, I find

find Nature, which above all things takes care of my health, prompting me ſtrongly to repoſe myſelf, and take a ſound ſleep, within the cool receſs of that ſhady grove.

Ul. However, let me intreat the favour of hearing ſome of the chief of theſe dreadful evils that attend us.

Goat. With all my heart. Know firſt then, *Ulyſſes*, that human nature is ſurrounded with unnumbred miſeries, whereof there are four that ſeem to be the principal; each of which, if my memory fails me not, would move me to prefer to it the life of the moſt deſpicable reptile upon earth.

Ul. Name them.

Goat. The inſecurity of the preſent good, the apprehenſion of future evils, the jealouſy of thoſe with whom you are obliged to live; and fourthly, the dread of the laws.

Ul. Oh! you think of too many bad things.

Goat. The point is how to think on fewer. But to begin, Pray what moral ſecurity can a man have, that he ſhall peaceably, even for one hour, poſſeſs his preſent enjoyments, I ſpeak of common advantages? Now theſe are primarily in the hands of Fortune, and how ſlippery a tenure that is, one need not ſay. They are in a ſecondary manner in the diſpoſal of Princes, who acknowledge no other law but their own will, and how irregular

regular a thing human will is, you know better than I.

Ul. This is true; but a wiſe man will take care, not to be obnoxious to the caprice of the one or the other.

Goat. If we conſider property, who is he that can depend upon the poſſeſſion of it for one poor day? For ſince the diſtribution into *meum* and *tuum* obtained in the world, each man's avarice is ſo whetted, that it is ever on the watch, by ways licit or illicit, to acquire riches, no matter at whoſe expence.

Ul. I am thoroughly convinced that men lay more ſnares for one another, than they do againſt any of you.

Goat. To what an extremity the fear of having theſe riches extorted from them, by the violence of Princes, may drive men, let it ſuffice, that I have known ſome quite diſclaim all uſe of them, and by an affected poverty, and real miſery, keep them buried, ſo that they were of no more uſe to the owner than to an indifferent perſon: All the advantage he reaped from them, was the knowledge where they were hid, and the pleaſure of watching them.

Ul. I bar all declaiming againſt avarice, which is ſo monſtrous a vice, that it diveſts men of all natural affection, even towards themſelves.

Goat. Of the apprehenſions from thieves, ſervants, workmen, and eſpecially of your wife (if ſhe happens to be ſomewhat younger than yourſelf) all that I ſhall ſay is, that let it be more or leſs it has no place in our eſtimate of things. We acknowledge no ſuch Deity as Fortune, and as we have no property, it is impoſſible there ſhould be any one diſhoneſt amongſt us. Much leſs, being all upon a par, can we have any fear of being robbed by one of ſuperior power, which might prompt us to hide what we value.

Ul. I am perſuaded that theſe things give many ſour reflections; but I am as much perſuaded, that he who has his paſſions in due ſubjection will ſteer clear of much the major part of them.

Goat. How can thoſe be held in due ſubjection, whoſe nature it is to be in a conſtant rebellion?

Ul. There never was yet a complete victory obtained without immenſe toils.

Goat. A very ſounding period truly! But to our ſecond point, I would fain know what animal is at all ſolicitous about things not preſent, except it be man alone.

Ul. What things not preſent?

Goat. Why, if the ſky be a little overcaſt you are frighten'd out of your wits for your harveſts. If you hear the thunder grumble, or ſee a flaſh or two of lightning, then

then is the time for ſuperſtition to begin her pranks: One flies to the temples and wearies the Gods; a ſecond takes ſanctuary under ground, becauſe, forſooth, ſomebody has told him, that "the lightning never pierces "the earth above five foot deep;" a third fool clothes himſelf with ſeal-ſkin*, becauſe ſome old woman has aſſured him, that "that "ſea-monſter was never known to be thun-"derſtruck."

Ul. Well, but how many can you charge with ſuch folly?

Goat. Every one; thoſe who have it not one way, have it another. How many could I name to you, that out of the mere dread of being ſick are never well, who ſo far from indulging in the liberty that health allows, never dare tranſgreſs, either in the quantity, or kind, preſcribed by their Phyſician? And then the leaſt alteration of weather, either to hotter or colder, gives ſuch a turn to their blood and ſpirits, that they find themſelves really out of order.

Ul. We muſt own, that there are ſome vapouriſh people, that are eaſily put out of order.

Goat. And I have obſerved, that of thoſe who are more hardy and deſpiſe theſe little notices, few are very long lived; and thoſe

* *Auguſtum certè illi pelle pro* ἀποτροπαίῳ *Fulminis uſum, a Suetonio in ejus vita refertur.*

that linger on, generally ſpeaking, ſo wear out and impoveriſh their conſtitution, that when youth deſerts them, a thouſand complaints ſucceed in its place. And then, upon reflection on ſome of the follies of their younger days, they fancy themſelves never free from having ſome hint or *minding* of them.

Ul. Is it not ſo with you?

Goat. No, becauſe we live by one ſimple rule, chalked out by Nature for us. Add to this, the diſheartning ſuſpicions of being deſerted in ſickneſs, the fear of being put into a wrong method, and the jealouſy of having your affairs miſmanaged. Now this can never happen to one of us, who have no wants but what we can ſupply ourſelves, and no concerns as we have no property.

Ul. And yet I have known ſome of you, who are ſo well equipped, ſo well ſet out of hand, very miſerable from the point of a thorn, which you could never have picked out without the aſſiſtance of us.

Goat. But the caſes are ſo very rare that they are of no account. Then as to your fear of death, what deſcription can exaggerate it?

Ul. Well, and are not you affected by the fear of death too?

Goat. Not before it comes upon us; not till the pains are actually upon us. Where-

as

as the very thoughts of it, or even the foreknowledge when it ſhall happen, throws you into ſuch horrors, that ſome of you have with your own hands opened a way to death, merely to get rid of the fear of dying. Ha! ha! ha! Let us now conſider the anxious cares that haunt you, concerning things future and at a diſtance. And how unhappy muſt be their ſtate, that are not only concerned for things neceſſary to their daily ſubſiſtence, but for what is at the diſtance of a year or two, ſo that the care to prevent misfortunes fills up all the intervening ſpace, from the apprehenſion till their arrival.

Ul. And I dare affirm that ſome of you labour under cares of the ſame ſort.

Goat. Name one.

Ul. The ant, who in ſummer lays up a magazine to laſt her through the winter.

Goat. I grant the fact, but deny the motive. It is not out of any apprehenſion of a failure or dearth, as when you provide againſt the future; but as ſhe never ſtirs from under ground, being not able to endure the winter's cold, ſhe lays up what ſhe has occaſion for, within her reach, in the place of her reſidence. To this ſhe is directed by Nature, not by any *preſention* that ſhe ſhall want what is not at that time of the year to be had above-ground. For how is it poſſible that they ſhould know when things are in

ſeaſon, who know not the ſeaſons themſelves? nay, we know nothing of time, or any of it's parts.

Ul. No! how comes it then that ſo many of you can ſo exactly make off and return at ſtated ſeaſons, as your birds of paſſage, the ſwallow and the field-fare? and that ſome can ſo regularly take to their winter-quarters in caverns, as the ſerpent and the badger?

Goat. This does not prove that they have any idea of the ſeaſons themſelves, abſtractedly conſider'd; but that they are ſenſibly affected by phyſical movements. Nay, farther, we know not only nothing of time, but nothing of the motion of the heavenly bodies*, which are it's ſubject. All that we perceive are the ſenſible differences cauſed by them; ſometimes by heat, ſometimes by cold; at one ſeaſon by winds, and at another by rains. And in theſe we are ſo very ſagacious, that the whole doctrine of your Auguries and Auſpices is founded in obſervations upon ſome of us. Now how is this to be accounted for? Why as we have not our heads filled, like yours, with a thouſand whims and extrava-

* *Pythagoras* aſſerted, that "Time was the ſphere of the "laſt Heaven, which contains all things;" to ſignify that all things are wrapt up and included in time; and that the motion of the Univerſe is the meaſure of time, which begun with this viſible world, and can only end with it.

gancies,

gancies, our attention being free, we are at leiſure to diſcern the moſt minute alterations.

Ul. So that you think it a misfortune to be ſenſible how time paſſes.

Goat. A very great one; becauſe as that, or rather the motion of the celeſtial bodies which gives it a being, is the cauſe of all the changes in bodies, it muſt have an effect upon your own. Now you that can calculate this will always be picturing to yourſelves death in an advancing poſture: This makes you gravely count the ſolemn hours one by one; that again gives the alarm to every ſuſpicion concerning futurity, which can never happen to us who live free, a rent-charge upon Nature. If what has been ſaid of the fear of death be not ſufficient to expoſe your vanity, to convince you of it let us a little conſider your cares for what ſhall happen after it.

Ul. A very laudable concern too; to leave our affairs in ſuch a condition that our children, who are a part of us, may paſs through life with fewer troubles than we have done.

Goat. Well, as long as you can plead any uſe in it, I forgive you; but what ſay you of being ſolicitous about things for which you cannot ſo much as plead the leaſt ſhadow of utility?

Ul. What do you allude to?

Goat. To your ſolicitude about the performance of your funeral ceremonies; for which, as if the earth were not the common parent of us all, and that every child had not a right to return to our mother, you make an expenſive bargain with your Prieſts, and thoſe that cannot pay the burial-fees, why let them eſcape being devoured by the dogs how they can.

Ul. I beg you to drop the ſubject; for after you have ſaid all you can on it, it will only appear that the community has indulged ſome advantages to certain ſocieties, but it can never furniſh you with any reflections upon the ſpecies.

Goat. What I have been mentioning is bad enough, but the worſt and the moſt ſlaviſh fear that I have to accuſe you of, is the fear that one lyes under of another. Now from this we are abſolutely free: There is no animal naturally an enemy to one of the ſame ſpecies, though he may be ſo accidentally, as through love, hunger, jealouſy, or the like, and very rarely this way neither.

Ul. And I dare aſſert the ſame thing; that neither are we by Nature enemies one to another.

Goat. Yet inſatiable appetite eaſily becomes ſecond nature. For as not one of you is content with what would ſuffice Nature, your ſtudy is how to diſpoſſeſs each other of what

what he has; whence ſprings that torrent of evils that rage amongſt you, wars, deſolations, maſſacres, treaſons, thefts, and as the height and perfection of all wickedneſs, the practice of giving poiſon one to another, a crime that we cannot think of without horror

Ul. And yet he that will may eſcape moſt of theſe.

Goat. As how?

Ul. By being contented with a little, and living to one's ſelf ſeparate from the world.

Goat. To the firſt of theſe, for ought I know, you may bring yourſelves; but for the ſecond I defy ye; becauſe you ſtand in need of ſo many things, that it is impoſſible any one man ſhould be ſufficient to provide them for himſelf. And depend upon it, that this is the true account of the riſe and foundation of all cities, that by living together you may be able to aſſiſt each other: And becauſe one man may have more of ſomething than is neceſſary, and leſs of another than he wants, you have found out a very proper means to carry on a traffic by the invention of money. But let me tell you one thing, that if, by means of it, you furniſh yourſelves with all you deſire, the very deſire of it will grow ſo ſtrong upon you, that it is a doubt at the foot of the account, if it does you more harm or good. For as every

body

body is contriving to make it his own, this ſo much diſpoſes you to quarrel, that it is impoſſible for you to have any dealings, even for a ſingle hour, without being ſuſpicious of each other.

Ul. I ſhall not pretend to deny, that the diſtinction of things into property muſt occaſion many troubles and broils, which I will farther grant, you are excuſed from, who enjoy every thing in common. But then the mutual ties of friendſhip, which we alone can boaſt of, give us ſufficiently the advantage of you: Friendſhip, that beſt of all the world's good things, by which we communicate not only a ſhare of all outward bleſſings, but a part of our cares too.

Goat. And will any man pretend to deny that there is ſuch a thing as friendſhip ſubſiſting amongſt us, when it is found flouriſhing not only among thoſe of the ſame, but of a different ſpecies? As for example, the friendſhip is very remarkable between the turtle and the parrot, the peacock and the pigeon, the ſtag and the buck, and the like.

Ul. This I can never admit; becauſe friendſhip muſt be founded on truth and virtue, and I cannot allow you to have any notion of either: So that thoſe combinations that appear amongſt you, directed to ſome ſelfiſh end, are rather compacts and conſpiracies than friendſhips; what you call ſo, are rather

rather natural inclinations, whereas what we honour with that title muſt be founded upon approbation and choice, which cannot be your caſe.

Goat. If you won't allow us any friendſhip, I hope you won't allow us any flattery neither, which does as much miſchief as ever the other did good.

Ul. And yet whoever makes uſe of his reaſon, cannot have the one impoſed upon him for the other.

Goat. But the flatterer appears ſo like the friend, that I fancy your reaſon will often be puzzled to find out the difference. Take notice that flattery addreſſes itſelf to your ſelf-love, which will prejudice the ſtrongeſt judgment.

Ul. I grant it; and as the deſire of praiſe is of the party, theſe will make a formidable alliance: Both propoſe the ſame end, to pleaſe you; the flatterer in the ſunſhine of your fortune, and the friend ſtands by you in the time of need. Though I grant you, that it is a melancholy caſe to be driven to this proof, yet he who coolly conſiders, will long before make the diſtinction.

Goat. If it be ſo eaſy, pray ſhew us a little how?

Ul. There are many characteriſticks, but the principal ſeem to be, that the flatterer reſigns himſelf intirely to your manners, does

as you do, changes his method with yours; is in love with every thing you admire, and is ſhocked with every thing you diſlike: whereas the friend is ſteady, purſues his own honeſt purpoſes, and will drop you when you drop your integrity. The flatterer then is like the ſhadow that always follows the body, and does what it does; whilſt the friend is like the light that ſhines on every object, but preſerves it's own purity. The flatterer commends every thing you do, the friend only when you deſerve commendation: The flatterer exaggerates every virtue, and diminiſhes every vice; but the friend holds a true mirror, that ſhews you both in their juſt dimenſions.

Goat. Proceed we to our laſt reaſon why we would not accept of your offer, which was, out of a dread of your penal laws.

Ul. And is it a reflection upon us, that we are governed by laws?

Goat. No; but the neceſſity of them is a ſtanding proof both of the weakneſs and wickedneſs of your nature. For what greater demonſtration of depraved appetites and diſſolute inclinations; diſcarding the remonſtrances of reaſon, and forcing you to take ſhelter under a ſtanding body of numerous laws, to compel you to keep within the lines of duty?

Ul. Let that be the wicked man's concern; but who does his duty out of a love

to

to virtue, need neither fear, nor even know the laws.

Goat. And pray how many of theſe tractable virtuous Gentlemen are to be found among you? I preſume one might caſt up the number of them, without going deep into Multiplication. Nay, were you ſuch gentle manageable creatures, yet always to have your ſenſes ridden with ſo heavy a bit, muſt be diſagreeable enough.

Ul. But what grows into a habit ceaſes to be a fatigue.

Goat. How laborious muſt the firſt conqueſt be, when it is the nature of your appetites to be deſirous of a thing in proportion to it's being illicit? But we have no wiſh repugnant to our nature, take our full enjoyment, not only where, but when we pleaſe, without having any remorſe from fear, or check from ſhame.

Ul. A glorious privilege truly! not only to be exempt from the reſtraint of laws, but the rules of decency.

Goat. I can be very eaſy under any reflections upon a ſubject of which I profeſs to have no idea. I hope you will take this for a plain anſwer, that the liberty I now enjoy is more endeared to me by comparing it with the ſlavery that I know you to be under. And what aggravates it is, to think that you brought moſt of it upon yourſelves through

through folly or ambition; I ſay, that you have in many points tied up your hands where Nature left you free; ſo that I declare, that I will not only not turn man again, but I do here renounce all dealings, all intercourſe with the ſpecies. For even the very cattle in your ſervice are involved in your quarrels: The beaſt that commits the treſpaſs muſt ſuffer in his own hide, becauſe of your fantaſtical diſtribution of what Nature made common. But thoſe that entered into ſo ridiculous a compact I think much more worthy of the ſtripes, it being that alone to which you ought to aſcribe all the frauds, contentions, and animoſities that each day breed among you; which hinder you from converſing with each other, as we do, without the fear of loſing the preſent good, or incurring ſome future evil. So that I wiſh you all the felicity to be met with, in a ſtate abounding with miſeries; whilſt I paſs the little remainder of life, at leaſt without the fear of death, and that can only be done by continuing as I am. *Exit.*

CIRCE.

CIRCE.

Tranſlated from the *Italian* of

JOHN BAPTIST GELLI, *&c.*

DIALOGUE V.

Ulyſſes, Circe, *and the Hind.*

Ulyſſes. 'TIS ſaid, dear *Circe*, that truth begets hatred; but ſurely to a noble mind nothing can be ſo odious as falſhood; and nothing renders a perſon ſo abhorred as a diſcovery that his tongue holds no commerce with his heart. So that I am determined to diſburthen my breaſt ſincerely, though I hazard your favour by it.

Circe. Let not the wiſe *Ulyſſes* think me capable of being offended at the truth, which

is

is always welcome to thoſe that are able to bear it: So ſpeak your thoughts ſecurely.

Ul. Why then I muſt own, I labour under ſome ſuſpicions, that you have not granted to theſe creatures ſo free a uſe of their underſtandings as of their tongues. If not, I muſt complain that I think myſelf abuſed. If otherwiſe, how is it to be conceived that they ſhould be unanimous in ſo monſtrous a propoſition, that it is better to be a Beaſt than a Man?

Circe. Were the caſe as you ſtate it, you would have reaſon to charge me with a breach of promiſe, which is ever the effect of a weak head or a bad heart. And yet I affirm to you, that when you diſputed with them they had the ſame exerciſe of their intellectual faculties as when they were men.

Ul. Prodigious! that they ſhould not be able to diſcern ſo broad a mark, when I ſo plainly pointed it out to them.

Circe. Who knows (which is nothing incredible) but they find ſome enjoyments, ſome pleaſures, unthought of by us? But come on; boldly purſue your enterprize, all may not prove ſo obſtinate. And be aſſured, that as all the animals you ſee have been men, what ſhape ſoever they may bear, none of them will offer you any violence. *Exit* CIRCE.

Ul.

Ul. It was a common ſaying with our wiſe men of *Greece*, that "* thoſe whoſe "judgment was ſufficient to conduct them "through life with decency and honour were "juſtly to be eſteemed in the higheſt rank "among mortals; that thoſe who had not "ſenſe enough to govern themſelves for their "own preſervation, yet had enough to be "adviſed by perſons wiſer than themſelves, "were to be placed in the ſecond form; "but thoſe that neither had enough to direct "themſelves, nor to liſten to thoſe who "had, were ſcarce worthy to be reckoned "a part of human nature." Thoſe whom I have been diſcourſing with, as I take it, are of this latter ſort, ſo that one is not to be ſurprized at the eſtimate they make of things. But as I may flatter myſelf that I can judge ſomewhat better, and am convinced how much it is the duty of man to be aſſiſtant to a diſtreſſed brother, think myſelf obliged to perſevere till I find ſome worthy of the gift I have to offer.—But ſee, what a noble herd of ſtags is here! I muſt try if there be any

* This is almoſt a tranſlation of the beginning of *M. Minutius*'s harangue to the ſoldiers. *Livy.* Dec. III. Lib. II. *Sæpe audivi, milites, eum primum eſſe virum qui ipſe conſulat quid in rem ſit: ſecundum, eum qui bene monenti obediat. Qui nec ipſe conſulere nec alii parere ſcit, eum extremi ingenii eſſe.* By which he alludes to thoſe verſes of *Heſiod*,

Ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ κακεῖνος, &c.

of my countrymen among them.—Tell me, ye ſtags, if Heaven has ought in ſtore to oblige you with, if there be any *Grecian* of your herd * ?

Hind. Oh ! ye bleſſed Powers, and do I once more hear the ſound of human accents ? And have I myſelf recovered the uſe of ſpeech too ?

Ul. aſide. Who knows but I may have leſs reaſon to ſuſpect *Circe* here ? This opens well, by thanking the Gods for the uſe of ſpeech.

Hind. Are you of *Greece*, pray, who put the queſtion ?

Ul. I am, my name *Ulyſſes.*

Hind. I alſo was of *Greece*, but of a different ſex : I was a Woman before *Circe* changed me into a Hind.

Ul. aſide. Nay, if I have to do with a Woman, who, they ſay, always takes the wrong ſide of the queſtion, we are not likely to gain ground. However, it will be ſome ſatisfaction to have tried both ſexes.

Hind. Why then does *Ulyſſes* give himſelf the trouble of wandering up and down the iſland in queſt of his countrymen ? And tell me, I adjure you by the ſame vows you

* The Ancients looked on themſelves as much obliged when adjured by things ſacred, as if they themſelves had ſworn by them. *Life of King* David. Vol. I.

made

made uſe of, How does it come to paſs that I have the privilege of ſpeaking with you, which I never enjoy'd ſince my tranſmutation?

Ul. If you eſteem it a privilege, you may thank me for it, who by dint of intreaties, out of the love I bear my countrymen, have obtained, firſt, that each ſhall have the power of ſpeech; after that, the bleſſing of being reſtored to their former ſhape; and to crown all, of being ſafely reconveyed to *Greece.* And as you are one, will you accept of the offer? Speak your mind freely, and I muſt add quickly too; for when you Ladies revolve a thing too long in your minds, either out of hurry or diffidence, you quite loſe yourſelves: So that your moſt celebrated repartees have been the moſt off-hand.

Hind. No. —— I think you could not deſire an anſwer ſhorter or quicker.

Ul. I cannot ſay it is the wiſeſt I ever heard, but I can ſafely ſay I never heard a ſhorter.

Hind. Why not the wiſeſt?

Ul. Only becauſe there is no ſenſe in it.

Hind. You ought to take it for granted that I have my reaſons when I ſay no.

Ul. That may be, but perhaps I may be better ſatisfied when I hear ſome of them.

Hind. Well then, don't you think I had

ſome for not conſenting to be reſtored, ſince you hear that I was a Woman?

Ul. I can't ſee any; ſince you muſt conſider, that you would have been changed into a rational creature, for which you ſeemed to expreſs the higheſt eſteem, when you ſo devoutly thanked the Gods upon the recovery of ſpeech, which is inſeparable from rationality.

Hind. My objection was not againſt becoming a Rational Creature, but againſt becoming a Woman. For Women are held in ſuch contempt among you, that ſome of the * Philoſophers have had the confidence to aſſert that we are of another ſpecies. Others have ſtiled us imperfect Men, and ſo have proceeded to philoſophize upon the hypotheſis of imperfection. But a little attention to their own births would have been ſufficient to expoſe ſuch extravagant notions.

Ul. Hey! dey! Why how came you by ſo much philoſophy?

* It muſt be owned, that in almoſt all ages ſome learned men have found leiſure enough to ſtart ſuch queſtions. Thus thoſe ancient ſages the *Gymnoſophiſts*, and thus among the *Indians*, the modern *Bonzi*, we are told, appear ſo much like ideots, when moſt abſtracted, that it is not eaſy to diſtinguiſh the apparent from the real Philoſopher. There was a book in the ſixteenth Century upon this ſubject, *An Mulieres ſint Homines*, which was anſwered by one *Simon Gediccus*, a *Lutheran* Divine of conſummate gravity; whereas it deſerved to be put into no other light but what the *Frenchman* ſets it, by tranſlating the Theſis, *Si les Femmes ſoient des Hommes.*

Hind.

Hind. You will be leſs ſurprized, when I tell you, that my huſband was a profeſſor of the firſt credit, with whom it was impoſſible to converſe ſo much, without picking up a good deal of what is ſo eaſily learned.

Ul. I can tell you one thing which I perceive he could never teach you.

Hind. Pray what was that?

Ul. To overcome the itch of prattling, which is ſtill ſo ſtrong upon you, that though you could coolly reject the offer, you could not forbear being tranſported when you found the uſe of your tongue.

Hind. What I have to alledge then in juſtification of my refuſal is, that you men treat us as your ſlaves, or at leaſt as your ſervants, not as you ought, like your equals or companions. A thing ſo immoral, ſo monſtrous, that I defy you to produce a parallel to it in Nature. Caſt your eyes round the Animal World, and ſhew me where the Female is not the partner, not the ſlave to the Male; ſharer of his pleaſures, and fellow-ſufferer in his troubles? Man is the ſingle exception. I ſay Man, who from being a Lord, degenerates into a Tyrant, and as he finds himſelf ſuperior to us in ſtrength and courage, is generous enough to take advantage of it.

Ul. What makes you declaim thus furiouſly?

Hind. I tell you once more, becauſe you uſe us as your ſervants.

Ul. Not as our ſervants, dear Hind; as our companions if you will.

Hind. D'ye call thoſe companions, where the one always commands, and the other always obeys? But what aggravates our unhappineſs is, that we purchaſe this bondage, or ſervice, (call it what you will) with our own money. For, according to your righteous laws, when once one of us chooſes to aſſociate herſelf (to uſe your ſoft phraſe) with one of you, her fortune muſt be thrown into your lap; and ſhe that has none, is ſure to be treated as a ſlave for life, or elſe her only deliverance from it, is by being ſhut up in ſome honourable priſon, to become a Prieſteſs to *Pallas* or *Diana*, or ſome ſuch ſelf-denying Goddeſs, but muſt never think to taſte of any worldly pleaſures more.

Ul. And yet this delivery of the portion into the Huſband's hands is evidently calculated for your advantage.

Hind. A very particular ſort of advantage is that! Becauſe, whereas others pay the perſon that ſerves them, we pay him whom we ſerve. But I deſire to know how this cuſtom was introduced for our good?

Ul. Becauſe, when men obſerved your unaptneſs for buſineſs from irreſolution or unſteadineſs, it was adjudged that the ſafeſt method to preſerve your fortunes, was to have them conſigned to your Huſbands, not

as

as Maſters of them, but as Attorneys for them, to ſecure them to you in bar of accidents. Accordingly you find upon their deceaſe they revert to you: So that what you ſuppoſe is diametrically oppoſite to the true ſtate of the caſe, and is evidently injurious to the Huſband. Whereas the faireſt way had been for the Huſband to be obliged to depoſite into ſome third hand juſt as much as he receives with his Wife; and then if there ſhould be any defect, the loſs ſhould be in common to both. This would at leaſt have had one good effect, that it would turn your thoughts towards improving the principal, which is not ſo often done, becauſe it is looked upon to be the Huſband's buſineſs to get abroad, and the Wife's to ſpend it at home. And yet in your widowhood you are indemnified, and all deficiencies are made good out of the man's effects.

Hind. But we that ſtay at home have a greater ſhare in the getting part, than you that ramble abroad. For you never ſaw a vaſt fortune raiſed where there was not a Woman as notable to keep, as the Man was induſtrious to get.

Ul. I believe it; and always thought you had a better turn for ſaving money than Men; for it is * *timorouſneſs* and *puſillani-*

* *Quoniam hunc ſexum cuſtodiæ & diligentiæ aſſignaverat, idcirco timidiorem reddidit quàm virilem. Nam metus plurimum confert ad diligentiam cuſtodiendi.*

Columella, Proœm. XII. *De Re Ruſtica.*

mity that puts people upon hoarding. But then theſe very qualifications prove you to be much more fit to receive than give command; this minute care and exactneſs being only to be exerciſed in little matters. Hence the higheſt encomium that a Woman can merit is, they ſay, that ſhe is very governable.

Hind. They ſay! that is, you ſay; and it makes for your purpoſe to have that notion generally prevail. But aſk us, or aſk experience, and you will find us as fit to govern, nay preſide, in affairs of the higheſt importance. Conſider the kingdom of the *Amazons*, how long was that preſerved without their being indebted to any of you, either in Politicks or in War? To relate how the bounds of the *Babyloniſh* empire was extended by *Semiramis*, or the *Scythian* by *Tomyris*, were to tranſcribe your hiſtories, which abound with their exploits.

Ul. And how many more ſuch can you name? I fancy you may count them all upon the fingers of one hand.

Hind. For which we may thank you; who never give us an opportunity of exerciſing theſe faculties, but keep us immured within your own houſes, employed in all the low offices that the care of a family brings with it; for which our ſole reward is, to hear

hear you * ſay magiſterially, that a Woman's fame and her employment ſhould begin and end within the compaſs of her *own walls.* And yet even in this little way you may obſerve ſuch an exactneſs, that the houſes where there are no Women, in compariſon of thoſe where they are, put one a good deal more in mind of a den than a paradiſe; which ſome of you have had the honeſty to own. As to the propriety and neatneſs relating to your own perſons, all that I ſhall ſay is, that I don't think it difficult to diſtinguiſh which is the old Batchelor.

Ul. I grant, that you have your merit in theſe kind of things.

Hind. And we ſhould diſtinguiſh ourſelves as much in things of an higher nature, if we were permitted to be concerned in them.

Ul. I beg you not to go too far, leſt you ſhould put me in mind of the Shoemaker, who, when they were criticiſing upon a ſtatue, aſſerted that the ſhoe was cut wrong at the inſtep, and proved his point; upon which the fellow growing vain, was for finding fault in another place; but a ſtander by pulling him by the ſleeve, told him, " Friend,

* He means *Thucydides*, who ſays, Καθάπερ τὸ σῶμα ϗ τὸ γύνομα τῆς ἀρετῆς δεῖν καλάκλεις ον εἶναι ϗ ἀνένδοξον.

" don't

" don't go higher than the inſtep, for all " above that is beyond your province."

Hind. I am glad you will allow us any thing; for, generally ſpeaking, your worſt word is too good for us.

Ul. How can that be, when we always honour you, and give you the preference?

Hind. Never, in things of any conſequence; but perhaps as far as giving the upper hand at table, and a few ſoft appellations merely for your own ſakes, whilſt we have any beauty left to engage you. When that is fled, Heaven knows your behaviour towards, both in words and deeds.

Ul. This is the height of ingratitude.

Hind. As for facts which are leſs generally known I ſhall ſay nothing of them; but your words are too notorious to be diſſembled. Is it not a ſaying with you, common even to a proverb, that " in Marriage there are but " two happy days; the firſt when the wife " is led in, the ſecond when ſhe is carried " out?"

Ul. Theſe are little freedoms of language that men of wit will indulge themſelves in, when they meet, to divert the cares of life: But I think their practice ſhews that they don't expreſs their real ſentiments, there being ſo very few that do not ſome time or other venture upon matrimony; and thoſe that

that never do, are looked upon as odd creatures at beſt, and ſeldom eſcape cenſure.

Hind. And yet you can all be ready enough to ſay, "the Man that takes one Wife "ſhould bear the figure of Patience on his "creſt, but he that takes a ſecond that of "Folly."

Ul. The moral is, that ſecond marriages, eſpecially where there are children, are ſeldom very happy; as they want that ſtrong cement of love that joined them in the firſt inſtance. Nor do I really think patience in the caſe ſo uſeleſs a virtue, as it is ſo liable to be exerciſed by ſome of you; which made a man of wit ſay, that "he never ſaw a bride "going to her huſband's houſe, but he al-"ways pictured her in his mind, carrying "one hand ſtretched out, and in it a lighted "torch, as who ſhould ſay, that ſhe was "going to ſet on fire the family ſhe was go-"ing into."

Hind. Nay never be aſhamed to give us the ſequel: "And the other held behind, "with a hook in it, with which ſhe had "been robbing the family from which ſhe "came out."

Ul. I cannot ſay that theſe things have not been ſaid by men of character, and perhaps they have had their provocations too. Neither will I deny how injuriouſly you have been accuſed by ſome of us, men of debauch-

debauched lives, or not of a capacity to conſider your worth, or how much we are forced to be obliged to you. All which I am proud to allow, or ſhould think myſelf unworthy the name of a Man. If Nature has given us in ſome things the advantage, ſo much the better for us: If you had been furniſh'd with ſtronger faculties of body or mind, you had been leſs fit for the part Nature intended you ſhould act, in ſubſerviency to us. And when you behave properly in that poſt, we think ourſelves not leſs obliged to you than to Nature herſelf for ordering it ſo. You are not therefore to take notice of every ſcurrilous ſaying, which fools are ever ready to throw out, ſince we can quote you as many good things juſtly pronounced in your favour, ſuch as that "It is you alone that make life "preferable to death: That you are our "crown;" according to that renowned *Egyptian* King, who after having ſhewn his immenſe treaſure to a Royal Brother, told him, "he had yet a jewel to produce, of "more value than all the reſt," and then preſented him to his Queen.

Hind. I aſk, How is it then that we are uſed ſo ill by you?

Ul. And I aſk, How do you mean?

Hind. I anſwer again, in treating us as ſervants, not as companions. Tell me then fairly, How came it to paſs that you ſhould, by preſcription, range out to the full extent of

of your Will, whilſt we are tied up by the ſhort bridle of Honour? Is it that none but we can offend againſt Honour? You indulge every deſire, and yet we muſt not be allowed the leaſt ſlip, though we have ſtronger temptations to it; not from a more furious or more ungovernable will, but from your vile importunity and irreſiſtible aſſiduity: And if you at length ſucceed in robbing a poor Lady of her honour, you are the firſt to repay her with a thouſand reproaches.

Ul. If it be ſo ineſtimable a jewel, let them lock it up ſafer then.

Hind. How is that poſſible, when every fellow has a key to it? So that if we are drawn aſide, as the fault is yours, ſo ſhould the ſhame be alſo. Eſpecially as you arrogate to yourſelves a ſuperior degree of underſtanding.

Ul. And yet if you would attend to the reaſon of this practice, you would not condemn it: But the error ariſes from your confounding caſes, and putting yourſelves, as brutes, upon the ſame foot with us. Now I demand, Is it right that the riches which a man has gained by his induſtry, or that the honours which have been the reward of his virtue, ſhould deſcend to one wholly a ſtranger to his blood?

Hind. No, certainly.

Ul.

Ul. But this muſt be the caſe, if Women were to give a looſe to unlawful deſires. Now this, I ſay, can never happen to Brutes, who have no property to leave to their offſpring, and have no concern about them, after they are able to ſhift for themſelves.

Hind. Since we have fallen upon the ſubject of Children, I deſire to know how that juſtice and equity, the want of which we have complained of, is obſerved by you in regard to them? For it is well known, that you caſt the whole care and burthen of their infancy upon us, contrary to the uſage of all other animals in the world.

Ul. And pray, don't you as dextrouſly ſhift off this incumbrance, by putting them out to nurſe? which I believe is as little practiſed among any other animals in the world.

Hind. Who is the occaſion of this but yourſelves? who, during their infancy, won't bear the leaſt noiſe, won't give yourſelves the leaſt trouble or concern about them. But as ſoon as they are grown up, things take a quite different turn. Then you enter as it were into a combination together, to deſpiſe and ſet us at nought. Nor is this expreſſed in words alone, but in very deed: They are called your ſons, take your name, and count themſelves only of your family, without taking any farther notice of us.

Ul. Nor

Ul. Nor is this founded but on the moſt reaſonable conſiderations.

Hind. I ſuppoſe the reaſon is grounded in this caſe, as in all the reſt, upon your power; which can always make reaſon take what ſhape it pleaſes.

Ul. The reaſon that I intended to give was, becauſe they derive their ſenſitive ſoul and eſſence of humanity from us, and us alone.

Hind. Are we then mere cyphers in the caſe?

Ul. You muſt know, the female can of herſelf produce nothing of a higher nature than the vegetative quality, which we enjoy in common with the plants. This, I ſay, is the higheſt perfection that ſhe can unaſſiſted reach. Hence you ſee, as Nature never acts in vain, ſhe has not diſtinguiſhed plants and trees into different ſexes. If there are ſome exceptions, as for example, in the corneile-tree, where you will find the female fruitful, and the male barren; as there can be no contact in the caſe, and the thing produced is of no higher a nature than the vegetative; for this, as I ſaid before, the female is alone and of herſelf ſufficient. This I illuſtrate by a familiar inſtance, ſuppoſe, of the hen, which of herſelf ſolely and properly can produce an egg, that has evidently the vegetative ſoul or nature in it, becauſe it

grows

grows to a certain determinate ſize: But yet this egg, as it is unimpregnated, will ever remain unfruitful. So Phyſicians aſſure us, that you yourſelves have often falſe conceptions, which they call *Mola*. Now this, it is plain, muſt be endued with the vegetative power, becauſe it increaſes to a ſtated magnitude, but has no ſenſitive quality, becauſe the other ſex was wholly unconcerned in the production: So that as our ſons derive from us alone the very animal eſſence and ſenſitive ſoul, they may well, as you obſerve, be called our ſons. Hence, when they arrive at any degree of maturity, you are, by univerſal conſent, abſolved from farther care, which ſtill remains a duty upon us.

Hind. What returns are we entitled to, for all our pains and care?

Ul. To be ever honour'd, and if occaſion requires, upon the deceaſe of the father, to be always ſupported: Which is never refuſed but by wretches below the name and dignity of Men. And in truth, Nature is herſelf your ſecurity, who ſeems to have impreſſed ſtronger affections towards the mother than the father.

Hind. If you come to a compariſon, we can give you ſuch inſtances of our love towards our children and huſbands, as would quite diſgrace yours. What think you of thoſe who, upon receiving the news of the

loſs

loſs of their children, have dropped down inſtantly dead? Of others, who upon ſeeing their huſbands expire, have immediately diſpatched themſelves; as thinking it not proper to live without a huſband, nor honourable to be joined to more than one?

Ul. Theſe are glaring acts, that ſeem at firſt ſight to carry a great deal of merit with them, and to claim applauſe, as proceeding from violence of love, or greatneſs of ſoul: Whereas in truth they ariſe from madneſs or cowardiſe; as diſtruſting that they could not ſurvive their loſs. But if Nature, who always acts for the beſt, had found that it were better that the Man and his Wife ſhould drop together, ſhe would undoubtedly have contrived that it ſhould always be ſo.

But our diſcourſe begins to be tedious, ſo I muſt put the queſtion once more, Will you reſume your former nature, and return with me to *Greece?*

Hind. By no means; and I thought I had given you ſufficient reaſons why, too.

Ul. If I had thought them ſo, I ſhould not have troubled you with the queſtion again.

Hind. What I have to add, can be no argument to you, though they are to me, that by being a Hind, I am every way upon a par with our males, I go and come as free as they: I bring my young ones into the

world with leſs * danger, and breed them up in it with leſs trouble, than the beſt Lady of them all.

Ul. Not that I ſuppoſe the happy minute you boaſt of is free from pain, or that you require no care after it.

Hind. But you muſt conſider our ſtrength, and that we naturally are directed to a certain herb called *Ara* †, the uſe of which immediately reſtores us to our health.

Ul. Is it poſſible that you have no concerns as we have about the education of your young ones?

Hind. Very few, I aſſure you, in compariſon of what you ſuffer. Becauſe as they have fewer wants, they muſt give us leſs trouble; and that too is ſo overcome by inſtinctive affection that it is ſcarce perceptible. Whereas you that are without that advantage feel it's full weight: So that not to give you the fatigue of perſuading me any longer, I declare that I live much more contented as I am. But not to diſcourage you, I freely own that, were I to change my ſhape, I

* *Inter omnia Animalia Mulier in partu maximè vexatur. Ariſtot. 7. L. 9. Hiſt. Anim.*

† What the Author calls *Ara*, is probably an abbreviation of *Ariſtolochia*, ſo called becauſe ἄρισα βοηθεῖ ταῖς λοχείαις, called hartwort, or birthwort, and is the ſame that *Cicero* calls *ſeſelis*.

Cicero Lib. Secund. De Natura Deorum, Cervæ paulo ante partum perpurgant ſe quadam herbula quæ ſeſelis dicitur.

would

would rather be a human than any other creature; as you may conclude, by our frequenting your roads more than the haunts of wild beaſts. So I wiſh you happy in your voyage, and I will myſelf endeavour to be as much ſo as I can, for the remainder of life in theſe woods. And ſince I have recovered the uſe of ſpeech, without being obliged to be a Woman again, I ſhall envy neither Gods nor Men.

Ul. I would not have you ſo obſtinate, dear Hind, in your opinion, becauſe you ought to think us better judges in the caſe than you are; eſpecially as we are quite diſintereſted, and only recommend this to you, wholly for your own good.

Hind. That, I remember, was the old cant, when you had a mind to perſuade us to any thing; and yet your chief regard was ever to yourſelves.

Ul. Beſides you ought to remember, that *Circe* reſtored you to the uſe of ſpeech, for no other end but that you might be able to declare your mind to me, in relation to the propoſal which was, by agreement, to be granted to thoſe only that ſhould deſire it: So that if you ſtill continue a Hind, I am afraid you will loſe the privilege of talking, which you ſeem ſo much to enjoy.

Hind. If I could ſuſpect that, I muſt own it would ſtagger my reſolution.

Ul. How can you doubt of it? Do any of your ſpecies ever ſpeak?

Hind. Well—— then e'en let it go—— For as I am to converſe only with Deer, and we have ſo many other ways of explaining our meanings and wants, (which are ſo few that they give us but little trouble) let who will cloſe with your offer; for my part, I refuſe, point blank.

Exit Hind.

CIRCE.

Tranſlated from the *Italian* of

JOHN BAPTIST GELLI, *&c.*

DIALOGUE VI.

Ulyſſes *and the Lion.*

Ulyſſes. I Know not what ſhould be the cauſe, that Nature (which is always in the right) ſhould make a greater difference between the ſexes in the human than in any other ſpecies. In the nation of the Birds, the difference in courage is very inconſiderable, if at all diſcernible: The fatigue with them, either in hatching or educating their young, is pretty equally di-

vided. The ſame is obſervable among the terreſtrial and aquatick animals, the bodily ſtrength as well as courage in both male and female being pretty near alike. But in rational creatures, the female has both theſe, if at all, in ſo low a degree that they are hardly cognizable: So that they ought rather to blame Nature, for having formed them fitter to be our ſervants than companions, than us for uſing them as ſuch; for this treatment is more owing to their mean, than to our haughty temper. If they were as ſtrong and bold, we ſhould not try to force them to ſubmit in this manner, nor could we if we would. But out of a diſtruſt of their own conduct, or natural timorouſneſs, they court our government, and voluntarily ſue for the yoke: So that I can't ſo heartily wonder, that the Hind ſhould refuſe to become a Woman again. For in her preſent ſtate ſhe enjoys her liberty, the choiceſt of all bleſſings, and by the change would be put into a ſtate of ſlavery, the ſoreſt affliction to any ingenuous mind. Let us look out then for one to whom our offer would prove a benefit indeed, and not as to her a real injury: Who knows but ſuch a one may be met with in this troop of Lions here advancing towards us.—But ha! what am I doing! If I ſhould offend them, I know the conſequence muſt prove fatal; if not I am ſecure, unleſs they

ſhould

ſhould be a little hungry, or ſo. Now though the Goddeſs gave me her word of honour, that no inhabitant of this iſland ſhould harm me, yet cannot I overcome the horror with which I am ſtruck at this dreadful aſſembly. However, in confidence of her love, as well as her honour, I will take the courage to accoſt them gently.—Lions, ſo may happineſs attend you in your preſent ſtate, and be increaſed at every change, tell me graciouſly, I adjure you, if there be any of you who before his transformation was a *Greek?* If there be any ſuch that is deſirous of reſuming his former ſhape (as who that conſiders does not?) and of reviſiting his natal ſoil, let him know, that the bounty of the Gods has thrown a Man in his way who is impowered by mighty love to effect both.

Lion. I was a *Greek*, as I perceive thou art, if the language that thou uſeſt be thy mother tongue.

Ul. I am thy countryman: *Ulyſſes*, if ſuch a name has ever reached thy ears.

Lion. Infinite times, not in *Greece* alone, but in my moſt diſtant voyages. But ſay, have you deſerted your trade, the glorious art of war, that rendered you ſo famous through the world? Or was you directed hither, like myſelf, by your better fortune?

Ul. I can't ſay by my better fortune, but it was owing to a deſire of ſeeing the moſt diſtant parts: For when our wars were happily concluded, and *Greece* had ſubdued the nations that were her foes, I thought there remained no other way to extend my glory, but by ſailing about the world.

Lion. And fair *Penelope*,—your wife,—that bright example of conjugal chaſtity,—I hope ſhe's well.

Ul. She is, and the ſtrong deſire I feel of ſeeing her, and the reſt of our *Grecian* friends, has urged me to prevail with *Circe*, (though her love to me be nothing inferior to *Penelope*'s) to grant me licence to depart, and to take as many countrymen as deſired to be changed back again into Men, to be companions of my voyage.

Lion. Though it often happens, that the perſon who means you well, officiouſly diſobliges you, yet you ought to take it kindly, as conſidering more the goodneſs of his intention than of his judgment: Becauſe you muſt commend the motive, how much ſoever you blame the exerciſe of it. So I thank you for your good diſpoſition towards me, though the offer that ſeems to you, I queſtion not, agreeable and advantageous, I am ſure would prove to me quite the reverſe.

Ul. That is as much as to ſay, that it is better to continue a Beaſt than to be a Man.

Lion.

Lion. Oh! beyond all controverſy. To prove the truth of which, I refer you to the beſt authority, to one of the wiſe men of *Greece*, who uſed to ſay, that " could we " freely inſpect the inſide of Man, we ſhould " find him a receptacle, a magazine built " by Nature, to treaſure up her choiceſt " evils in."

Ul. This Man would have been wiſer as well as juſter, if he had taken the blame off of Nature, and laid it upon his own back; upon his own depraved appetite, which I ſuppoſe he had gratified at the expence of his conſtitution.

Lion. I am not now ſpeaking of bodily evils, but of thoſe of the mind, which are more maligant and more difficult to be cured.

Ul. No body ſhould be too poſitive; becauſe as the body is the vehicle that carries the ſoul, if it be weak or out of order, ſhe muſt be obſtructed in her operations, which can be no ſmall misfortune.

Lion. I did not deny that the indiſpoſition of the body does impede the operations of the mind; but I aſſerted, that the diſeaſes of the mind hurt the man more than thoſe of the body. Which ſeems to be a clear propoſition, as the mind is the better and nobler part.

Ul. I grant it, but nevertheleſs, if the mind cannot perform her functions without the

the body, the diſorders of each muſt be equally bad.

Lion. I ſay thoſe of the mind are more dangerous; becauſe as for thoſe of the body, a man perceives them upon him, either by his complexion, his pulſe, a general faintneſs, or a thouſand other ways, and as ſoon as they are diſcovered, every one applies for a cure. But diſorders of the mind ſo far deceive us, that we do not only not wiſh to have them removed, but enjoy them, and entertain them as real bleſſings; hence they frequently are attended by that long train of ills, the loſs of our country, friends, children, property, honours. Whereas the worſt that bodily diſeaſes can tend to, is death, which is waiting for us in a thouſand ſhapes. To proceed, if thoſe diſtempers of the body are juſtly eſteemed the worſt, that take away the ſenſes or underſtanding, as the lethargy, phrenzy, falling-ſickneſs, and the like, thoſe of the mind all do as much, therefore they are to be reckoned worſe.

Ul. I allow your argument to be concluſive.

Lion. You know that to be ſometimes ſick, Phyſicians tell us, it never the worſe for us, as it is natural. But then the illneſs muſt not be of ſuch a ſort as not to let us underſtand whether we are ſick or no. For to know that we are not well, and to deſire help,

help, is itſelf a good ſign in the patient. Now this can never be in diſtempers of the mind, for he that labours under them cannot form a right judgment: That itſelf being the ſeat of the diſtemper. And he that is ill, muſt firſt know that he is ſo, before he can either find, or ſeek a cure.

Ul. And yet the ſame thing may be ſaid of drunkenneſs, whilſt the fumes of the wine are in a ſtate of action, they obſtruct the avenues to that receſs, where the internal ſenſes perform their operations; ſo that the perſon thus diſorder'd is not conſcious of his condition, which leads him into unnumber'd miſtakes, whilſt he ſeems acting gravely for the beſt.

Lion. Very well; and what is drunkenneſs but a ſhort madneſs? In this caſe, the organs more immediately concerned in the act of judging are ſpoiled for a time; in the former, for ever. To prove farther, that theſe diſorders are worſe than thoſe of the body, you never knew a perſon that called a fever a ſtate of health, the ptiſick a ſign of ſound lungs, or that ever brought his having the gout as a proof of the goodneſs of his joints. And yet you hear people every day call anger, valour; luſt, love; envy, emulation; and timorouſneſs, induſtry: Hence the former always careſs the Phyſician, whilſt the latter always hate the Monitor.

Ul. What

Ul. What miſchief does this confuſion of names cauſe in the world? When ſcandalous Vices ſtrut in Virtue's robes, and honourable appellations are beſtowed on crimes that call aloud for chaſtiſement?

Lion. Add to this, that he who labours under any infirmity of body, uſually takes to his bed, where, during the cure, he finds ſome reſt, though never ſo imperfect; and if to ſhift the pain a little he tumbles and toſſes from ſide to ſide, he has a friend at hand to cover him when he wants it, and to entreat him to be as ſtill as he can. But he that has his mind diſorder'd, finds no quiet, knows no repoſe in himſelf, nor is there any friend to adminiſter it to him, but is in a continued perturbation: So that as that tempeſt is worſe to the mariner which hinders him from making the port, than that which hindered him from ſetting out to ſail; thus the diſeaſes of the mind, which hinder it from ſeizing the haven of reaſon, and keep it toſſed up and down in a boiſterous ſea, are more miſchievous than thoſe of the body; which, though they may hinder the operations of reaſon, yet do not quite deſtroy it. To cloſe the argument, be pleaſed to conſider, that they who are afflicted with bodily pains only ſuffer it, whereas thoſe that are diſordered in mind, are the people that do miſchief to others.

Ul. Take

Ul. Take care that you don't indulge your ſuſpicions too far; becauſe the authors of miſchief are commonly too private to have any witneſs to what they do.

Lion. Examine a little into all the quarrels and calamities that have plagued the world, and you will trace them up to thoſe poiſonous ſources, to ambition, envy, avarice, reſentment, or ſome ſuch other diſeaſe of the mind of man; which not only deprive it of the uſe of reaſon, but render it ſo turbulent as to let it know no reſt itſelf, or to ſuffer it in any body elſe. Nay, one of theſe boiſterous ſpirits is ſufficient, if he be of any rank or quality, to deſtroy the peace of a whole community.

Ul. Well, granting that the diſeaſes of the mind, according to your ſuppoſition, are more miſchievous than thoſe of the body, Are none of you ſubject to any of theſe maladies?

Lion. I anſwer no.

Ul. I hope you have conſidered the point enough to inform yourſelf rightly, elſe I ſhould conclude, that where there is no reaſon to moderate the paſſions, they muſt be very unruly.

Lion. If we have not the uſe of reaſon, (which I grant may be ſufficient to controul the paſſions in ſome degree, though not altogether) you muſt take with you alſo, that we

we have not ſo much natural perverſeneſs, with which your reaſon ſtrikes in, ſo as to heighten the diſorders of the appetites; whereas ours are leſs unruly, merely for want of ſeeing things in the manner that you do. For inſtance, what room can there be for ambition where all are equally great, and where no ſlight or contempt can be paſſed on any one? We acknowledge no head over us, nor are there any degrees of honour amongſt us: Which are ſuch alluring baits to you, that Right and Wrong loſe all diſtinction in the eye of him that is in purſuit of them. Nay ſome have been ſo hardy as openly to avow, that if ever Juſtice is to be diſpenſed with, it ſhould only be when Empire is the object *. Envy can never have place among thoſe of the ſame ſpecies, becauſe they are all equal; nor amongſt thoſe of different kinds, becauſe as they know nothing one of another, they muſt be ignorant of each other's happineſs. Neither can there be avarice, where there is no diſtinction of property. The ſame reaſons hold good as to all other vices that render human life ſo wretched. Which made a wiſe man ſay, that "the ſole ſuperiority "Man could reaſonably boaſt of, was a pre-"eminence in miſery."

* *Cæſar* uſed frequently a verſe of *Euripides*, which expreſſed the image of his ſoul, "that if Right and Juſtice "were to be violated, they were to be violated for the ſake "of reigning."

Ul. Very

Ul. Very well; but ſuppoſing that more evils attend us than you, there are ſome good things in which we as much excel you.

Lion. Name them.

Ul. The virtues.

Lion. Why then I dare aſſert, that there is not one of theſe to be found amongſt you that does not ſhine more conſpicuous and perfect amongſt us.

Ul. You muſt prove as well as aſſert.

Lion. I deſire nothing more. Let us begin with Fortitude, by which *Ulyſſes* has acquired the glory to be ſtiled "the ſpoiler* of "cities, and the ſubduer of nations." And yet there was not one of thoſe ſplendid actions, in which you diſdained to have recourſe to fraud and trick; thus dignifying a ſcandalous vice, with the ſpecious names of ſtratagem and conduct.

Ul. Ha! is this to affront me, Lion?

Lion. Though my words were directed to you alone, I intended the application ſhould be general: So I hope you will pardon me, as I had no deſign to affront you: But I know it is an univerſal maxim with you, that it is honourable to overcome in war, let the means be what they will; which notion never yet could get footing with us. Accord-

* Theſe are titles given by *Homer* to *Ulyſſes*, as πολίπορθος, *Domitor Trojæ*. *Hor.* Lib. I. Ep. II.

ingly

ingly you ſee all the wars we wage, either amongſt ourſelves, or againſt you, are carried on without the leaſt plot or craft: Each confiding in his proper ſtrength, out of the greatneſs and firmneſs of his heart, revenges the injury that has been offered him, without being accountable to any laws for doing it, or liable to any diſgrace for refuſing it.

Ul. But how do you prove that this does not proceed rather from anger than valour?

Lion. By the manner in which the combat is performed; where each, ſcorning to yield, perſiſts to the laſt gaſp, without fear of pain, or dread of death; preſerving our heart ſtill unconquered: As is evident from our never ſubmitting to have recourſe, in order to move pity, to vile prayers, or any ſuppliant diſhoneſt geſtures. And when we are conquered (as there can be but one victor) the overthrow is never completed but in our death. To proceed, you ſhall never ſee a Lion baſe enough to ſerve a Lion, or a Stag own a Stag to be his maſter. And yet you ſee one Man ſervant to another, without ſeeming ſenſible that it is a proof both of his cowardice and of his baſeneſs. How can this be accounted for, but that our courage is in its nature invincible? This is ſtill more evident, from that generous diſdain of all refreſhments, when we fall into your hands, chooſing

chooſing to ſuffer any thing rather than to aſſociate with you; bravely preferring death to ſervitude. So that the only means you have of getting one of us to live tame amongſt you is, by ſtealing a Lion's whelp, who, through your falſe careſſes, may be won to be beholden to you: Having with his liberty, loſt that noble roughneſs of manners, and immenſe ſtrength of limbs, to which he was born. Beſides, Nature could never intend to beſtow ſo much courage upon you as upon us, becauſe you would not have ſo much occaſion to exerciſe that virtue, which therefore is not confined with us to one ſex, our females being as able to repel all injuries done to themſelves, or young, as ourſelves. The Hind and Mare, you ſee, equal the Stag and Horſe in ſtrength and ſwiftneſs; whereas whilſt you undergo the toils of war, or dangers of the ſea, for the good of your Country, your wives have no other buſineſs aſſigned them, but to exerciſe their inventive faculties at the fire-ſide. So far therefore are you from poſſeſſing more valour than we, that I deny that you have any thing of it at all. What with you is called Courage is no more than cowardice, conducted with diſcretion; for I will maintain, that you expoſe yourſelves to no danger, nor run into any inconveniency, unleſs it be to avoid a greater: Which, in my opinion, ſhould de-

nominate an adventurer rather a Coward than a Hero. It would ill become you therefore, to lament that Nature has not better armed your bodies with claws, fangs, or horns, ſince you yourſelves take pains to debaſe or diſarm your minds.

Ul. "He that diſputes without an oppo-"nent, *they ſay*, eaſily gets the better of the "argument:" So that till you are contradicted, it is no wonder that you ſhould conclude, that wild beaſts are more valiant than men. But I am ſo far from ſubmitting to your opinion, that I will uphold it, that there can be no valour but amongſt men. Now to convince you what I ſay is the pure ſincere truth, you muſt know that Fortitude is the mediocrity between Raſhneſs and Fear, determined by Reaſon concerning an object juſt and honourable. Is it poſſible then, according to this account, that there ſhould be ſuch a thing as valour among you? who have firſt no judgament to find this mean between the two extremes, whence you are ſometimes too confident, and at others too timorous. Secondly, you are not qualified to conſider the nature of what is juſt and honourable (which can alone juſtify one in encountering dangers) but your reſentments only ſerve to pleaſe or revenge yourſelves. This is ſo wide of the virtue that is the ſubject of our diſcourſe, that whoever expoſes himſelf

himſelf to dangers, either out of anger, pleaſure, or ignorance, may be allowed to have as much of the Fool as you pleaſe, but has not a ſpark of the true Hero. Which ariſes from a defect, in not having adjuſted the boundaries of what is to be feared, and what ought to be deſpiſed.

Lion. Surely you allow us very little, if you won't allow us to know that every thing which deſerves to be feared is an evil.

Ul. Evils, as ſuch, are the objects of fear; but then they are not all equally ſo; there being ſome evils, of which he that has no dread, inclines a good deal more to the Idiot than the Hero: Such, as for example, are diſgrace, poverty, ſickneſs, and the like. But when the motive is juſt and honourable, all dangers, let them appear in what horrid ſhapes they will, vaniſh before the truly brave man. Thus the valiant man ſhrinks not at the apprehenſions of death, although the moſt ghaſtly of all evils, as it is the end of life; not therefore that all kinds of death are to be deſpiſed; and the braveſt man ought not to be aſhamed of being ſtartled at natural death, ſhipwrecks, or the like. We allow him therefore the title of valiant, who ſhrinks not at death where the motive is honourable, whether it be in defence of his own perſonal Honour, or of his Country. Which laſt is eſteemed ſo glorious a fate, that

the voice of nations conſpire to dignify the brave Man, that falls in his Country's ſervice, with particular funeral Honours.

Lion. If the contempt of death be ſo highly valuable in your account, Where is this to be met with ſo pure and unmixed as in our wars? where we neither conſider it, nor any of it's frightful attendants.

Ul. But then this fearleſſneſs in you is owing to ſelf-preſervation, intereſt, or revenge, not to the laudable motives of what is juſt and honourable. Thus thoſe amongſt us, who to get rid of ſome excruciating paſſion, or to avoid the diſgrace of poverty, (evils that come upon us not through any default of our own) take ſanctuary in death, are by no means held worthy of the glorious appellation of being brave, but are deſervedly branded with the infamy of being ſots and cowards.

Lion. As to dangers, it is evident that we muſt be inſenſible; becauſe we never ſo much as think of them.

Ul. This may denominate you bold, but not valiant. For there are things which a brave man may, with ſafety to his character, juſtly ſhrink at: Such as are the things that human nature was never conſtituted to encounter or ſupport, as earthquakes, blaſts from heaven, and the like. And yet even in theſe caſes He will, agreeably to his character, be leſs affected than others:

others: But as he that trembles at every incident is a baſe Wretch, ſo he that indiſcriminately regards nothing is a raſh Fool. It is in the middle of theſe two extremes (for vices are but extremes, erring in defect or redundancy) that this noble virtue Fortitude conſiſts; which whoever poſſeſſes, will never expoſe himſelf to perils without a cauſe. For as life is more valuable than any thing elſe, it would be the height of folly to expoſe it for a trifle; eſpecially as this can only happen to the brave and noble minded, who are worthy to enjoy it longer, if it were only for the ſake of others. So that we refuſe this title to thoſe who, for hire, expoſe themſelves to the dangers of war, when neither their own Honour, nor the ſervice of their own Country, required it of them. Neither do we beſtow it on Fops, who through an immoderate deſire of pleaſures, nor on Miſers, who through an extravagant luſt after riches, are ready to riſque their lives in purſuit of them. Theſe are not brave fellows, but luxurious coxcombs, and avaricious wretches. Thus thoſe that run into difficulties, through paſſion or ignorance, are called furious and raſh; but we never confer the honour of being valiant, unleſs on thoſe that dare to deſpiſe death, when Glory is the prize to be obtained, and Diſhonour the evil to be avoided. Which, as I ſaid before, can never happen to you,

who are not capable of forming a judgment upon the matter.

Lion. But don't you, that are ſo cautious how you beſtow this honourable name, dignify thoſe with it, who through compulſion of the laws, maintain ſome dangerous poſt, which entitles them ſo ſome high rank in the government?

Ul. Yes, in a reſtrained ſenſe; but we don't allow them to reach the perfection of the virtue we have been deſcribing, though they come very near it. For he that is truly brave performs the duties of the character, and acts, primarily and principally, out of a love to virtue, let the conſequences be what they will. Whereas thoſe that act out of any reſtraint, or with a view to any reward, have a little too much of ſelfiſhneſs in the caſe.

Lion. Do you confer that honour on thoſe that excel in the art and operations of war?

Ul. Yes; but thoſe are improperly termed valiant, and their bravery is of a lower rank, becauſe their merit is founded in an art, and a mechanical habit of offending others with impunity to one's ſelf, not on election, guided by right reaſon, which conſtitutes the virtue. For granting this excellency it's full merit, it is certain that it inclines more towards the apprehenſive and timorous. Where-

as

as he that exceeds in the daring part, will do leſs violence to Fortitude, as there is leſs merit in abſtaining from acting wrongly, than in ſuffering honourably. But if the brave man ſuffers, he finds his reward in it, by having obtained the glorious end propoſed, with the applauſe of his own gallant mind, which is ever free from fear.

Lion. To ſpeak the truth, *Ulyſſes*, your acts of Fortitude, as you call them, ſeem to me to ſtand in need of ſo many requiſites and circumſtances, that I am apt to think they very ſeldom are to be found. And even after that, they muſt receive a ſanction from the general vogue of the world, and by what fallacious arts that is gained, by you eloquent men, I need not ſay. However, as I don't think myſelf obliged to believe every thing that I cannot anſwer: So I am of opinion ſtill, that there is more true Fortitude to be met with amongſt us than amongſt you. It's acts with us are more ſimple, and leſs embarraſſed with difficulties; And as I am reſolved to remain a Lion, why, I will hear no more arguments againſt it. So thanking you for your good intentions, I muſt take my leave, and join my valiant brethren of the troop. *Exit* Lion.

Ul. How poor a degree of underſtanding muſt this wretch have had, not to be ſenſible of any operations, but what ariſe wholly

from the body! So that he called thoſe acts of Fortitude, which are in reality mere inclinations and natural movements, without election, or any other act of the underſtanding. But let him continue a beaſt, without that reaſon of which he is ſo unworthy, whilſt we proceed to find out ſome that are capable of carrying their thoughts higher than the corporeal part, and the impulſe of mere matter.

Exit Ulyſſes.

CIRCE.

CIRCE.

Tranſlated from the *Italian* of

JOHN BAPTIST GELLI, *&c.*

DIALOGUE VII.

Ulyſſes, Circe, *and the Horſe.*

Circe. WHAT makes *Ulyſſes* in this ſolitary grove, and in this penſive poſture?

Ul. The beauties of the ſcene, and coolneſs of the ſhade, firſt tempted me in, and I have ſince been detained by falling into a reverie upon this moſt ſerious ſubject, How few there are that either know, or are deſirous of knowing, what is their better and more noble part. And yet this is ſo neceſſary a piece

piece of wiſdom, to every one that propoſes to attain the end and perfection of his nature, (which all muſt deſire) that without this be firſt eſtabliſhed, the other is utterly impracticable; for which reaſon our wiſe anceſtors have taken care, in the moſt venerable edifices of *Greece*, to have this motto inſcribed in capitals, KNOW THY SELF *.

Circe. Whence do you collect, that there are ſo few who attend to this conſideration?

Ul. From their actions; for, as you know, Man is compounded of two natures, the one corporeal and earthy, the other immaterial and heavenly: By the former he is like the brutes, and by the latter related to thoſe divine ſubſtances that keep the ſpheres in motion: This therefore, as the moſt valuable, ought to be moſt prized; inſtead of which their whole care is laid out upon the body, to ſooth, adorn, ſatisfy, and preſerve it as long as it is poſſible.

Circe. I thought I had heard you ſay, that in *Greece* there were great numbers that gave themſelves up wholly to the ſtudy of the arts and ſciences, that they might cultivate what you call their better part.

Ul. It is very true; but theſe numbers, I

* This precept, KNOW THY SELF, was inſcribed on the temple of *Apollo* at *Delphos*. *Vide Plutarch*'s Oration to *Apollonius*.

am

am afraid, will be found very inconſiderable, in compariſon of the maſs and bulk of mankind, that are wholly attentive to the welfare and pleaſures of the body. And even of theſe wiſe men the major part, I fear, ſtudy virtue for the ſake of the body, as thinking it's happineſs cannot be ſo well procured and carried on without it. But I will venture to affirm, that who purſue not virtue for it's own ſake and value, but becauſe they make ſome advantage of it, are very unworthy of the name of wiſe. For the chief deſire of the ſoul being to know truth, and the reaſon of things, in which it acquieſces as in it's proper end, thoſe that are conſcious of no ſuch principle as the ſoul, muſt of courſe lay out their whole thoughts how to gratify the body: Which I hold to be the ſource of all the miſery and unhappineſs that attend human life.

Circe. Oh! my *Ulyſſes,* I flattered myſelf that the little time allowed me to enjoy your company, would have paſſed ſmiling off, amidſt an unbounded variety of pleaſures on every ſide, ſpringing up new and freſh, in this ſeat of all that is delightful; where the perpetual ſpring, ſo much the boaſt of happy mortals in the golden age, is actually flouriſhing, as in the moſt celebrated pieces of your beſt poets, before diſcord and enmity had being in the world; where a rich

collection

collection of animals, without controul, harmleſs, and ſecure, either rove over the verdant glades, or ſtroll through the cool receſſes of this riſing wood. I thought theſe entertainments would have incited you to partake of them. Inſtead of which, inſenſible of the joys that court you in every ſhape, I find you now muſing upon a bare flint beneath ſome ſpreading tree, or quite loſt in thought upon ſome rock that overlooks the ſhore: This is not the chearful return I promiſed myſelf from your ſprightly converſation, heightened by the joys I ſhew you, and provoked by the love I profeſſed for you. It can therefore be no common grief that ranckles in your heart, and lets you feel no eaſe.

Ul. Thou art thyſelf, my little Syren, the readieſt proof that I could bring, that there are people, whoſe thoughts are ſo wholly engroſſed by ſenſual delights, that they have no reliſh left for the pleaſures that ariſe from a contemplation on the ſecrets of allwiſe Nature. Firſt weighing down to earth, and then clenching there, that active principle which elſe would ſoar above the ſkies, to converſe with immortal ſubſtances, amidſt pure extaſies of delights, which the groſs affections of ſenſe can bear no proportion to. And here I declare, that could I recover but four of thoſe whom thou haſt transformed,

to

to preſent them to our wiſe men of Greece, I ſhould be ſo overpaid by the glory and honour of the action (though a frail and ſlippery reward, yet as it is reckoned amongſt the goods of the mind) I ſhould, I ſay, find greater pleaſure in it than in all the ſenſual delights, which either this or any other ſituation could afford me.

Circe. If theſe wiſe men are ſuch great rarities, your glory would be confined to a narrow compaſs, and your fame muſt ſoar within a little ſphere, ſince ſo great a majority, according to your own calculation, would be inſenſible of your merit, as they are ignorant how much man excels the reſt of the animal world.

Ul. I ſhould not eſteem it ſo; ſince to be praiſed by one man of an eſtabliſhed character, would weigh more with me than the caſual applauſes of an ignorant multitude.

Circe. How then do you account for it, that you cannot carry your point? and that you can find not one that will accept of your offer?

Ul. Becauſe, as I ſaid, all that I have yet met with, are of the ſort I have been deſcribing, that never knew or conſidered the true dignity of their nature, but were wholly attentive to the corporeal part and it's gratifications: And finding that part of which they were altogether obſervant, better accommo-

commodated and leſs diſturbed in their preſent ſtate, having no thought that ſoared ſo high as to conſider their divine part, they muſt of neceſſity deſire to remain as they are.

Circe. If there are ſo few that are conſcious of having this Divinity within, it is no wonder that they have hitherto eſcaped you. But if you are inflexibly determined to purſue your enterprize, ſuch is the variety in the humours and caprice of men, that you may very well hope yet to find one of your opinion. In the mean time, as I frankly confeſs, that I feel none of thoſe extaſies, in the refined way you have been talking of, I ſhall, as uſual, take a turn in this winding valley. *Exit.*

Ul. Whilſt I am reſolved to try on, 'till I find ſome one wiſe enough to know the dignity of Man, and what conſtitutes him ſo perfect a being; for to know one's ſelf is the firſt fruit that Wiſdom bears. It being a greater ſatisfaction to confer a favour on one man of ſenſe, than to ſcatter a thouſand on as many fools.—But what a ſtately Horſe is here! oh the beauteous beaſt! Sure Nature, next to man, takes delight in laviſhing her ſkill on this animal. I own, I feel myſelf already ſo prejudiced in his favour, that methinks I wiſh I may find him a *Greek.* So tell me, gentle Horſe, what thou waſt before thy change.

Horſe.

Horſe. I was a *Greek*; but why?

Ul. To let thee know that it is in my power to make a *Greek* of thee again; to releaſe thee from this inchantment, to reſtore thee to thy country, and to the liberty of ranging through the world.

Horſe. This bargain will require more than two words; becauſe juſt the ſame abhorrence that I felt in my ſtate of manhood, at the thoughts of being turned into a brute animal, I perceive now, upon your propoſal for my being changed from a Horſe back into a Man.

Ul. I muſt beg your reaſon for it; becauſe I muſt own your propoſition, ſimply conſidered, appears ſhocking to human underſtanding.

Horſe. My reaſon is, becauſe as I am, I find fewer things to hinder me from enjoying my eaſe, and from attaining that perfection and end which is agreeable to my kind and nature; whereas when I was a man, I came very ſhort of doing the duties of a man.

Ul. Sure you forget that you of all animals are moſt obliged to our aſſiſtance, and can make the worſt ſhift without our care.

Horſe. How true that may be of thoſe who when young, through your artful careſſes, might have been deluded out of the generous wildneſs natural to them, I care not; but

but am certain, it is no argument to me, who never knew what reſtraint was, but live as you perceive, free, and range at my will, without ſuſpicion or fear.

Ul. Have you any thing better to offer, why you refuſe?

Horſe. I think this ſufficient, that we are leſs hindered than you, in acting agreeably to our nature.

Ul. I ſhould be glad to hear how, for as yet I proteſt I don't ſee it.

Horſe. With all my heart. Why you muſt know then, there are * *two* principal ſprings of action, that hinder both you and us from doing what is ſuitable to our reſpective natures. The firſt is, the fear of what is diſagreeable, and may prove injurious; the other, the deſire of what is delectable, and may prove beneficial. Now theſe two frequently are a drawback upon us both, in the performance of our duty; by laying a biaſs in you upon the will, in us upon the appetite, (our origin and ſource of action) diverting it under the idea of fear of what is hurtful, or attracting it under the notion of what is deſirable.

Ul. This wants to be a little explained.

* *Epictetus* makes the whole of wiſdom to conſiſt in theſe two things, ἀνέχειν καὶ ἀπέχειν, i. e. *to bear and to forbear.*

Horſe.

Horſe. Have a little patience, and it ſhall be done to your hands. The firſt of theſe impediments, which is fear, robs us of that fortitude which prompts us through dangers to purſue what we ought; the other of our temperance, which reſtrains us from purſuing what we ought not. Now theſe two obſtacles are lighter in our way than yours, becauſe our fortitude and temperance are ſtronger. By the former we keep down that part of our appetite, which you call the irascible paſſions, ſo as neither to be too timorous, or too confident: By the latter we ſuppreſs the paſſions of pleaſure, ſo as neither to be hurried too violently to what delights, nor to be too ſoon daunted at what hurts. Thus by having the paſſions of each kind more moderate, we meet with fewer diſtractions in performing the operations agreeable to our nature.

Ul. I ſhould have a very high opinion of your ſkill, if you could prove theſe virtues to be found in greater perfection in you than in us.

Horſe. As to Fortitude, the whole ſtream of your writers runs in our favour. I ſhall not inſiſt upon your poets, who, as their chief aim is to give pleaſure to their readers, may be allowed ſometimes to * *ſay the thing that*

* This is a ſtrict tranſlation in *Gulliver's* Voyages of, *Dire quello che non è*, in *Gelli*.

is not; but your hiſtorians, whoſe profeſſion it is ſolely to regard the truth. Now when one of theſe intends to raiſe the idea of his hero's valour, he compares him to ſome ſuch beaſt, as a furious lion or a ſturdy bull †. But how would it ſound, in ſpeaking of one of us, if they ſhould ſay, that he was valiant nay even as a man. This therefore, I hope, gives it clearly for us.

Ul. You confound bodily ſtrength with fortitude.

Aſide. This, I find already, was one of thoſe that was never conſcious of any pleaſures but thoſe of the body.

Horſe. And whence does ſtrength of body proceed but from ſtrength of mind?

Ul. From a mind rightly qualified to exert it, I grant it does.

Horſe. And where will you find this qualification to ſo high a degree as in us, who have the mind leſs diſturbed, as it is agitated by fewer paſſions?

Ul. What paſſions can you name in us, not to be met with as well in yourſelves?

Horſe. I anſwer, all thoſe that relate to things abſent or future. We regard nothing but what is preſent, without being ſo ſharp-

† *Ægyptii ſacerdotes cum ſortem & temperatum ſignificare volunt Taurum integræ valetudinis pingunt, ait Orus.*

ſighted

ſighted as to torment ourſelves concerning what has not yet a being.

Ul. Nor do we.

Horſe. I aſſert that you do, both by fear and hope; fear of what diſpleaſes, and hope of what invites; which actually affects you with joy or ſorrow, and holds the mind in ſuch a ſtate of diſtraction or ſuſpenſe, ſo as to render it unfit to perform it's functions duly. Now from theſe paſſions flow all the reſt.

Proceed we now to our Temperance, which ſecures us from thoſe other impediments to our duty, which ariſe from pleaſurable objects. And who ſo hardy as to deny us the preference in this virtue? I mean as it relates both to joy or ſorrow.

Ul. This I muſt beg leave to do, as long as I find you more governed by the ſenſes than we are.

Horſe. And yet our practice ſhall confute you, and experience be the demonſtration.

Ul. With all my heart. I deſire no better proof.

Horſe. Now Temperance, as we have ſaid, relates both to joy and ſorrow. But becauſe it is much more difficult to abſtain from pleaſures, than to behave decently under afflictions, I ſhall conſider the firſt branch of it, and begin with the moſt powerful propenſion to love. Now what animal in

the world is guilty of ſuch ridiculous madneſs upon this ſcore, as you every day give proofs of? Caſt your eyes through Nature, and tell me, if after pregnancy * there be not an univerſal truce? Beſides, we never recede the leaſt tittle from our dignity, or even degrade ourſelves, to make a compliment of our ſuperiority to our females, like you, who take a pride in profeſſing yourſelves their ſlaves. How many of you, out of a wanton indulgence to this paſſion, have diveſted yourſelves of all regard to your diſtreſſed families, (which we abhor) to your honour, your dignity, and fixed upon yourſelves an everlaſting diſgrace, and ſometimes the very extremity of poverty? As for your authors, who publiſh their infamy in proſe or rhime, and your wretches who have from this motive procured to themſelves an untimely end, it would be tedious, as well as needleſs to touch upon them, as inſtances of ſuch every where abound. All that I ſhall ſay is, that having once perſuaded yourſelves that beauty is *ſomething divine*† (a love and deſire of which is always commendable) from hence ſprings the fallacy; for you dreſs up that phantaſtical grace, which is the reſult of due proportions, and well mixed co-

*This is alſo tranſlated by Captain *Gulliver*.

† *Iſocrates*, in his panegyric upon *Helen*, ſpeaking in praiſe of Beauty, ſays, that "It is a thing of a divine nature."

lours,

lours, in all the attributes of heavenly beauty diſcoverable in the Supreme Being, and ſo you confound your human paſſion with the deſire of that excellency which is the perfection of the human ſoul. I call it your human paſſion, becauſe it neither rages ſo inceſſantly or furiouſly in any other kind, but only at ſtated times, for the preſervation of the ſpecies.

Ul. As if we had not ſeen you guilty of a thouſand freaks from the ſame motive.

Horſe. The worſt that I dare ſay you ever ſaw, is ſome quarrels ariſing from jealouſy, which is inſeparable from the paſſion. But this I chooſe to paſs by, leſt it ſhould offend you, conſidering what horrid and ſhocking ſcenes it now and then introduces amongſt you. Read your hiſtories, and you will find how many plots, conſpiracies, treaſons, murders by ſword, (and what is worſe) by poiſon, have alarmed the world from that ſingle caſe. So now I think it high time to leave this firſt branch of Temperance, to conſider it as far as it concerns your food, in which I dare ſay, you will find yourſelves excelled by every beaſt ſavage or domeſtick: Amongſt them you will find none that exceeds the demands of Nature, or the kinds that ſhe allots them; be it ſeed, herb, fleſh, or fruit. Whereas you, not content with any one ſort of food, ranſack the world for variety, and

after that call in the help of art, to make it what it never was intended to be, by which you are eaſily drawn in to indulge to ſuch a degree, as either to procure you a ſhort life, or a tedious decrepit old age. As for Drunkenneſs, as it robs you of all the boaſted ſuperiority of reaſon, I ſhall ſpare your ſhame, as you have been ſo ſevere upon yourſelves as to allow, that he who commits a crime through this vice, is worthy of double puniſhment; the firſt according to the quantity of the fault, the ſecond for having ſuffered himſelf to be deprived of his underſtanding, which ſhould have guarded him againſt it. I hope by this time you are convinced that we are more temperate than you, and that we are obliged to Nature for it, in giving us more of that virtue that is able to remove thoſe obſtacles that hinder us from acting agreeably to Nature.

Ul. I ſhall not deny, that who obſerves particular operations ſimply, without reſpect to any propoſed end, will be apt to conclude that you are more temperate than men; and yet I will undertake to demonſtrate, that nothing can be falſer than ſuch a concluſion. For you muſt know, that Temperance is an elective habit, acquired upon a wiſe choice, of which whoſoever is poſſeſſed, he will not behave himſelf indecently under afflictions, or immoderately in pleaſures: Though afflictions

flictions are not ſo much it's object as pleaſures, nor all pleaſures alike: Thoſe of the Mind, ſuch as a deſire of honour, thoſe of the Underſtanding, ſuch as ariſe from intenſe ſtudy, and the like, fall not under it's conſideration: Nor all the entertainments of the Senſes neither. He can never be called an intemperate Man, that indulges to never ſo great a height of admiring pictures, ſtatues, and other objects of ſight; much leſs He that amuſes himſelf with muſick, vocal or inſtrumental. Nor can the pleaſures of the ſmell fall under it's notice, unleſs from the ideas they raiſe; as the dog enjoys the ſcent of the hare, in hopes of eating him. So that there remains but two of the ſenſes, the touch and taſte, for this virtue to exerciſe itſelf about: Or more ſtrictly, only the touch, the taſte being rather a branch of that ſenſe than a diſtinct one; as that monſter * of a voluptuary, who ſo far abandoned himſelf to the pleaſures of wine, wiſhed that the Gods had beſtowed on him a length of neck equal to the crane's, that he might enjoy the flavour of the draught longer, and improved too through ſuch a tube.

Horſe. What would you infer from thence?

Ul. Have a little patience, and you ſhall hear. Why you muſt know, that man has

* *Philoxenus. Ariſt. Ethic.* Lib. III. cap. 10.

the inſtruments, or organs, of the ſenſe of feeling, in greater perfection than any other animal.

Horſe. How do you make that appear?

Ul. You ſhall ſee. All organs and inſtruments by which ſenſation is performed, muſt be wholly free and void of their objects; for it is abſurd to ſay, that any thing can receive what it had before. Thus, for inſtance, the eye muſt not be tinged with any particular colour, nor the palate be poſſeſſed of any one original taſte; for then we ſhould ſee as through a diſcoloured glaſs, or have a predominant taſte, as people complain that every thing ſeems bitter, in your bilious fevers.

Horſe. This is very true; but I don't ſee how it makes for your purpoſe.

Ul. Now this can never be the caſe with the organs of feeling, which are either nerves, fleſh, or ſkin; and as the objects of theſe are the primary qualities, ſuch as hot, dry, cold, or moiſt, (anſwering to the four elements) is it impoſſible the inſtruments ſhould be wholly free from theſe qualities.

Horſe. How can theſe faculties then receive theſe objects, if they have them already?

Ul. Why they do only perceive the exceſs or defect of what is in themſelves, *i. e.* diſcern what is more hot, dry, cold, or moiſt than

than themſelves. Hence thoſe that have theſe organs in the beſt temper, muſt be ſenſible of the more minute difference, and that muſt be Man, who has his conſtitution better mixed, as all agree, than any other animal. From whence it follows, as we have that ſenſe more exquiſite, we muſt perceive higher pleaſures from it than other animals can do. And as our pleaſures are more exalted, it is no wonder if our deſires of them are leſs moderate; though I am far from granting that too.

Horſe. But will you, againſt daily experience, deny, that we do not ſuffer ourſelves to be drawn aſide by theſe pleaſures as much as you?

Ul. I am ready to allow that you abſtain eaſier from pleaſures, and ſuffer leſs from afflictions, but deny either to be the effect of Temperance.

Horſe. But why?

Ul. Becauſe, as I ſaid, Temperance is an elective habit, choſen upon a chain of right deductions. Now how can you be ſaid to have the Virtue, who have not the Reaſon upon which it is founded? Nor know how to fix the mediocrity in which it conſiſts, and whoſe bounds cannot be tranſgreſſed with ſafety to the preſervation of the ſpecies. For Nature has affixed certain pleaſures to invite us, as well to take care of the individual as

of

of the kind. But you can never be ſaid, like us, to have a freedom of choice, who are directed by Nature in all your actions.

Horſe. Whence then ariſe thoſe effects of Temperance, which, I hope, you will not deny to be found in us?

Ul. From an inſtinct that Nature has implanted in you, as being conſcious how imperfect your intelligence is, and how ill qualified you are to judge what would tend beſt to your preſervation; and therefore ſhe gave you a ſtandard rule, that you ſhould not exceed in any thing that might haſten your diſſolution. The ſame care has provided, that as you are deſtitute of reaſon to moderate the paſſions, you ſhould not be ſo ſtrongly affected by them, as to let them be injurious to life. But ſtill this is not Temperance, which upon choice deſires, and rejects in a proper time and manner.

Horſe. If the ſame end be obtained, what is it to us whether it be by Nature or Temperance?

Ul. However it cannot follow, that it is better to be forced to a certain determinate point, than to move towards it freely, and upon choice. So return, return then, gentle Horſe; be as thou waſt, a Man, and let thy Country bleſs thy ſight with mine.

Horſe.

Horſe. That is more than I can agree to; for though I may not be able to ſupport my notions ſo well as you, it will by no means follow, that I don't perceive advantage enough in my preſent ſtate, not to reſolve to continue in it.

Ul. Nay, if you are ſo invincibly obſtinate, I ſhould recommend the ſame thing to you: For certainly he is unworthy of any better ſtate, that gives himſelf up ſo implicitly to the guidance of Senſe, as to be blind to the light of Reaſon.

CIRCE.

CIRCE.

Tranſlated from the *Italian* of

JOHN BAPTIST GELLI, *&c.*

DIALOGUE VIII.

Ulyſſes *and the Dog.*

Ulyſſes. IF Nature (as our *Grecian* Sages tell us) wills that every creature ſhould attain it's end and perfection, why did ſhe, at the ſame time, give our Senſes power to drag down to Earth our Thoughts; and to keep the Soul intent upon groſs objects, (which I dare ſay was the caſe of our Horſe) till the much greater number of us degenerate into ſomething approaching very

very near to the Nature of beaſts? Now theſe, as they have their ultimate end upon Earth, have their eyes turned down towards it; whereas Man has his face erect to Heaven, to remind him that his thoughts ought to be directed thither, to contemplate the nature of ſpiritual Beings, which will raiſe him to a more exalted kind of happineſs than falls to the ſhare of mere Humanity.

Aſide. But what can this poor Dog mean by coming up to me in this familiar manner? See how he ſtops! Surely this is in obedience to his Nature, which is fond of Man, and the ſight of one in this place is a great rarity.

I believe, nay, I may ſay I know (for it was Experience taught it me) that ſhe gave us more ſenſes than are abſolutely neceſſary, for our more comfortable ſupport, and for the more exact information of our underſtanding. But then why, I aſk, are theſe Senſes permitted, becauſe their objects are there, to weigh down to Earth our better part, which elſe would naturally be ſoaring up to Heaven?

Aſide. But how this Dog ſeems to look with pleaſure on me! And by his geſtures one would think that he underſtood every word I have been ſaying.

I ſay this permiſſion could be granted for no other purpoſe, but that the conſideration

of

of the diſparity and diſagreement between the parts of which we are compoſed, ſhould excite in us a greater care and circumſpection. This gives our virtue a better opportunity to exert itſelf; for difficulties not only prove, but ſerve to ſtrengthen and perfect it too.

Aſide. This Dog grows ſo fond, that I muſt ſpeak to him.—So, come here poor beaſt.—How loving and faithful is this creature to Man!

Dog. Tell me, gentle Cavalier, if you are of *Ithaca* in *Greece*, as your accents ſeem to declare you?

Ul. I am a *Greek*, and *Ithaca*, as thou ſayeſt, is my Country.

Dog. I gueſſed ſo by your dialect, which every province has peculiar to itſelf. This made me ſtop, overjoyed to meet a Countryman; but pity ſoon ſucceeded, when I ſaw you could not obtain the ſame happineſs that is conferred upon myſelf.

Ul. What happineſs?

Dog. Of being transformed by *Circe* like myſelf into ſome beaſt.

Ul. D'ye call it happineſs to be changed from a Man into a Brute?

Dog. I do indeed, as I will anſwer for it you would too, if you could have obtained the ſame benefit. If this does not of itſelf

ſeem

ſeem clear, have a little patience and I will prove it to you.

Ul. With all my heart; for I have been uſing my intereſt with *Circe*, to get you all turned back into Men, to redeem you from ſo much wretchedneſs.

Dog. Firſt, if you have no objection, may I crave your name?

Ul. Ulyſſes; my firſt employment was ſtudy, and after that I took to arms.

Dog. I ſhall with the greater pleaſure converſe with you, as your time has been employed in the two moſt honourable profeſſions in the world. My name was *Cleanthes*, and I too followed my ſtudies for a certain time, but being eaſy in my fortune, I quitted them, if not wholly, at leaſt in part, as people in ſuch circumſtances uſually do, to enjoy my ſelf more at leiſure, till arriving at this iſland I was chang'd as you ſee me; from which day I date my happineſs.

Ul. I expect, or rather demand, that you ſhould point out wherein this ſuperior happineſs conſiſts.

Dog. If you pleaſe; I ſhall begin with the Virtues, becauſe in them you place your ſo much boaſted ſuperiority: in Juſtice, Fortitude, Temperance, and the like. But firſt reſolve me one queſtion; Which ſoil do you think deſerves the preference, the country of the

the * *Cyclops* [*Sicily*], which, they tell us, untilled, and uncultivated, furniſhes it's inhabitants with a luxuriant crop of every kind of grain and fruit, or yours of † *Ithaca*, mountainous and barren, which with all your pains and care rewards you with a poor return, hardly ſufficient for the goats it's natives? Anſwer me this, I ſay, all national prejudice apart.

Ul. Notwithſtanding my ſtrong partiality to my country, I muſt own, that the ſoil you have ſo well deſcribed, claims to be preferred.

Dog. The ſame merit will hold good in Souls: Thoſe are beſt that reach an excellency with the greateſt eaſe.

Ul. This I alſo readily allow.

Dog. Then you confeſs that the ſouls of Brutes, which without care or ſtudy are of

* Mr. *Pope*'s *Hom. Odyſſ.* IX. 133. Of the Land of the *Cyclops*,

The Soil untill'd a ready Harveſt yields,
With Wheat and Barley wave the golden fields,
Spontaneous Wines from weighty cluſters pour,
And Jove *deſcends in each prolific ſhow'r.*

Ille M. Cato ſapiens cellam penariam Reipublicæ, nutricem plebis Romanæ Siciliam nominavit. Cicero in Verr. C. 2. 2

† *Hom.* Lib. *Odyſſ.* 4. v. 823.

Horrid with cliffs, our meagre Land allows
Thin Herbage for the mountain Goat to browze.

them-

themſelves productive of the Virtues, are better, and more noble than yours, which know nothing that is not taught them.

Ul. What virtues are Beaſts ſo adorned with from their own proper nature?

Dog. Much greater than what Men are adorned with, with all their art. And that our diſquiſition may be the more unexceptionable, let us begin with the firſt and chief of all.

Ul. Which do you mean?

Dog. I mean Prudence: Without which no virtue can poſſibly exiſt. For as virtue is the mediocrity between two extremes determined by right reaſon, it muſt follow that there can be no virtue without Prudence. For the middle point, called Virtue, is not an arithmetical medium, conſiſting in an equidiſtance of it's two extremes; ſuch as, for example, in continued quantities is the center of the circle, from whence draw as many lines as you pleaſe to the circumference they will be all equal; or in a diſcrete quantity, ſuch as ſix in the numbers two and ten, which is juſt equally removed from each: But it is a geometrical medium, which is diſtant from it's extremes by a ſimilar, a rational proportion, ſuch as, for example, is ſix between nine and four, which contains four one time and half, and is contained as often in the number nine; and it is therefore called the middle between the one and the

other by a rational proportion. So then the middle point, in which the virtue conſiſts, being not placed in an equal diſtance from the extremes, like an arithmetical medium, it is plain that ſome virtue muſt determine it in a rational proportion of extremes, after the manner of a geometrical medium, and that virtue muſt be Prudence. So that there can be no virtue without prudence, and therefore it is with good reaſon eſteemed the rule and foundation of all the reſt; and this, I ſay, is to be found better in us than amongſt you.

Ul. What proof do you bring of that?

Dog. Reaſon; for I hope you will allow that habits are to be judged of by actions.

Ul. True.

Dog. Then you muſt alſo grant, that we are more prudent than you, there being more of that to be diſcovered in our actions than yours. And that this is alſo true you will prove to yourſelves by a fair induction, by a diligent attendance upon the operations of any one ſpecies amongſt us. Let us begin with the leaſt, I mean the inſects; and here you will ſee the Ant ſo provident as to lay up in harveſt, a ſtock to carry her through the winter. The Spider with great craft hangs out her nets, to catch the prey that is her ſupport; whilſt the Waſp, with many other ſort of flies, take ſhelter under ground from the

the ſeverity of the cold. As for the Bees, I ſhall not trouble you with a detail of their actions, their wiſe government, and exact adminiſtration of it; ſo many authors having ſpent a great part of their lives in ſtudying their manners and policy. Next, let us go to the Birds; and here you will find them all changing their reſidence, till they find one agreeable to their conſtitutions, and thoſe of them that are conſcious they are bad nurſes, leave their eggs, and afterwards their young ones, to be educated (as for example, the Cuckow) by others. The Eagle, when he ſuſpects the * legitimacy of his children, convinces himſelf by turning their faces full againſt the ſun. The Cranes put themſelves under the government of one, who when the reſt ſleep, ſtands aloof watchful with a ſtone in his claws, which he drops and rouſes them upon any alarm of an invaſion. The † Partridge, to defend her little brood from the fowler, expoſes herſelf till they make their eſcape, and after that ſhe makes her own. The Swallow, when ſhe cannot come at clay to make a cement with ſtraws to build her

* *Deſumitur ex nono Lucani Lib.*

Utque Jovis volucer, calido dum protulit ovo
Implumes natos, ſolis convertit ad ortus.
Qui potuere pati radios, & lumine recto
Suſtinuere Diem, cæli ſervantur in uſus;
Qui Phœbo ceſſere, jacent.

† *Le Pernici*, the red legg'd Partridges.

neſt, dips herſelf firſt in water, and then rolls herſelf in the duſt, till ſhe gathers a mortar much like yours. In breeding up her little ones, how wiſely does ſhe employ her care, to make an equal diſtribution of the food amongſt them, as well as to preſerve a neatneſs in the neſt! When the Magpye finds her eggs are diſcovered, her next care is to remove them by two at a time, which ſhe does by ſticking them with a viſcous matter, with which ſhe is ſupplied from herſelf, each at the end of a twig, under which ſhe thruſts her neck, and bringing them to an equal balance, carries them off. There is another ſort of Partridge †, of which the hen is obliged with great privacy to hide her eggs from the cock-bird, who is ſo very amorous, that not brooking her abſence, would elſe deſtroy them. The ſagacity of ſome Quadrupeds, particularly of the Camel and Elephant, is too notorious to be inſiſted on. The Stag, when he is grown unwieldy through fatneſs, as knowing himſelf to be unfit to ſtand a chace, withdraws to ſome private ſtation; and does the ſame again when he caſts his horns, as being in both theſe circumſtances unable to defend himſelf. Nor does the Hind diſcover leſs prudence, in chooſing to bring forth near ſome path beaten by human

† *Le Starne.*

foot-

footſteps, as moſt likely to be free from the haunts of wild beaſts, thinking it ſafer to be expoſed to the mercy of men: And when her young ones are grown pretty ſtrong, ſhe is obſerved to lead them to ſome ſteep place to teach them to leap. The Bear, that ſhe might teach her cubs to climb trees, frightens them herſelf, that they might learn that way to defend themſelves. I ſhall paſs over the prudence of the Horſe, and thoſe of our own ſpecies, as being a ſubject too familiar to you, and that of the Reptiles, particularly of the Serpent, as too obvious, it being born ſymbolically in the hand of Prudence herſelf. Nor ſhall I detain you with ſtories of the ingenuity viſible in Fiſh, both in defending themſelves or making their eſcape: This ſpecies by raiſing a mud in the water with it's gills; *that* by emitting a dark liquor like ink. Nay you yourſelves have ſufficiently confeſſed how ingenious they are, by borrowing from them the art of building thoſe veſſels by which the commerce of the world is carried on. Your oars are but an imitation of the make of the feet of the Nautilus; your ſails of his wings, which he ſtretches to the windward, and ſo rides top-gallant over the waves. So that I hope you will ſubſcribe to this plain propoſition, that we poſſeſs a ſuperior degree of prudence; and conſequently, that the ſtate, for which Nature has done

ſo much, claims the preference. As the luxuriant ſoil of the † land of the *Cyclops*, that produces her fruits of herſelf, is of more value than your country *Ithaca*, which without great care would bring forth none.

Ul. I expected at your firſt ſetting out, *Cleanthes*, to have found you a maſter of all moral knowledge, but was ſoon undeceived, when I ſaw that you did not ſo much as know what ſtrictly Prudence is; and for want of a diſtinct idea of it, I obſerved you frequently confounded it with art.

Dog. I aſſerted that Prudence is, that knowledge by which we conduct our actions, and diſpoſe them to the beſt advantage. This I hope you won't deny.

Ul. No, but I ſhall deny it to be all. For he does not deſerve the name of prudent, who is ſo only in one thing; ſuppoſe in the preſervation of his health, or in the ſkill of managing his weapon: He alone is worthy of it who is ſo in every thing relating to a quiet and happy life. And therefore this virtue cannot exiſt among you, as I pove thus; Prudence is a virtue ſubſiſting in the part of the underſtanding, called practical, becauſe it has actions for it's object, and univerſals for it's principles, which by reaſoning ſhe ap-

† *Diodorus Siculus* tells us, Lib. V. chap. 1. that the *Leontine* plains, and many other parts of *Sicily*, bear wild wheat to this day.

plies

plies to particulars. Now this you cannot do, becauſe you are not endued with this faculty.

Dog. But how will you prove that this power may not be the reſult of Senſe, and not of Reaſon?

Ul. She paſſes a judgment both upon things paſt and to come; therefore it muſt know them; but Senſe, you will confeſs, knows only things preſent.

Dog. Pray, do not the memory and the imagination comprehend things abſent?

Ul. Yes; but then they paſs no judgment on them, nor do they afterwards apply them to particulars.

Dog. But why may not we have by Nature the principles of Prudence in us, as well as you have thoſe of Science?

Ul. Becauſe they are ſuch as muſt be acquired, either by diſcipline or by experience. You cannot have them by diſcipline, becauſe you are not capable of conſidering univerſals; nor by experience, becauſe you have not memory, which lays up that ſtore of particulars with which when reaſon ſerves itſelf it becomes experience.

Dog. He that denies us to have any memory, ſure is very little acquainted with us.

Ul. And yet I will maintain, that what you call Memory is nothing but Imagination.

Dog. Where is the difference, granting what you ſay, if Imagination ſerves the ſame purpoſes in us as Memory does in you?

Ul. It is very true that the Fancy preſerves the images of things, which ſhe has received from the Senſes, as Memory does; but then the Memory preſerves them more diſtinct, and ranges them in better order. Beſides, it connects the idea of time with it; ſuch as when it received ſuch and ſuch impreſſions, which mere Fancy cannot perform. "The "Aſs will not go by the ditch where he "once fell in," ſays the proverb. But this is only becauſe the imagination repreſents to him the fall indiſtinctly, and without any notion of the time when. So that as it does not appear to him in what part of time this happened, whether it was in the paſt, is in the preſent, or is to be in the future, his apprehenſion will not ſuffer him to riſque a ſecond tumble. So that it is certain, thoſe ſpecies that have the Imagination in a higher degree of perfection, by which they perceive things more diſtinctly, will ſeem to have Memory: As you above all animals ſeem to retain ſome things, particularly the knowledge of your Maſters. And where this power is leſs perfect, they will appear to have leſs of memory; as the Flies, which when driven from a place, immediately ſeem to forget it, by returning inſtantly to ſettle upon

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it again. Therefore as Man alone, by the knowledge of the parts of time, can be ſaid to have Memory, he alone can be ſaid to have Prudence: For without that it would be impoſſible to judge when it is proper to do a thing, and when not, in which Prudence conſiſts.

Dog. If you will not allow us to have Prudence, What is that principle that directs us to do only what is agreeable to our Nature?

Ul. An inſtinct, a property implanted in you for your preſervation, conducting you to what is your end. So that if you ſhould, for example, aſk thoſe Ants that were born laſt ſpring, upon what motive they lay up their ſtore, having not felt the rigour of any preceding winter, and conſequently it could not be from prudence; their anſwer muſt be, becauſe we ſee our parents do the ſame, or that they act by ſome natural impulſe urging them to it.

Dog. But is not this the ſame thing in us which would be called Prudence in you?

Ul. No, it is rather quite a different thing; becauſe Prudence is not a natural gift, but an habit, begun upon choice, and brought to perfection by repeated acts. That you may ſee this the clearer, you muſt know that in our mind, (I ſpeak of the Underſtanding and not of the Senſe) are two powers, with the

the one we contemplate things unchangeable, neceſſary, and eternal. By neceſſary I mean, that have their beginning in ſuch a manner, that it is impoſſible for them to be in any other manner. By the ſecond we conſider things contingent and variable, or ſuch as may exiſt as well under one form as another. The firſt of theſe is called the ſpeculative Intellect, the ſecond is ſtiled Reaſon, Diſcourſe, and the practical Underſtanding. But, becauſe things neceſſary and unchangeable are of three ſorts, that is, they are principles, or concluſions from them, or an aggregate of both; therefore in this ſpeculative part, there are correſpondent to them three habits, Intellect, Science, and Knowledge. By the firſt we take in Principles, the ſecond Concluſions, and by the third both. And becauſe things contingent are of two ſorts (I ſpeak now of moral not phyſical accidents) active and operative or executive; the active regards our own manners and moral operations, ſo as to render the Man good, by correcting his appetites, and conducting him to happineſs: the executive relates to combinations external to him, and the wiſe adminiſtration of them. The firſt falls under the notice of Prudence, which is nothing but an habitude of acting according to Reaſon, in things good or bad for us perſonally conſidered; the ſecond falls under the cognizance of Art, which is the habit

habit of acting wiſely in things external, and conſtituted artificially. So that you ſee how other Animals cannot be ſaid to have either Prudence or Art, as you are void of Reaſon, or, call it the practical Intellect, which is the ground they have to work upon. Nor is it ſtrange that Nature, which never does any thing in vain, has given you neither the one nor the other. Having only yourſelves to provide for, and your young ones a ſhort time, till they can make a ſhift without you, you could have no occaſion for Prudence or Art, as thoſe have to whom the government of families and ſtates are committed; and eſpecially, as you want no ſupplies that Nature does not furniſh you with.

Dog. Your eloquence, *Ulyſſes*, is ſo artful and at the ſame time ſo forcible, that who ſhould incautiouſly liſten to you, would be in danger of being drawn in to give his aſſent, as if nothing but truth dropt from thoſe lips, though you groſſly ſtumbled at the very threſhold, as the ſaying is, of your diſcourſe.

Ul. What is this mighty blunder you charge me with?

Dog. That in reckoning up the intellectual habits, you took no notice of Opinion, and yet what ſhare that has in the acts of the Underſtanding one need not ſay.

Ul. The charge recoils upon yourſelf, for want of obſerving that I obviated it at the very

very threſhold, as you call it, by declaring, that I confined myſelf to thoſe contingencies that are within our own power, which are properly the objects of Prudence, and left out of the conſideration ſuch as depend on nature, that fall under the notice of Opinion, which is no wonder if it ſometimes errs, as natural effects are ſo immenſe and various.

Dog. Why was this left out of the conſideration?

Ul. As unworthy to be reckoned amongſt thoſe higher powers, or intellectual habits, becauſe it brings no improvement to the Underſtanding. Thus a Man is not eſteemed wiſe for having an opinion of a thing, but for knowing it. Beſides, Opinion is liable to be deceived, which can never happen to the forementioned habits.

Dog. Are you in earneſt! not liable to be deceived?

Ul. The three firſt, which ſubſiſt in the mind or ſpeculative intellect, as their objects are immutable, cannot be deceived. But, that muſt ever be true or falſe, which the Soul ſhall judge to be ſo with either of theſe. The like may be ſaid of the two powers of the practical intellect; but with this difference, that with the firſt three ſhe judges and pronounces true on her own part, and on the part of the things which ſhe conſiders as they

they are immutable, and muſt for ever remain ſo: Whereas with the powers of the ſecond kind, ſhe only pronounces what is true as far as they are concerned, and not the objects themſelves.

Dog. Will you be ſo hardy as to aſſert, that Prudence, or the Art that you have been ſpeaking of, is not capable of being miſtaken?

Ul. No; but this is not the fault of the faculties, which are good and true, but it proceeds from the part of the objects which are variable.

Dog. And yet this methinks may be anſwered; but I chooſe rather to return to our propoſition, and demand of you again, if we have not Prudence, how comes it that there is ſuch a rectitude in our operations, and that we make fewer miſtakes than you? And if we are wholly void of Art, to what do you aſcribe that ſurprizing ſkill, that ſhews itſelf in what we do for our own ſervice, and eſpecially for the ſervice of our young?

Ul. To an Inſtinct, or a certain natural Prevalency implanted in you, according to your different ſpecies, for your preſervation, wholly different from either Prudence or Art. And that this is ſo, be pleaſed to remember, that all animals of the ſame ſort, obſerve exactly the ſame forms, as well

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in building as in every thing elſe. Whereas were theſe the effect of Art or Prudence, which always act upon choice, there muſt be a variety ſuitable to the circumſtances of time and place, as you find in every thing we do.

Dog. You ſeem to me, *Ulyſſes*, to argue from mere differences of terms, which are arbitrarily affixed by you to things. So that what is ſtiled in you Prudence and Art, is in us no more than Inſtinct, or a natural Prevalency. But if ours be leſs liable to miſtakes, I think it a proof that it is more eligible, and ourſelves more perfect. So biding adieu to our controverſy I ſhall leave you to enjoy your preſent ſtate, becauſe you ſeem to think it beſt, and for the ſame reaſon I ſhall continue in my own.

Exit Dog.

CIRCE.

CIRCE.

Tranſlated from the *Italian* of

JOHN BAPTIST GELLI, *&c.*

DIALOGUE IX.

Ulyſſes *and the Steer.*

Ulyſſes. I Find my ſelf at preſent rightly qualified to ſubſcribe to the proverb, that nothing is ſo equally diſtributed as the Underſtanding *: ſince there is not one of theſe beaſts with whom I have been diſcourſing, but is ſo ſatisfied with his own ſhare of it, that he cannot bear to ſubmit

* *Carteſius* takes theſe very words. *Diſſertat de Method.* P. 1. Dr. *Calamy* quotes them as a wiſe reflection of *Carteſius*. *Vide* his Sermons.

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to the judgment of Man, who can reaſon ſtrictly, and act freely. For, that the ſtate of a brute is more deſirable than ours, is ſo monſtrous a propoſition, that in their former ſhape they durſt not be ſo hardy as to maintain it. It muſt then be owing to nothing elſe but the ſtrong prejudice that every being has to itſelf, which may make it abhor a total change, leſt it ſhould riſque a diſſolution by it. And this jealouſy is perhaps ſtronger in Man than in any other creature. I ſpeak now of a thorough ſubſtantial change, not a little accidental alteration; for I fancy, we ſhould meet with few old fellows, that would heſitate long whether they would be turned back to five and twenty; no ſick man would have any ſcruples, whether he ſhould change conſtitutions with the robuſt, or the beggar his purſe with the wealthy. But to ſuffer an eſſential tranſmutation, ſo as to become quite another creature, is what few or none can bear to think of. This is the beſt account I can find for their obſtinacy in rejecting my propoſal.—But what a beautiful young Steer do I ſee coming up, careleſsly grazing towards me! How much fierceneſs is in his ſour look, and yet how gentle and tractable is his carriage! Surely we are much obliged to nature for this beaſt, which ſeems calculated to do our drudgery both by his ſtrength and temper. I will try if he was a

Greek,

Greek, which I ſhall eaſily do, for I obſerve he liſtens to every word I ſpeak, as if he underſtood me.—So, gentle Steer, I adjure thee by thy hopes tell me of what country thou waſt before thy change?

Steer. Of the ſame that you were, if you ſpeak your mother tongue.

Ul. Then I preſume, you feel the ſame longing to return that I do.

Steer. Not I truly, I always thought that where one is happieſt, that is our trueſt country. And as I would upon no account return to manhood again, ſo neither can I think of quitting ſcenes ſo delightful and a ſoil ſo fertile.

Ul. Do you feel then no compunction, no tenderneſs for friends deſerted, and relations left behind? No concern for thoſe whom to part with, to ſome generous minds, has been eſteemed worſe than death?

Steer. For my part, if I had no other motive to determine me to continue as I am, this would be a very ſtrong one, that by having my cares diſengaged from thoſe external concerns, they all or chiefly center in myſelf. Hence we live quietly and contentedly with one another, and each being ſupplied by Nature with every thing he wants, there can be no room for hatred, quarrels, envy, rapine, murders by ſword or poiſon, with a thouſand other calamities, with which

your human life abounds, and which made a wiſe Man ſo juſtly call it, an ocean of miſeries.

Ul. This outcry againſt us, methinks, comes with a very ill grace from thoſe that are guilty of ſuch groſs enormities, whom it would become at leaſt not to be cenſorious.

Steer. It muſt not be denied, that we alſo have our irregularities; perhaps by the appointment of Nature, which will not ſuffer any thing in this world to be without defect; but this we dare affirm, that you ſhall find but one vice raging in one ſpecies, as Surlineſs in the Bear, Fierceneſs in the Tiger, Ravenouſneſs in the Wolf, and Gluttony in the Hog. Whereas each of theſe is to be met with in a very flouriſhing condition in Man alone.

Ul. What you ſay may be true of the ſpecies, but not of the individual; it being impoſſible that all vices can be in one, conſiſtent with his being, though all the virtues may dwell very peaceably in him, that is ſo happy as to acquire them.

Steer. Why ſo? as Nature has furniſhed him with a genius equal to every thing.

Ul. Becauſe the vices being contrary to each other, as Cowardice to Raſhneſs, Avarice to Prodigality, cannot meet together in the ſame perſon, though the virtues,

tues, which are aſſiſtant to each other, very well may.

Steer. And will any man dare to deny, that the virtues are not alſo to be found amongſt us?

Ul. Not ſo perfect; though there ſhould be one or more found in a whole ſpecies; whereas one man, I ſay, is capable of them all.

Steer. Our opinions ſeem hitherto to claſh extremely.

Ul. So, who ſhall be judge in the caſe?

Steer. I will name one, that is yourſelf, and will demonſtrate the point ſo clearly, that I ſhall freely ſubmit the deciſion to your ingenuity. To begin, I think your wiſe men agree, that * *Juſtice* is an epitome and collection of all the virtues in one, as containing them all in itſelf, and giving law to the reſt. It is ſhe that dictates to the valiant, and reſtrains him from declining dangers when glory is the prize. It is by her the temperate man diſdains to abandon himſelf ſo far to pleaſures, as to have no regard to decency. What but this virtue keeps the civilized man from abhorring the thoughts of doing an injury? Nay it reduces all human actions, good and bad, to a proper regula-

* *Theognis* ſay of Juſtice,

Ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετή ἐστιν.

tion, and one ſtandard rule. Not only ſuch as are voluntarily entered into by conſent of parties, as contracts, loans, mortgages, and the like; but ſuch as men are driven to by revenge, or ſome unwarrantable habit, either ſecretly, as thefts, aſſaſſinations, poiſonings, treaſons, and falſe teſtimonies; or openly with a high hand, as robberies, aſſaults, diſfigurations, murders, and the like outrages upon human nature.

Ul. It is true; and therefore Juſtice has alone been ſtiled the complete virtue†; for whereas the reſt have only a tendency to make the perſon poſſeſſed of it happy in himſelf, this has a more extenſive influence, and conſiders the publick welfare.

Steer. This is the point then on which I ſhall reſt my argument; if there be no ſuch thing as pure ſincere Juſtice among you, neither, by conſequence, can there be any other real true virtue, as amongſt us, and therefore our ſtate is more deſirable.

Ul. Your concluſion is very natural and eaſy, the only difficulty that remains is to prove it.

† *Hierocles* ſays, that Juſtice is the moſt perfect of all Virtues, and that like the octave in muſick, which contains all the notes, it includes all the other virtues. So Mr. *Dacier* tranſlates διὰ πασῶν ἀρετῶν περιεκτικῆς τῶν ἄλλων; for which ſenſe he ſays he is indebted to the learned Dr. *Salviati*.

Steer.

Steer. Will not the concluſion be eſtabliſhed, upon a proof of the propoſitions that infer it?

Ul. That is a ſtroke of logick that I little expected.

Steer. I wonder why; ſince you know I was a *Greek*, and muſt be acquainted with it, in the courſe of our education.

Ul. I grant it, I allow it.

Steer. The major propoſition of the two, I have already ſufficiently proved, as you granted, that where there was no Juſtice there could be no Virtue, ſince you allow it to be the complete Virtue, as containing all the reſt in itſelf.

Ul. With all my heart. Go on to your minor propoſition.

Steer. This is as clear as the light, if the received maxim of your learned men be true, that every creature is known by it's actions. Which, if applied to men, will abundantly make out my aſſertion.

Ul. If men did all act in one uniform manner, I own there would be ſomething in it.

Steer. But the actions of the majority are ſufficient to juſtify an inference. Now, if there was ſuch a thing as natural Juſtice among you, and Man lived according to a law written in his heart, what occaſion would there be for ſuch a voluminous collection of

Statutes, to catch the flies at leaſt, though the heavier brutes break through them?

Ul. It muſt be confeſſed, that if each would follow the law that Nature dictates, of doing what in the ſame circumſtances he would deſire ſhould be done to himſelf, there could be no want of any other rule; though, to ſay the truth, they ſeem to be interpretations and comments on the natural Law, and as far as any of them deviate from the original they are faulty. For as in ſpeculation there are ſome truths ſo evident that they need no proof, ſuch as, that the ſame thing can be and not be at the ſame time, and other truths again ſpring from, and are founded on this: So in practical life, there are certain lights and natural principles ſelf-evident, ſuch as, you ſhould not do what you would not have done to yourſelf; upon which all the ſuperſtructure of written Laws depend.

Steer. Now to me they ſeem rather calculated to interpret this natural Law according to your own ſenſe, that it may be turned and twiſted at your pleaſure, till that appears to be right in words which is moſt unjuſt in fact. And I fancy your experience will agree with mine, that that Lawyer will always be eſteemed the moſt able in his profeſſion, who can beſt make the Law ſpeak as he would have it.

Ul. I

Ul. I muſt caution you to confine yourſelf to the intention and ſpirit of the Laws, and not to the abuſe of them; and then let us ſee if you will be able from thence to defend what you at firſt advanced, that there is no ſuch thing as Juſtice to be found among men.

Steer. You muſt know then, that Juſtice divides itſelf naturally into the diſtributive and the commutative. The firſt relates to rewards and puniſhments, in providing that the Good be properly rewarded, and the Bad duly corrected. The ſecond provides for an equitable intercourſe, and juſt commerce of things neceſſary to the benefit of mankind, eſtabliſhing a fair method of dealing, by which alone peace can be preſerved in civil life. Now if theſe two parts of Juſtice cannot be found among you, neither can the whole, which is never any thing elſe but the aggregate of it's parts.

Ul. But what proves that neither of theſe parts of Juſtice, according to your diviſion, is to be found amongſt us?

Steer. Your own experience, unleſs you ſuffer yourſelf to be quite blinded by prejudice. To begin with the firſt, what pretenſions have you to an impartial equitable diſtribution of rewards and puniſhments, according to the merit of the parties, when one

ſees Virtue ſo often treated with contempt, or perſecuted with malice?

Ul. One would hardly believe, that there could be any motive for doing violence to the Good and Innocent.

Steer. I can tell you of one; that a good man is a ſtanding reproach to a villain, who, by having ſuch a compariſon at hand, ſees his own corrupt actions ſet in a ſtronger light. Caſt your eyes upon what form of government you pleaſe in *Greece*, either that by one, by few, or by all, and I will anſwer for it, you will be furniſhed with variety of examples, where through intereſt, envy, or ſome other ſcandalous motive, the ſelf-ſame action has been rewarded in one, and cenſured, or perhaps puniſhed, in another; and ſo the reverſe.

Ul. But granting all this; How does our want of juſtice prove that you abound with it? Or how does it appear that you have any?

Steer. From our actions, as far as our circumſtances will admit. When did you ever ſee in our combats, the applauſe beſtowed but on the conqueror, whilſt diſgrace always purſues the unworthy?

Ul. Theſe may be well-known truths among yourſelves, for aught I know; ſo I ſhall not diſpute them with you; but haſten to the ſecond branch, and ſee how much com-

commutative Juſtice is to be found among brutes.

Steer. I can readily tell you; juſt as much as is to be found among men, that is, not one ſingle grain of it: Only with this difference, that we, by having every thing in common, as having no occaſion for this virtue, have never cultivated it: But you, where every thing is cantoned out into property, and cannot poſſibly ſubſiſt without it, have, through your inſatiable avarice, and luſt after riches, quite baniſhed it from the world. So that in all your contracts and tranſactions, your ſole care is to get, no matter by what means, or at whoſe expence. And he that ſucceeds beſt, by the vile arts of fraud and falſhood, is ſure to have his addreſs in buſineſs highly applauded: Which ſeems to me to juſtify the practice.

Ul. Oh fie! what juſtify diſhoneſty?

Steer. Why not, when it is the ſure road with you to honour? How many wretches could I name (whoſe mean natural abilities would mark them out in low life for contempt) in ſuch high eſteem, merely from the advantages of fortune, as to have every folly extolled, and each inſipid ſentence liſtened to with admiration? Nay your common proverbs, in every body's mouth, ſeem calculated to countenance and propagate the notions, baſe as they are, of the merit of riches, and the

the crime of being poor. And yet I fancy when theſe great men, that have had their thoughts ſo debaſed, and quite immerſed in the deſire of riches, come to part with this world, they can give no more account of it than if they had never been in it. Having neither examined their own nature, or obſerved the beauties that are every where diſplayed to them through the univerſe. For them the beauteous ſtructure of the world was made in vain, and all things might as well have continued in the confuſion of the firſt chaos: their eyes were ſo conſtantly turned down upon their darling treaſure, as never to be caſt up towards heaven, to contemplate the wonderful appearance of ſuch immenſe orbs, rolling round them in perpetual harmony. And yet theſe are but the degrees and ſcale by which their thoughts ſhould mount up to more amazing and more divine ſpeculations. And what aggravates the caſe is, that even with ſuch wretches the poor man is ſo deſpiſed, that his natural advantages are of no more account than the ſtrength of a ſlave, or the venal beauty of a common proſtitute.

Ul. It will be of no ſervice to the argument, to ſhew that there are irregularities in the actions of men, ſince I readily grant, they are ſo often drawn aſide from their duty to do what in cool diſpaſſionate thoughts they abhor.

abhor. But then this is ſo far from proving that there is no ſuch thing as Juſtice amongſt us, that I could at the ſame time tire you with examples, of many that would ſcorn, upon any conſideration, to violate the leaſt of her ſacred laws. Much leſs will thoſe actions of yours demonſtrate that you have juſtice among you, though ſome of them may appear under the form of it.

Steer. That's very hard, if it be true that every creature is to be judged of by it's actions.

Ul. Not in the leaſt, becauſe they are in you no more than certain habits, from propenſions implanted in you by Nature; who being conſcious, that ſhe had not given you light ſufficient to guide you to your happineſs, ſupplied you with theſe unerring rules. But be ingenuous, do you really know ſtrictly what Juſtice is?

Steer. It is an uniform and conſtant will, that renders to every one what is due and fit for him. This is the uſual definition, and I deſire to know if you have any exception to it?

Ul. I have not, if by will you mean a habit confirmed by repeated acts. For a perſon is not to be denominated juſt from one or a few acts, but from the whole or general tenour of them.

Steer.

Steer. I underſtand ſo; having always eſteemed powers not yet exerted into acts, to be ſo imperfect as not to deſerve notice.

Ul. Your own account therefore demonſtrates, that there can be no Juſtice found among you, becauſe you cannot be ſaid to have a will, which is the ſubject on which it is originally founded. Now the will being a rational faculty, is only to be found in rational creatures.

Steer. Why can it not be found in the ſenſitive appetite, which we have in common with you?

Ul. Becauſe the will is under the influence of the underſtanding, which influence conſtitutes the will, and juſtice is the regulation of it's operative part. Now this faculty does not only take cognizance of things [for that ſenſe can do] but their relations alſo, by which it can aſſign what is proper to one and what to another, which is more than mere ſenſe can do.

Steer. If you won't allow it to be Juſtice, pray what is it that ſo reſtrains our appetite in what belongs to another, that our conduct is much leſs blameable that way than yours?

Ul. I have told you; it is a principle impreſſed on you by Nature, for your preſervation, under which you act neceſſarily. And thoſe operations that proceed from mere Nature, no more deſerve praiſe or blame than the

the ſtone deſerves to be condemned for tending towards the center, or the fire to be praiſed for it's aſpiring quality. As to what you ſay of your acting freely (for I verily believe you ſeem to yourſelves to have your appetite free) I anſwer, that granting as much as you deſire, yet you cannot pretend, that you know perfectly and diſtinctly what you do; and conſequently ſuch actions can never be called good and perfect, of which the actor himſelf hath not a clear diſtinct knowledge.

Steer. Theſe are refinements and ſubtleties invented by yourſelves, to gratify your pride of being ſuperior to your fellow creatures. But whoever ſhall judge by your actions, muſt conclude, that if you have any Juſtice among you, it is only in words, which cannot be ſaid of us, who have not the art to expreſs to another the contrary of what we feel within ourſelves.

Ul. Let us diſcourſe a little more diſtinctly upon this virtue, according to your definition, which is certainly a very juſt one, and it will ſet your miſtake in a clearer light. For if Juſtice conſiſts in rendring to all their due, ſhe muſt render to the immortal Gods the adoration which is ſo much their right. And this either is a part of, or a diſtinct virtue ſo intimately joined and connected with Juſtice, that

that it is from thence by us called Religion *. Now how is it poſſible that you can have this virtue, either entire or in part, who know nothing of the Gods, nor have any thoughts or belief of their exiſtence? For having not the uſe of reaſon to weigh the properties of motion, and the nature of accidents, as they cannot ſubſiſt of themſelves, but in another, you could never attain to the knowledge of a firſt mover, or an independent ſubſtance.

Steer. That is more than I know; this I am ſure of, that there are amongſt us who pay their reverence each morning to the riſing ſun, acknowledging him to be the great Miniſter of Nature. And amongſt the birds, as ſoon as he breaks out above our horizon, there are thoſe that turn towards him, and ſalute him with a ſong. Nay, there are even plants that ſeem to adore him, by always unfolding their leaves, and turning their flowers towards him.

Ul. This proceeds not from any knowledge of him as a divine creature, but from the joy and comfort they perceive in his light and heat. And that they might enjoy the more of it, they look towards him, and ſo expreſs the complacency they feel by ſome ſigns of joy. Let us proceed to the other branch of Juſtice, by which we return to our country and our parents what is due to them,

* From *religare*, to bind hard.

called

called Piety. I ſhall not deſcant upon the duties to our country, though they are not leſs obligatory than thoſe to our *natural Parents* *, becauſe you cannot be concluded under them; for by having no property, you can have no country or ſettled habitation. And then as to your parents, what tribute of ſervice or gratitude are you capable of paying to thoſe, whom you do not ſo much as know, after you come to maturity enough to live without their care?

Steer. To obviate the charge, I produce to you the Stork †, who, when his aged parents are diſabled from flying, ſtirs not from the neſt, but nurſes and cheriſhes them with his blood, and as their feathers drop off, ſupplies them with his own, to defend their nakedneſs from the cold.

Ul. An argument from a ſingle ſpecies will prove but little. And perhaps the ſtork does this more to ſerve himſelf than his father or mother: For being of a cold nature, and eſpecially after one of his large meals of watry food, he thruſts himſelf in between them

* *Plato in Critone inquit,* τιμιωτέραν μητρὸς καὶ πατρὸς. *In majore honore Patriam habendam, quam Matrem & Patrem. Cicero Patriam antiquiorem Parentem appellat, in Lib. de Repub. & Epiſt. ad Atticum.*

† *Petronius Arbiter vocat Ciconiam Pietaticultricem. Et in nummis Hadriani Ciconia eſt expreſſa cum inſcriptione,* PIETAS AUGUSTA.

Caſſiodorus Var. Ep. 14. *Lib.* 2. *ait, Ciconias plumis ſuis Genitorum membra frigida refovere.*

to

to partake of their warmth. There are beſides ſome duties to ſuperiors; to thoſe whoſe virtues entitle them to our reſpect, which we call Obedience and Reverence: Pray what footſteps or ſigns of this are to be traced out among you?

Steer. As we are all equal, I ſee no room for this mighty difference; though in kinds that ſtand in need of a leader you find it very remarkable, as amongſt the Cranes and Bees, who have a ſtrong ſenſe of loyalty to their reſpective Sovereigns.

Ul. If you would call it by it's right name, call it natural inclination. There is alſo a debt for favours reeeived, termed Gratitude; What place has that among you?

Steer. You will find us not only grateful to one another, but ſo far as even to enter into your ſervice, merely out of gratitude for our ſubſiſtence.

Ul. That is, you are very obſequious as long as you pleaſe, and when you are pleaſed to forget them, you return all favours received with your heels. I ſhall not trouble you with many queſtions concerning particular friendſhips (I mean not natural affections, which have nothing to do with juſtice) which have virtue for their foundation, and a free approbation of the mind for their ſupport: Nor concerning the tenderneſs and caution with which we ought to carry ourſelves toward thoſe that are by Fortune placed below us,

us, all which duties having a long deduction of arguments for their foundation, cannot be expected amongſt you, where no reaſon is. So that I hope by this time you are convinced, what unreaſonable prejudices your ignorance had poſſeſſed you with againſt us.

Steer. Wether I am convinced or no, I find myſelf ſilenced, which I muſt impute to your great ſkill and practice in managing an argument. But if theſe are prejudices, they are ſuch as I fear I ſhall never be able to get rid of, as they grew up with me from experience, and ſenſitive knowledge, which I ſhall always think the moſt certain. Nevertheleſs I return you all the thanks due to good intentions, and ſo ſhall beg leave to retire, and continue as I am.

CIRCE.

Tranſlated from the *Italian* of

JOHN BAPTIST GELLI, *&c.*

DIALOGUE X.

Ulyſſes *and the Elephant.*

Ulyſſes ſolus. AFTER all it is ſtrange, that among ſo many *Greeks*, changed into ſuch different animals in this iſland, I ſhould not find even one that will accept of my offer. So that if the ſaying in ſuch vogue with us in *Greece* were true, that what great numbers agree in cannot be falſe, one would from hence be apt to conclude, that the ſtate of animals void of reaſon was preferable to ours. But the obſervation, I fancy, holds good only in things relating to active life; for in things merely ſpeculative, I ſhould oppoſe to it that other general rule, *that we ſhould think with the few, though we ſpeak with the many*; whom I find always ſtigmatized with

with the character of unconſtant, fickle, various; and whatſoever elſe denotes inconſiderate and obſtinate. The only way then to reconcile theſe oppoſite aphoriſms (for I have a tender regard for every propoſition that is eſtabliſhed upon long experience) is to ſay, that the firſt relates to practice, the ſecond to theory. As, therefore, the knowledge of the dignity of human nature, and wherein conſiſts it's ſuperiority to animals without reaſon, is the object of theory, which alone examines truth, it is no wonder if the many fall into groſs miſtakes about it. I find then, I can hope for no ſucceſs this way; ſo am reſolved with my little crew, which *Circe* has already reſtored, and the bark now riding at anchor impatient for my return, to ſet ſail immediately for *Ithaca*. For if it is not in my power to ſerve them, I ought to put it out of theirs to diſſerve me. A human creature amongſt brutes muſt live, like them, according to imagination and ſenſe: Whereas amongſt rational creatures, a life regulated by the rules of art and prudence will lead me inſenſibly towards perfection: Or rather, by proceeding daily from one degree of it to another, I ſhall arrive at a ſtate of happineſs and contentment.

Come on then, let us to the ſhore, and let wiſdom, as ſhe always ought, begin at home. But ſtay — what creature of immenſe ſize do I ſee ſtalking along the ſtrand?

Surely, unleſs the diſtance deceives me, it muſt be an Elephant. How aſtoniſhing is the variety that Nature exerciſes in the production of animals! I am ſo taken with his preſence, that I begin already to wiſh I may find him to have been a *Greek*. I will put the queſtion to him, and if he anſwers my expectation, it will give me a real pleaſure, to find my labour not altogether thrown away.—Tell me, Elephant, (if, as I think, thou waſt once a man) who thou waſt before thy change?

Elephant. A *Greek*——of the renowned city of *Athens*—in which I for many years gave myſelf up to the ſtudy of philoſophy. *Aglaophemus* was my name. But pray let me know why you aſk me? For this is agreeable to the character of a Philoſopher, who is ſuppoſed to be always inquiſitive into the cauſe of every appearance, and always deſirous of ſatisfying his thirſt after knowledge.

Ul. Thanks to the immortal Gods, that I have at length diſcovered a lover of truth, and one that is indeed worthy to be called a Man. Know then, *Aglaophemus*, that *Circe* has granted me the power of reſtoring to manhood every *Greek* transformed in this her iſland, but with this condition, that they themſelves are deſirous of it. Warmed with the deſire of delivering my countrymen from ſuch vile impriſonment, I have with great earneſtneſs urged my privilege with every one

that

that I met with; but have not been ſo happy as to light on one that would accept of my offer, or ſeemed at all ſenſible of the dignity of the human, or of the baſeneſs of their preſent condition.

Eleph. But whence do you collect, that you ſhall find me more agreeable to your ſcheme? Or what pretenſions have I above the reſt, to be thus emphatically ſtiled a Man?

Ul. From your profeſſion; which is deſirous of knowing the truth, and is indefatigable in it's reſearches after it. Whereas the others being either Farmers, Fiſhermen, Phyſicians, Lawyers, or Gentlemen, who always propoſe to themſelves either profit or pleaſure; and fancying that they find a higher enjoyment of ſenſual pleaſures in their preſent ſtate (though they may be greatly miſtaken) it is no wonder if they are fond of continuing as they are. But a Philoſopher, whoſe only aim is truth, muſt hold in low eſteem all the pleaſures of ſenſe, that he might arrive at that happineſs of mind that is his perfection. This is to act according to the human nature; and ſuch acts conſtitute the man. Whilſt he whoſe life is paſſed over in the gratifications of a beaſt, no more deſerves the name of a man, than what is void of heat merits to be called fire, or that to be called light where nothing is viſible.

Eleph. I muſt own myſelf to have been ſeverely attached to truth: It was the love of this that firſt put me upon the ſtudy of philoſophy, and after that moved me in queſt of it to leave my native country, and travel through the world; till at length arriving at this ſhore, I was changed by *Circe* into what you ſee me; which ſtate whether it be more eligible than yours I am not yet ſatisfied: However I ſhall not take your word for it; but proceed in the method of the Philoſophers, who though they won't embrace a propoſition without the reaſons for it, yet neither will they reject it, though it does not appear evident to them, unleſs it be contradictory to ſome known principle, and contains within itſelf ſome manifeſt abſurdity. For he that will not believe any thing can be but what he underſtands, will not be very likely to improve himſelf. So that I ſhall very patiently liſten to the reaſons you have to offer, why it will be ſo great an advantage to me to be reſtored to manhood. And if I find them as convincing as you ſeem to imagine, I will inſtantly diveſt myſelf of my preſent ſhape, reſume yours, and ſet ſail with you in tranſport for *Greece*.

Ul. And I, in return, give you my word of honour, that if you ſhall prove to me, that yours is preferable, I will immediately intreat the Goddeſs to transfom me into one of theſe beaſts, and paſs the reſt of my days here

here with you. So much am I taken with your engaging diſcourſe, and modeſt manner, ſo truly worthy of a follower of right reaſon.

Eleph. You engage for more than I ſhall inſiſt on, though you ſhould not prove your point. For I well remember, that in my own tranſmutation, I underwent ſuch a ſcene of fatigue and horror, that it is not a little advantage that ſhould make me ſubmit to another change myſelf, or deſire one in you, though I muſt own to you, I am not quite ſatisfied that my condition is altered for the better. But propoſe your arguments for the great excellency of your own ſtate, which urge you ſo ſtrongly to perſuade me to a change.

Ul. I ſhall; and in compliance to your education will proceed philoſophically. You know then, that though in Nature there is an almoſt infinite variety of creatures, there is not one that does not act in a manner proper and peculiar to itſelf. This ariſes from that form which conſtitutes it's particular being. So that till it ceaſes to be, it cannot ceaſe thus to act.

Eleph. True; elſe Nature would have made ſomething in vain; which is impoſſible.

Ul. You know alſo, that the nature and eſſence of agents is known by their operations. And that thoſe are eſteemed better, and more noble, whoſe actions are ſo; it be-

ing not given to man to know cauſes but by their effects.

Eleph. True; for to underſtand cauſes originally, and from thence to deduce their effects, ſeems to be reſerved only to the firſt Origin and Cauſe of every thing.

Ul. From hence you will clearly infer, that the nature of man is more perfect than that of the beaſts. For what do you take to be the diſtinguiſhing property of animals?

Eleph. I ſuppoſe ſenſe; becauſe to live, to grow, and to propagate it's kind, it has in common with vegetables. So that it is ſenſe alone that belongs to them as animals.

Ul. What do you underſtand by ſenſe?

Eleph. The knowledge of the nature of things, by the aſſiſtance of the ſenſes.

Ul. And in man what?

Eleph. I ſhould ſay the ſame; though I know that knowledge in man is called intellective, and in brutes ſenſitive. For neither can you know any thing but by the ſenſes.

Ul. It is neither true that it is the ſame thing, nor that we can have no notion of any thing but by the ſenſes. It being certain that the underſtanding can form within itſelf many things clearly intelligible, and make thoſe again productive of others, without the interpoſition of ſenſe. But then it muſt be granted, that the prime ſource of theſe images is from the ſenſes, and that

we

we underſtand nothing but whoſe origin is deducible from thence. And ſo far only the propoſition you advanced is true.

Eleph. Theſe are whimſies and extravagancies that are of no real advantage to the mind, but rather ſerve to miſlead and perplex it. Whereas we are humbly ſatisfied with knowing only things uſeful, neceſſary, or agreeable to us, and in theſe I don't ſuppoſe that our knowledge comes one jot ſhort of yours.

Ul. It no more becomes you to be poſitive in theſe things, than it does a blind man upon the ſubject of colours.

Eleph. But I ſhall prove what I ſay to you. Tell me, pray, is not the moſt certain knowledge the moſt perfect?

Ul. Yes.

Eleph. But the knowledge that comes by the ſenſes is the moſt certain.

Ul. Who taught you this?

Eleph. Myſelf: For whilſt I ſee that the leaves of the bay-tree oppoſite to us are green, if the united voice of all the world ſhould aſſert the contrary, I could not believe them.

Ul. And yet how could you be ſure that you are not miſtaken; or that they would not be in the right?

Eleph. How could I be more ſure of it than by ſeeing it?

Ul. By being certain beyond all doubt, that your eye could not be deceived; and

this you may be, by the aſſiſtance of the underſtanding; ſo that you are capable of being more ſure of it than by the bare ſenſe. And that this is ſo, give me leave to aſk you, do you ſee the ſun there? Well; and pray does it ſeem to move or not?

Eleph. It appears to me not to move.

Ul. What ſize does it ſeem to be of? and of what colour?

Eleph. As to it's ſize, I fancy it is near about ſuch a body as you yourſelf would make, if caſt into a ſpherical figure. And it ſeems to be near of the ſame colour with theſe oranges.

Ul. I deſire no ſtronger proof how much you may be miſtaken, in any repreſentation made by the ſenſes, unaſſiſted by the underſtanding. For of three things of which you was entirely ſatisfied, two of them are entirely falſe.

Eleph. Which two do you mean?

Ul. That the ſun is motionleſs, and no bigger than you deſcribe it. As to the rapidity of it's motion, it is agreed, that no ſenſible ſwiftneſs, not that of the moſt impetuous arrow upon the wing, can bear any proportion to it. For notwithſtanding it's immenſe diſtance, it is whirled by the motion of the higheſt heavens once every day round the earth*. The ſpace it runs through therefore daily, muſt as much exceed the cir-

* *That is, according to the Ptolemaic Syſtem.*

cum-

cumference of the earth, which is held to be more than two and twenty thouſand miles, as the ſun's diſtance from the centre of the earth exceeds the earth's † ſemidiameter. And as to it's magnitude, it is by calculation about one hundred and ſixty-five times bigger than the earth, which is well known to any body at all converſant in the mathematicks. Nor are we leſs certain of this, than you are that the bay-leaves are green: In which you are not miſtaken; but you have not the full proof that you are not, without the aid of reaſon.

Eleph. How ſo?

Ul. Becauſe it is by that alone we diſtinguiſh what is the proper object of one ſenſe, from what is common and perceptible by more. By this then it would be clear to you that you could not be deceived in the perception of the proper object, under the neceſſary circumſtances of a due diſtance, a ſuitable medium, and the like: And at the ſame time, how liable we are to errors, when we pronounce from one ſenſe, a judgment upon objects common to more. Thus under the requiſite conditions, you could not err in your judgment upon the green leaves; colour being the proper object of the eye: But when you came to ſpeak your ſenſe of the magnitude and motion of the ſun, you ſee how

† *Which at a medium between his greateſt and leaſt diſtance is,* 81,000,000 *of miles.*

you

you blundered, and that for the reaſon I told you. So little cauſe have you therefore to boaſt of the knowledge conveyed by the ſenſes, that without the aſſiſtance of the underſtanding, I will venture to affirm it to be the loweſt.

Ul. Pray are there then more ways of knowing?

Ul. The powers and faculties of perception are of three orders or degrees. The firſt is of thoſe pure immaterial intelligences, who are ſuppoſed to preſide over the †*motions of the heavenly bodies.* The proper objects of which (as their own eſſence ariſes not from any corporeal form, and is not dependent upon any modification of matter) are thoſe forms that are ſelf-ſubſiſtent, and independent upon matter. But if theſe take any cognizance of material forms, it muſt be by a reflexive act, from ſpecies within themſelves, or by actual intuition on the ‡ firſt Cauſe, which, as it produced all things, muſt contain them all in itſelf. The ſecond power is the reverſe of this; which, as it ariſes from a modification of body and organized matter, from which it is inſeparable, it can have only material forms for it's object, and thoſe only as they are actually inherent in matter. And becauſe matter is the

† The *Pythagoreans* taught, that God aſſigned to the inferior Gods, the different ſpheres of the heavens. See more of this in *Plato*'s *Timæus*.

‡ Πρῶτον αἴτιον. prin-

principle * of diviſion and diſtribution into particulars, it follows, that this power can only take in particulars, and this is what we call ſenſe. There is alſo a third power or faculty of perception, of a middle nature between theſe two, and that is the human underſtanding. Which being not the reſult of any material form, or dependent upon any ſtructure of organs, but a pure power of the ſoul, has not for it's object material forms, as they either are in, or depend upon matter, but ſo as ſhe may conſider them in their proper nature. Hence, when ſhe undertakes to examine them intimately, ſhe not only abſtracts and diveſts them of matter, but ſtrips them of all the qualities attendant on it. So that our underſtanding is as much ſuperior to ſenſe, as it is inferior to thoſe pure intelligences that I have been deſcribing.

Eleph. How does that appear?

Ul. Becauſe there is a greater certainty in it's knowledge. For as ſenſe only takes cognizance of particulars, and of matter, which are in a conſtant motion and variation, it can have no abſolute certainty of them. Becauſe in ſtrictneſs, even in the very article of judging, the ſcene has ſhifted and has undergone a change, and is not only altered, but very

* This is according to the *Pythagoric* ſchool, that the ὕλη being undeterminate as to any ſhape, is the cauſe of diviſibility. So *Simplicius* calls ὕλην διαιρέσεως αἰτίαν, the cauſe of diſtribution.

dif-

different from what it was when it was firſt taken into conſideration. Whereas our underſtanding, by ſtripping things of their ſenſible qualities to their bare eſſence; by dividing it's parts, and comparing what is eſſential and what is only adventitious to it, does acquire an indiſputable knowledge of it.

Eleph. How could you get any true knowledge this way of ſuch a creature, for example, as man, by conſidering him diveſted of matter, when he cannot exiſt without fleſh and bones?

Ul. You muſt know, that matter may be conſidered either in a general reſpect of all things, or elſe in a particular reſpect to the individual. The matter common to all men is fleſh, bones, and nerves; what is proper to this man, is this fleſh, theſe bones, and thoſe nerves. The particular is doomed to a perpetual change, and is ever drawing near to a diſſolution. The underſtanding conſiders man as a rational creature, compoſed of fleſh and bones, and mortal; in this univerſal way then He becomes unchangeable, and is therefore capable of being the object of certain knowledge.

Eleph. Well; and does not imagination do the ſame thing in us? For you muſt allow, that the pictures of things drawn on it are immaterial, which ſhe can afterwards diſtribute into ſuch diviſions or combinations as ſhe pleaſes.

Ul. It

Ul. It muſt be granted, that the imagination is ſo noble a faculty of the ſoul, that ſome have doubted if it be not the ſelf-ſame thing in us that is called the underſtanding. And thoſe that have not gone ſo far, have agreed at leaſt, that the underſtanding is imperfect without it. But this does not prove it not to be much inferior, and in truth her ſervant, to wait upon her in all operations. And this order is obſerved in all Nature, that every power * made for the ſervice of another is leſs perfect. Thus in yourſelves it is manifeſt, that the external ſenſes of hearing, ſeeing, and ſo forth, are leſs noble than the common ſenſory that takes them in all. So fancy, that is aſſiſtant to diſcernment, is of leſs account than her miſtreſs. In us it is ſtill more evident; for though fancy receives the images of objects immaterially, it comprehends them with the adjuncts of time, place, and the like, which are eſſential to matter as ſuch: And therefore it cannot ſtrip it of theſe circumſtances. But this is not the caſe with the human underſtanding, which can conſider things without quantity, time, place, change, or the like properties of matter; though it acquires this abſtracted knowledge, not from the things themſelves, but at ſecond hand, from their images painted on the imagination. Now though fancy in you can

* Τέλη πάντων ἐστὶν αἱρεσώτερα τῶν ὑφ' αὑτά. Vide *Ariſtot. Ethic.* Lib. I.

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compound or divide ſo far as from a horſe and a man to form a centaur; or can figure to itſelf a man deſtitute of hands or feet, yet it cannot ſeparate matter from form, or ſubſtance from it's accidents, or mix theſe, as our underſtanding can do. Becauſe you take theſe in by one ſingle act of ſenſation in the ſame ſubject. Beſides, this imagination of yours can repreſent nothing to itſelf, but what you have ſeen either in the whole or in it's parts.

Eleph. This is what I ſhall never grant, it being evident, that many things are the ſubject of our thoughts, which we never could ſee. When a ſheep flies from the wolf, is this from any averſion to his colour, or antipathy to his ſhape?

Ul. No.

Eleph. Why does ſhe ſhun him then?

Ul. Becauſe ſhe thinks him her enemy.

Eleph. And yet ſhe never ſaw ſuch a thing as enmity. Which I think is full to our point.

Ul. It is very true, that you are endued with a certain power, which we call ſagacity, that collects and draws from ſenſible objects, ſome intentions and properties that do not fall under the notice of the ſenſes. Such as when a bird ſees a ſtraw, ſhe ſuppoſes that it is proper to make her neſt, and accordingly carries it off for that purpoſe. Or when a ſheep ſeeing a wolf, takes him for an enemy, and ſo avoids him. Which actions cannot

cannot be imputed to the ſenſes, becauſe they come not under their cognizance. And this is the motive that prompts you to what you ought to ſeek or ſhun. Nevertheleſs it muſt be owned, that theſe intentions are very few in number, and only ſuch as are neceſſary to your preſervation, ſuch as relate to things hateful, grievous, delightful, profitable, injurious, and the like, which are obſervable in our children, before they come to the uſe of their reaſon, nay even in ideots. But the judgment in man diſcovers properties in things, not only neceſſary to his being, but to his more comfortable being in the world. Nor does it do this by natural inſtinct, as your ſheep, without any reflection, flies from the wolf, but acts by a chain of conſequences, founded upon a compariſon of one thing with another. This is called thought, and by ſome, particular reaſon, as it conſiders particlars in the ſame manner that the underſtanding does univerſals. Hence when a man ſpies a wolf, though he judges him to be no friend, yet he does not, like the ſheep, immediately and naturally ſpring from him; nay, if he ſees him ſafe muzzled, he is ſo far from being ſhocked at his approach, that he will out of curioſity make up towards him. But if he ſees him running furiouſly at him, lank with hunger, and open mouthed, he concludes that he means him no good, and ſo chooſes to keep out of the way. This account, I think, gives us fairly the ſuperiority.

Eleph. I muſt be ſo free with you as to own, that ſome things of what you have ſaid appear clearly intelligible to me, and others again leave me quite in the dark.

Ul. The fault is in your nature, which cannot raiſe itſelf up to ſuch truths. But embrace my offer, and be once more the moſt noble animal in the world, and you will underſtand it all.

Eleph. I ſhould be obliged to you, if you would point out in what this ſuper-excellency of manhood conſiſts.

Ul. You muſt know then, there are two faculties that diſtinguiſh man from the whole animal world, the Underſtanding and the Will.

Eleph. What mighty feats do theſe perform, to make them deſerve to be ſo much boaſted of?

Ul. Knowledge is the object of the firſt, love and hatred of the ſecond.

Eleph. As they are in us of ſenſe and appetite.

Ul. Only with this difference, that in you they go no farther than preſervation, but in us they extend to happineſs. Let us begin regularly with the Underſtanding; for a thing muſt be known before it can be deſired or diſliked. Now this is not confined to particulars, like ſenſe, which is her meaneſt attendant (and which by reaſon of the mutability of things, can never extract any fixed truth from them) but comprehends univerſals;

ſals; by forming an idea of many individuals contained under the ſame ſpecies, in which many individuals equally agree. And this knowledge it acquires after this manner: The fancy preſents to the Underſtanding the image or picture of one man, with all the circumſtances that accompany him as ſuch; in this place, at that time, under ſuch a form. And becauſe theſe conditions can only agree to this ſole individual, ſo far the Underſtanding has only knowledge of a particular. But if afterwards it reflects upon this image, and the ſpecies it belongs to, and then ſeparates them from theſe circumſtances, ſtripping it of all that related to it as a particular, and an individual, retaining only the human nature in it, it muſt form within itſelf an intellectual idea, productive of this univerſal knowledge, that human nature conſiſts of a corporeal ſubſtance, mortal and rational; and this is what all mankind equally agree in.

Eleph. I don't yet ſee what advantage this univerſal knowledge, by the Underſtanding, has over our particular knowledge, by the Senſes.

Ul. I will tell you; a demonſtration that what you know is certainly ſo, and cannot be otherwiſe, which is more than mere ſenſitive cognizance can pretend to. Becauſe he that ſhould find this man, and ſo on a ſecond, to be a rational creature, would have no proof that every man was ſo. Neither would he that ſhould ſee that a dog is endued with

ſenſe, or if you pleaſe a horſe, have any proof that all dogs, or all horſes, have this quality. But he that knows that man is nothing elſe but a rational creature, knows that every man is rational. And he that knows, that an animal is nothing but a body animated with a ſenſitive ſoul, muſt know that every dog and horſe, by being animals, muſt be endued with ſenſe. And what is more, he muſt be certain that what he knows, is, and muſt be infallibly ſo. Becauſe he reaſons from it's proper cauſe, as the being a man is the cauſe that every man is rational; and the being an animal is the occaſion in a dog and a horſe of their being ſenſible.

Eleph. Well, I muſt confeſs that I begin already to ſee, that your intellectual knowledge is more noble, becauſe more certain, than our ſenſitive.

Ul. Nay farther, our Underſtanding need not, like your ſenſes, take in the knowledge of things as they are complicated and intire, but can ſeparate the qualities and properties which compoſe them. Thus, for example, when it ſees a white object, it knows from itſelf what whiteneſs is; namely a colour ſtreaming upon the organ of ſight from the ſurface of ſome body. Whereas ſenſe can never diſtinguiſh white from a white body, comprehending under one and the ſame act, the ſubject, with it's form and accidents: Becauſe colour is not ſo much the object of the organ, as the thing coloured; as you may con-

convince yourſelf, by conſidering that you paſs not a judgment upon colours, but the thing coloured; and this every man, as well as you, does, that follows only the information of ſenſe.

Eleph. I grant that this knowledge is very clear and diſtinct.

Ul. Farther yet, our Underſtanding, in order to acquire a perfect knowledge of things, can compound or divide them, by way of affirmation or negation; which is above the ſphere of ſenſe. For by knowing that a ſubſtance receives and ſupports accidents, and that bodies ſuſtain colours, which are accidents, it compounds theſe two natures, and collects that body is a ſubſtance. Again, by being ſatisfied that ſubſtance is what ſubſiſts of itſelf, but that colour muſt ſubſiſt in another, what does it do but divide and ſeparate theſe two natures, by denying the one to be the other, which forms this propoſition, that colour is not a ſubſtance. And ſo on, by the help of many of theſe affirmations and negations, it comes at many truths that never could have fallen under the notice of ſenſe, and conſequently, muſt eſcape you. For though you avoid what offends you, this is not by reaſoning, in the way I have been deſcribing, which is above your capacity, but from the impulſe of appetite, which hurries you from it without any reflection.

Eleph. So far I underſtand alſo.

Ul. Nor is our Underſtanding bounded here; but by revolving and reviewing the ſeveral ſemblances and images of things depoſited by the ſenſes in the fancy, it extracts the knowledge of many things that could not fall under the notice, either of the external or internal ſenſes. For it is thus that it acquires a clear conception of univerſal natures, of ſeparate forms, and heavenly beings, nay as far as his nature will permit it, to reach even the knowledge of the Supreme Cauſe of all things. This is what imagination, ſagacity, or the higheſt faculty you can boaſt of, never can pretend to.

Eleph. And in what manner do you know this Supreme Cauſe?

Ul. Not only in a negative manner, as ſome have taught, but by ſuppoſing an Original Cauſe, and then denying it to be capable of any affections that imply defect, ſuch as we ſee are the properties of matter in corporeal creatures. Such a one then is unproduced, incorruptible, unchangeable, not contained in place, uncompounded, of unlimited duration, and the like. Nor have we an idea of him only by the means that others have aſſerted, by the way of ſuper-excellence, ſuch as that he excels in goodneſs, beauty, amiableneſs; all that in the univerſe is good, beautiful, and amiable. But man knows him by inſpecting himſelf, by conſidering that the excellence of his own nature conſiſts only in this,

this, that he *can reaſon upon all things* *, either thoſe below or ſuperior to himſelf, and can in ſome meaſure aſſimilate himſelf to them, and become what he pleaſes. A farther diſcovery that he makes is, by examining his own imperfections, that his knowledge in reſpect of all things is only potential and not actual, and therefore he is ignorant at one time of what he may know at another; from hence he forms the idea of an Intelligence of a more exalted and perfect kind than his own, always actual, comprehending all things that either are or have been from all eternity, and not capable of any new information, as containing within himſelf the ſpecies of whatſoever either has been or can be in the world. This is the Firſt Cauſe which, by governing all things from the beginning in ſuch wonderful order, muſt of neceſſity be an Intelligent Being, and for ever continue to be ſo, after one uniform manner of intellection.

Eleph. Oh! ſurprizing power of the human Underſtanding.

Ul. And it is the more ſo, by being conſcious that it does underſtand; which is above the reach of ſenſe. For though the eye takes in the rays of light, and the ear is affected by ſounds, yet the eye ſees not that it ſees, nor does the ear hear that it does ſo. For theſe powers being affixed to certain or-

* The original is, *intendendo tutte le coſe.*

gans of the body, cannot reflect and reaſon upon themſelves. Whereas the Underſtanding being a power ſpiritual and divine, may be turned in upon itſelf, and ſo diſcern both it's own faculties and their value, which is, let me tell you, it's peculiar privilege. Heaven itſelf, though of ſuch purity and honour, is inſenſible of it's own worth. And the ſun, the firſt miniſter of Nature, and ſource of light in heaven, feels not his own high ſtation. But man, who is acquainted with his own excellency, and ſuperiority over every other creature, whoſe end he ſeems to be (ſince by knowing their reſpective natures, he can employ them for his uſe) rejoices in himſelf, and feels a ſincere contentment and ſelf-complacency. And that he might be the better qualified for this, he is furniſhed with a faculty that treaſures up his notions, called intellectual memory, which as much excels yours, as it's objects are more noble.

Eleph. This makes a farther diſcovery of your happineſs.

Ul. Nay, what is more, Man has this property, that it is not in the power of his Underſtanding, to entertain a conceit ſo abſtruſe or ſublime, which, by the help of language, he cannot freely communicate. For we don't underſtand a voice, like you, only as a ſign and expreſſion of ſome common paſſion, ſuch as joy, grief, fear, and the like; but by the aſſiſtance of words, whoſe import we have agreed upon, we can

can deſcribe it juſt in the manner we would have it explained. It is by this canal that inſtruction is conveyed, and ignorance in one man is baniſhed by the ſkill of another. For though the more knowing cannot always from himſelf impreſs the very thought he would communicate to the ſcholar, yet by this means he can put him in a method to form it in his own mind. It was from obſerving this, that the old *Ægyptian* ſages broke out into ſuch extravagant raptures, as to call man the terreſtrial God, the heavenly Animal, Reſident of the Gods, Lord of all below, Favourite of all above, and in a word, the Miracle of Nature.

Eleph. Without doubt, ſo much perfection will require very pompous expreſſions to do it juſtice.

Ul. But there is yet another faculty, and that not a tittle ſhort of this in point of excellence, I mean the Will, by which we freely deſire or avoid what is judged right or wrong by the Underſtanding: As you fly or purſue what Senſe recommends or deters you from.

Eleph. Would not the appetite have been ſufficient for this, without the addition of a new power?

Ul. It evidently would not; becauſe appetite, under the influence of ſenſe, could only deſire or abhor what falls under the notice of ſenſe. Whereas the virtues or vices which attract our love, or cauſe our averſion, could

could never come under the cognizance of ſenſe. This then ennobles the man, by making him the free lord of all his actions; which ariſes from it's own freedom, not being determined by Nature more towards one extreme than the other. For though the object be good, it is no more conſtrained to the purſuit of it than of it's contrary. Whereas mere natural agents, being impelled towards their objects within a certain diſtance, muſt act as neceſſarily as the flame, which, within reach of combuſtible matter, cannot but ſet on fire. But in us the Will, though what is good and amiable be propoſed to it, and it be diſpoſed in ſome degree rather to purſue it, yet it is free from all force, either to chuſe or to reject it. Every other faculty in man, as an animal, owes it's ſubjection to this; for though each may be affected by it's object, without the conſent of the Will, yet it muſt be ſo as always to be under it's government, whenever it pleaſes to exert itſelf. Thus, though the ſight, when a viſible object be preſented to it, muſt be moved by it naturally, yet the Will can command it away, and turn it to ſome other; and ſo with the reſt of the ſenſes. And no object, nay no force on earth below, or heaven above, can conſtrain it to deſire what it diſlikes. The caſe is very different with the ſenſitive appetite; to which when an object is preſented which it deſires, the animal is hurried away ne-

neceſſarily and naturally to it, without any choice: As every obſerver muſt confeſs.

Eleph. Well, but after all where is the great dignity that this confers on human nature?

Ul. So great, that it was this alone made the old ſages pronounce him to be the miracle of Nature.

Eleph. Give me leave to aſk why?

Ul. Becauſe every other creature being under ſtated laws, by which it muſt attain the very end which Nature has preſcribed to it, and no other, it cannot ſuperſede thoſe directions: But man, by having his choice free, can obtain an end more or leſs worthy as he thinks fit, by letting himſelf down to creatures much below him, or by emulating thoſe as much above. He that elevates himſelf no higher than the earth on which he grows, will become a mere vegetable; and he that abandons himſelf to ſenſual pleaſures will degenerate into a brute. Whilſt he that looks with an eye of reaſon on the glories of the heavens, and contemplates the ſtupendous regularity of Nature, will change the earthly into a celeſtial creature; but he that dares ſoar above the groſs impediments of fleſh, to converſe with divine objects, will become little leſs than a God*. Who therefore

* The *Pythagoreans* propoſe the θείαν ὁμοίωσιν to their ſcholar, as the great incitement to virtue.

Hierocles, in his commentaries on the Golden Verſes, ſays, that they lead to the likeneſs with God, which is the aim of the *Pythagorean* Philoſophy.

fore can look without aſtoniſhment on man, not only the moſt noble, and the ſovereign over animals, but who has this peculiar privilege indulged him by Nature, that he may make himſelf what he will?

Eleph. How comes it to paſs then, if the Will has what is good for it's object, and it be unbiaſſed in it's choice, that you prefer oftner what is it's contrary, and fly from virtue to follow vice?

Ul. The reaſon of this appearance is, the intimate and wonderfully ſtrict attachment and combination it has with the ſenſes, and from the neceſſity the Underſtanding (whoſe light the Will follows) is under, of taking it's information from them, who often ſhew him an apparent for a real good: So that the Will being diverted and miſled by the one, which is impoſed upon by the miſrepreſentations of the other, it muſt be granted, if it does not purſue evil, yet it does not ſufficiently avoid it; nor does it exerciſe the ſovereignity it ought over the ſenſitive appetite. So that in truth, all our errors proceed from the irrational part of our nature, which we have in common with you, and not from what conſtitutes us men.

Eleph. No more, no more, *Ulyſſes*, every moment of delay hinders me from the happineſs I have already been too long deprived of. Let me inſtantly put off the Beaſt and reſume the Man.

Ulyſſes

Ulyſſes changes him. Which I here grant unto thee, by the authority to me committed.

Aglaophemus. Oh miraculous effect! oh happy change! more happy, from the experience I have had of both conditions. This breaks in upon me like a flood of light, upon a wretch long pent up in darkneſs; or like the pleaſures that a proſperous change affords one inured to miſery. How I pity the wretches who refuſed this offer, that they might wallow on in all the ſordid delights of ſenſe! Thanks to my benefactor, who by his wiſdom pointed out to me the truth, and by his eloquence warmed me in the purſuit of it. The Gods alone can render you a ſuitable reward, for the favours you have conferred upon me; whilſt I, in obedience to ſtrong natural impulſe, make them an humble offering of my thanks, tracing up the bleſſings that are beſtowed upon me, to the ſole Original Cauſe of all things, from whence they are derived, eſpecially this laſt, of knowing the imperfection of every other creature when compared with man. And becauſe the only return I am capable of making is gratitude, let me indulge it, till it kindles into ſome rhapſody ſacred to his praiſe. And do thou, *Ulyſſes*, whilſt thy heart burns with the ſame zeal, give devout attention to this holy hymn, which I dare dictate to the world.

I.

Silence ye winds, ye whisp'ring trees
Attend; let list'ning motion cease,
Whilst the First Mover of the world's great frame
Inspires the song. Hail ever sacred name!
Father, Maker, Source of all
That great, or wise, or good we call,
Whether on earth, where foul corruption reigns,
Or else above, in blissful azure plains,
Where substances divine, in purer day,
Flourish unchang'd, unconscious of decay.

II.

'Twas he that stretch'd the pendent earth,
Self-poiz'd amidst the concave skies,
He gives the gushing fountains birth,
And bids the healthful torrent rise.
'Twas he, whose bounty stor'd
For man, imperial lord,
With grim inhabitants the woods,
And peopl'd all the genial floods:
He first the soul enlighten'd from above,
And taught the heart to glow with holy love:
For him th'enlighten'd soul in rapture burns:
To him the glowing heart his love returns.

III.

Ye spirits pure, æthereal train,
You that reside in mystick cells,
In secret chambers of the brain,
Where mem'ry and invention dwells,

Powr's,

Pow'rs, virtues, potentates,
That round the throne of Reaſon ſtand,
Where free volition waits,
Proud to receive her Queen's command,
Sing the Firſt Cauſe; ye pow'rs, divinities,
Sing to your elder brothers of the ſkies,
Till echoing heav'n ſhall catch the ſong divine,
And all the world in one grand chorus join.

Ul. Let me trouble you but with this one queſtion more; Were you not conſcious of this knowledge of a Firſt Cauſe in your brutal capacity?

Agla. No, but inſtantaneouſly with my change I felt this light ſpringing up in the ſoul, as a property natural to it: Or rather I ſhould expreſs myſelf, that it ſeemed like a recovery in the memory of ideas it had been before acquainted with. But I have this advantage however from my experience, that by having a more perfect knowledge of the excellency of human nature, I draw this concluſion; that as man has been more beloved by the Supreme Cauſe, ſince he is more honoured than his fellow creatures, the end he ought to propoſe to himſelf, ſhould be very different from that of other animals, who, by being without reaſon, muſt be without the knowledge of a Firſt Cauſe.

Ul. Right; and to carry the thought yet higher, it cannot be but that if the knowledge of truth is the perfection of the human mind, and this cannot properly be ſaid

to

to be acquired here, whilſt we are in this mortal frame, ſtruggling under many obſtacles, which at beſt muſt ſoon end in death; it muſt follow, that when the ſoul is enlarged, and free from theſe impediments, this muſt be the ſubject of it's purſuit in ſome future ſtate, unleſs we will ſuppoſe Nature to have acted in vain. And though man in this preſent life cannot, like other animals, attain the end of his nature, and acquire the ſum of what he aims at, yet he may be ſaid to enjoy it in ſome degree, whilſt he keeps above the groſs pleaſures of ſenſe, and lives in a manner agreeable to a rational creature.

Agla. Let us fly then, my *Ulyſſes*, from this accurſed ſhore, where this falſe artful woman, with her vile ſorcery, makes men live like beaſts, not only in manners but in ſhape alſo. Let us, I ſay, quit this ſlavery to return to *Greece*, and to the full enjoyment of all the liberty of reaſon. Nor do thou dare truſt thyſelf again with the ſight of the foul inchantreſs, leſt by ſome new illuſion ſhe prevail with thee to remain in this unhappy land.

Ul. Come on then, it is my ſoul's deſire. And ſee! how the propitious Gods, ever favourable to thoſe who ſtrive to imitate them, have prevented our wiſhes, by ſending a gale inviting to our voyage.

FINIS.

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